Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey
The Chinese University of Hong Kong

RESEARCH REPORT ON PUBLIC OPINION DURING THE ANTI-EXTRADITION BILL (FUGITIVE OFFENDERS BILL) MOVEMENT IN HONG KONG

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

To understand public opinion on the unprecedented social movement aroused by the Fugitive Offenders Bill (commonly known in local and international media as the anti-extradition bill movement) (hereinafter referred to as "the Movement") in 2019, the Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey (CCPOS) at The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) was commissioned by The Independent Police Complaints Council (IPCC) to produce a research report based on the centre's existing on-site protest survey and telephone survey data, as well as an additional large-scale telephone survey, that look into Hong Kong people' views towards the Movement.

On-site Protest Surveys

Starting in June 2019, CCPOS coordinated a series of on-site protest surveys to examine the *views of the people who participated in the protests*. By December 2019, 26 on-site surveys were conducted on 17,233 respondents. The main findings are presented as follows:

Who Protests?

1. *Demographics*:
   - Across the 26 surveys, more male respondents (40.5% to 64.2%) than female respondents (34.4% to 59.5%) were surveyed.
   - Young people were the most active in the Movement, with the percentage of respondents below age 35 ranging from 41.6% to 93.8%.
   - The Movement's participants generally were highly educated, with most respondents (66.8% to 88.5%) having received a tertiary education.
   - Middle-class (41.9% to 64.9%) and lower-class (28.1% to 48.6%) protesters were the Movement's principal participants.

2. *Political orientation (Self-identified):*
    - Moderate democrats were the Movement's core participants. Throughout the Movement, they have accounted for roughly 30% to 40% of total respondents.
    - The second most prominent protest constituency comprised localists, at roughly 20% to 40% of the protester population throughout the Movement.

3. *Social movement experiences:*
    - Most participants in the Movement also participated in the 2014 Occupy Movement/Umbrella Movement, at roughly 50% to 70% across the surveys.
    - For roughly 10% to 30% of respondents, their participation in the Movement was the first time they ever participated in a protest.

Why Protest?

4. *Protest motivations:*
    - The top reasons that respondents cited for participating in the protests were to 'call for the withdrawal of the Fugitive Offenders Bill', 'express dissatisfaction with the police's handling of the protests', 'express dissatisfaction with police charging arrested protesters for rioting' and 'call for establishment of an independent commission of inquiry'. Roughly 80% to 90% of respondents viewed these causes as 'very important'.
    - In addition, 'strive for Hong Kong's democracy/dual universal suffrage' was another core demand of the Movement. Roughly 70% to 90% of respondents viewed this cause as 'very important'.
    - Fewer respondents (roughly 40% to 60%) suggested that a 'call for the resignation of Carrie Lam or major officials' was 'very important'.
    - Comparatively, respondents have attached more importance to political causes than economic ones in the Movement.

5. *Changes in movement demands:*

- Despite the government's announcement of a suspension of the bill on June 15, the Movement has continued to evolve. Most respondents agreed to shift demands to 'restart political reform' (59.8% to 73.7%) and 'focus on police brutality' (76.2% to 86.4%). Meanwhile, fewer respondents (35.3% to 46.4%) agreed to shift demands to 'focus on community issues'.

6. *Political slogans:*
   - 'No rioters, only tyranny' and 'Hong Kong police consciously violating the law' are the most representative slogans of the Movement. Roughly 90% of respondents said these two slogans were 'very representative'. These findings demonstrate public dissatisfaction with the government and police in the Movement.

How to Protest?

7. *Protest actions:*
   - The Movement has involved a variety of protest activities. The three most common protest actions were related to expressing opinions, which include 'join online petitions' (mostly around 80% to 90% of respondents have undertaken this action), 'share pro-movement promotional materials online' (roughly 70% to 80%) and 'express supportive opinions online' (also roughly 70% to 80%). In addition, roughly 60% to 70% of survey respondents indicated that they have expressed opinions on Lennon Walls. Comparatively, resource-oriented actions, such as donating money or resources, were less common.
   - Only a small portion of respondents (3.1% to 20.3%) have engaged in radical actions, such as 'standing on the frontlines to impede police actions'.
   - In the later stages of the Movement, most respondents also joined the following activities: boycotting pro-government shops; patronising pro-movement shops; singing protest songs in public; and joining labour strikes.

8. *Decentralised organising:*
    - Unlike previous large-scale social movements in Hong Kong, the Movement has been characterised as having no 'central stage'. More respondents viewed digital media platforms (i.e., social media and the online discussion forum LIHKG) (around 80% to 90%) as more important to the Movement than traditional social movement groups and political parties (around 60% to 70%).

9. *Digital media usage:*
    - Digital media have served as a vital hub of information circulation for protesters in the Movement. Respondents often have relied on online news media (over 80% to nearly 100%), Facebook (roughly 80% to 90%) and the online discussion forum LIHKG (roughly 50% to 90%) as sources of information about the Movement vs. traditional media (roughly 40% to 60%).
    - Digital media also have served as a platform through which people can participate in the Movement. In particular, respondents have often used different platforms such as Facebook, Telegram and LIHKG to distribute movement-related information and discuss movement issues.

Attitudes Towards Protests

10. *Radicalisation:*
    - As the Movement continued, protesters increasingly have believed in radical protests' efficacy. The percentage of respondents who agreed that 'radical protests could make the government heed public opinion' increased from 38.2% during the early stages of the Movement to over 60% during the later stages.
    - At the same time, protesters have become less worried about the backlash over radical protests. The percentage of respondents who agreed that 'radical protests could alienate the general public' decreased from roughly 50%-60% to roughly 30%.

- The overwhelming majority of protesters (mostly around 80% to 90%) held a positive view towards the synergy between the Movement's peaceful and radical camps.
- The protesters have become more sympathetic towards the use of radical tactics. While roughly 70% of respondents agreed that 'when the government fails to listen, the use of radical tactics by protesters is understandable' in mid-June, the percentage rose to over 90% since late July.

11. Persistence:

- When Hong Kong's government refused to make other concessions after suspending the Fugitive Offenders Bill, nearly all respondents (close to 100%) wanted to continue the Movement – either escalate protests or sustain the Movement's current form. Only a few percentages of respondents wanted to suspend the Movement.
- As the Movement continued, the police have stepped up their efforts to crack down on protesters. However, this strategy largely failed to dissolve the tensions and pacify the situation, and only served to energise the protesters. A very high percentage of respondents (72.6% to 80.4%) said that the police's repressive policing strategies actually would strengthen ('slightly increase' or 'hugely increase') their motivation to protest, while less than one-tenth of respondents (5.4% to 9.2%) said it would weaken their motivation.
- Another reason why the protesters have persisted for such a long time also could be because they feared the potential repercussions should the Movement fail. For example, 82.5% to 91.5% of respondents thought that if the Movement did not make further gains, it would be 'very possible' that the police would 'pose threats to Hong Kong people's daily lives', with 72.4% to 91.6% of respondents believing that the government would take 'mass-scale political revenge' against the protesters, 75.4% to 93.7% envisioning a 'significant erosion of political and civil liberties in Hong Kong', and 70.9% to 84.4% expecting that Beijing would 'actively interfere with Hong Kong's affairs'.

12. Solidarity:

- The overwhelming majority of respondents (roughly 90% or higher) agreed that the radical protesters either represented their views or else they identified with the radical protesters.
- Only roughly 30% of respondents agreed that while they identified with the radical protesters' goals, they disapproved of their radical tactics.

Telephone Surveys

The telephone surveys aim to examine *the general public's views* towards the Movement and related controversies. From May to October 2019, CCPOS conducted five waves of population telephone surveys with random sampling (target respondents being Hong Kong residents aged 15 or above) to gauge public views on the Fugitive Offenders Bill and the Movement. To continue monitoring public opinion, IPCC tasked CCPOS with conducting a more updated, large-scale survey. The commissioned random telephone survey was conducted from November 7 to December 13. A total of 2,008 Cantonese-speaking Hong Kong residents ages 15 and up were interviewed, with the principal survey findings presented below:

Views on Police

13. Trust in police:

- The six waves of telephone surveys have been keeping track of public trust in the police. As the Movement evolved, distrust in the police has continued to grow. On a scale of 0 to 10, the public trust score has dropped from 5.60 during the first wave to 2.60 during the fifth wave. The last wave has witnessed a bounce back to 2.85, which is still lower than the trust levels in earlier waves.
- In terms of percentage, the proportion of respondents who gave the police a 0 score in trust increased from 6.5% during the first wave to nearly 50% during the last three waves.

14. Satisfaction with police performance:

- Most respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the police's overall performance during the Movement (72.6%), specifically with how they handled fierce conflicts (70.6%), while fewer respondents (45.7%) expressed dissatisfaction with the police's performance in conducting daily functions unrelated to public events.
- The main reasons for respondents' satisfaction with the police's overall performance were that police 'maintain public safety and order/protect people's livelihoods' (33.1%) and 'have exercised restraint/their performance meets the standards' (32.8%).
- The top reasons for respondents' dissatisfaction with the police's overall performance entailed 'use of excessive force/too violent' (69.5%), 'abuse of power/violation of protocol' (13.2%), 'arbitrary arrest' (12.6%) and 'lying/poor response to public criticisms' (12.5%).

15. Acceptance of police actions:

- The public largely disagreed with many police actions against the Movement. On a scale of 0 to 10, the most acceptable action was 'arrest operations at protest scenes' (2.79), followed by 'performing searches and arrests on public transport' (2.68), 'dispersing protesters with tear gas, rubber bullets and pepper spray, etc.' (2.54), 'disguising as different identities at protest scenes' (2.33), 'dealing with journalists in conflict situations' (2.32) and 'handling conflicts between people with different political views' (2.19).
- The least-acceptable actions were 'non-disclosure of police identification numbers on uniforms' (1.78) and 'firing live rounds during confrontations' (1.66).

16. Changes in image of the police:

- After witnessing or experiencing how the police have been handling the protests for months, most respondents (68.8%) said that their image of police has worsened. Only 7.2% said that their image of police has improved. Roughly one-fifth (22.3%) said 'no change'.

- The 712 incident in Yuen Long (82.2%), the 831 incident at Prince Edward MTR station (49.8%) and the firing of live rounds at a protester on October 1 (38.3%) were key defining events that greatly have deteriorated respondents' image of the police.
- On the other hand, some respondents who had a better image of the police pointed out the police officers performed their job conscientiously and dutifully despite difficulties (67.6%). Moreover, they appreciated the police more because they had to endure insults from protesters (40.3%), as well as harassment and doxing of themselves and their families (38.5%).

Views on Protesters and the Movement

17. Support for the movement:

- After several months of conflicts, respondents were asked to express their attitudes towards the Movement in November and December. Over three-fifths of respondents (62.3%) said they supported the Movement, nearly one-fifth (18.0%) said they were against the Movement and nearly one-fifth (17.9%) indicated 'half-half' support.
- The main reasons that respondents cited for supporting the Movement were 'dissatisfied with Hong Kong SAR government or the central government' (33.5%), 'oppose the Fugitive Offenders Bill' (29.0%) and 'protect and strive for democracy, freedom, justice and rights' (28.0%).
- The main reasons that respondents cited for opposing the Movement were 'oppose protesters' damaging society or harming citizens' (46.2%) and 'oppose protesters' use of violence or illegal acts' (25.7%).
- Furthermore, given that Hong Kong SAR government already announced the withdrawal of the Fugitive Offenders Bill in September, most respondents (70.0%) still thought that the protesters should continue to strive to force the government to meet other demands. Roughly a quarter (24.4%) thought that the protesters should not continue.

18. Acceptance of protest actions:

- The general public largely disagreed with many radical actions that protesters undertook, though to a lesser extent than their disagreement with police actions. On a scale of 0 to 10, the most acceptable protest actions were 'non-cooperation movement, such as obstructing the operation of MTR and government departments' (5.20) and 'besieging and attacking government buildings, such as police stations and central government offices, etc.' (5.13).
- Other actions – such as 'occupying the airport' (4.73); 'vandalising specific stores' (4.57); 'use of weapons to attack police officers, such as steel pipes, slingshots, throwing bricks, etc.' (4.35); 'damaging MTR facilities and traffic lights, etc.' (4.26); and 'hurling petrol bombs at police officers or police stations' (4.16) – were viewed as less acceptable.
- The least-acceptable action was 'use of force during conflicts between people with different views' (3.92).

19. Views on protest radicalisation:

- Across the surveys, most respondents (66.8% to 82.9%) agreed that 'when participating in protests in Hong Kong, it is a must to uphold the peaceful and non-violent principle'.
- However, 55.7% to 68.4% of respondents also agreed that it was understandable for protesters to carry out radical actions when large-scale peaceful protests failed to make the government respond to demands.
- While respondents largely sympathised with the protesters' use of radical actions, public opinion was divided on radical protests' efficacy. While 37.7% of respondents agreed that radical protests could be more effective than peaceful protests, 33.5% disagreed with this notion, with 27.7% answering 'so-so'.

20. Changes in image of the movement:

- Over half the respondents (52.0%) said their image of the Movement has remained unchanged despite protesters' use of violence. Roughly 3-in-10 respondents (33.9%) provided a poorer evaluation of the

Movement, whereas roughly one-tenth (11.0%) provided a better evaluation.

- The protesters' use of force against people with opposing views during conflicts (52.7%), damaging MTR facilities and traffic lights (45.5%), arson (44.7%) and hurling petrol bombs (42.5%) were the top reasons that respondents cited for significantly undermining their image of the protesters.

Views on Escalation of Force

21. Views on use of force by police:

- Across the telephone surveys, roughly 70% of respondents (67.7% to 71.7%) agreed that the police have used excessive force in handling the protests, whereas roughly one-fifth (17.4% to 22.7%) disagreed.
- In the final wave of surveys, respondents who agreed that the police have used excessive force were asked whether they personally had experienced or witnessed any event involving the use of excessive police force: 67.5% of respondents said 'no', whereas 32.3% answered 'yes'.

22. Views on use of force by protesters:

- Fewer respondents thought that the protesters have used excessive force during the Movement. Across the telephone surveys, 32.8% to 41.4% agreed that the protesters have used excessive force, whereas 29.3% to 37.4% disagreed.

23. Accountability:

- Most respondents (50.5% to 58.9%) thought that the SAR government should be held mostly responsible for the escalation of violence, followed by the central government (17.8% to 23.8%), then Hong Kong police (18.1% to 22.5%). Roughly one-tenth of respondents thought that the protesters (9.6% to 12.7%) and foreign forces (9.4% to 11.6%) should be held accountable.

News Acquisition and Political Participation

24. News acquisition:

- Most respondents said that news coverage by traditional media (56.5%) and live media broadcasts (55.2%) were important channels for seeking information about the Movement. Over two-fifths (44.8%) mentioned text reporting by online media, followed by social media (29.2%), LIHKG (14.5%), information forwarded by family members or peers (10.4%) and Telegram (10.2%).
- Respondents were asked about their views on journalists' work in conflict situations during protests, most said that it was more important for journalists to record on-site situations (71.2%) than to refrain from obstructing police work (23.9%).

25. Political participation:

- Over half the respondents (52.6%) have participated in the Movement in one way or another. More than two-fifths of respondents (43.2%) have participated in anti-extradition bill protests or rallies. Roughly 3-in-10 respondents (32.5%) have provided assistance to protesters (such as donating money or resources, or offering free rides, etc.) and 'express feelings on Lennon Walls' (27.2%). Less than one-fifth (16.3%) have participated in besieging or occupying actions, or have provided on-site support. Only a small portion of respondents (4.1%) has participated in verbal or physical conflicts with police.
- The respondents who participated in the Movement cited the following main participatory reasons: 'express dissatisfaction with the government's handling of the Fugitive Offenders Bill controversies' (40.0%); 'express dissatisfaction with overall governance' (39.4%); 'strive to get the government to meet the demands' (39.2%); and 'support young protesters' (38.4%).
- Very few respondents (3.3%) have participated in pro-government/pro-police activities: 2.3% participated in pro-Fugitive Offenders Bill/pro-police protests or rallies; 0.8% participated in verbal or physical conflicts with protesters; and 0.6% joined activities to

express appreciation for police officers, such as donating money or sending them fruit baskets and other gifts.

2. INTRODUCTION

The Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill (referred to henceforth as the Fugitive Offenders Bill), proposed by the Hong Kong government in February 2019, has triggered a series of mass assemblies and demonstrations across the semi-autonomous territory since March (commonly known in local and international media as the anti-extradition bill movement) (hereinafter referred to as "the Movement"). The scale, intensity and longevity of this Movement have surpassed any of the city's previous protests.

In addition, the Movement is also known for its twists and turns over several months. Originally only aimed at opposing the Fugitive Offenders Bill, the Movement later evolved into a broader campaign that also has demanded political reform and has called for an independent investigation into conflicts and police actions.

To understand public opinion on the unprecedented movement, the Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey (CCPOS) at The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) was commissioned by The Independent Police Complaints Council (IPCC) to produce a research report, based on the centre's existing survey data and an additional large-scale opinion survey, to look into Hong Kong people's views on the Movement. Generally speaking, the centre has conducted two types of surveys in the past few months:

- **On-site protest surveys**. These surveys aim to examine the *views of people who participated in the protests*. Since the beginning of the Movement, a team of university researchers – led by Professor Francis L. F. Lee (School of Journalism and Communication, Chinese University of Hong Kong), Dr. Samson Yuen (Department of Political Science, Lingnan University), Dr. Gary Tang (Department of Social Science, Hang Seng University of Hong Kong) and Dr. Edmund W. Cheng (Department of Public Policy, City University of Hong Kong) – began a series of on-site

protest surveys. In mid-August, they published a preliminary report to provide an initial examination of the Movement's early stages (see https://sites.google.com/view/antielabsurvey-eng/intro). Based on the team's groundwork, the present commissioned task will update its research findings further, up to December, and provide a more tailor-made analysis to suit the IPCC's needs.

- **Telephone surveys**. These surveys aim to examine *the general public's views* towards the Movement and related controversies. From May to October 2019, CCPOS conducted a series of random population surveys to track public opinion on the Fugitive Offenders Bill and the Movement, especially views towards the protesters and police. To continue to monitor public opinion on the Movement, IPCC has tasked CCPOS with conducting an additional large-scale random survey in November and December to gauge public views towards the police and protesters.

This commissioned report has been produced independently by CCPOS as a vigorous academic work. CCPOS has upheld the highest standards of academic integrity and professional autonomy in designing, conducting and presenting the research. The report was mainly written in December 2019 and January 2020.

3. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The commissioned report aims to examine and document public opinion during the Movement. IPCC has set out the overarching objectives of the assignment as follows:

1) Identify attitudes (any changes if any) towards/amongst key stakeholders including views on the general protesters, protesters who took violent actions, the police, the local community etc.
2) Find out causes as well as aspirations for actions (violence) taken by the stakeholders (e.g. protesters) during the study period

CCPOS had conducted on-site protest surveys and telephone surveys and provided tailor-made analysis to address the two broad objectives outlined by IPCC. For the first objective, both the on-site protest surveys and telephone surveys aimed to identify attitudes towards the general protesters, protesters who took violent actions, the police, and the local community. While the on-site protest surveys focused on the attitudes of the protesters, the telephone surveys focused on the public attitudes. For the second objective, we mainly deployed the on-site protest surveys to find out the causes and aspirations for violent actions taken by protesters. In addition to identifying attitudes, both on-site and telephone surveys also contained certain questions to examine behaviours, including the protesters' actions and public participation in the Movement.

More specifically, the on-site protest surveys covered the following areas:

- To profile protesters' personal characteristics (**Section 5.1**)
- To present protesters' motivations and changes in movement demands (**Section 5.2**)
- To examine the ways in which protesters have been participating in the Movement (**Section 5.3**)
- To analyse protesters' views on certain key characteristics of the Movement: the use of radical actions; the Movement's persistence; and solidarity among protesters (**Section 5.4**)

The telephone surveys covered the following areas:

- To understand public attitudes towards policing by the Hong Kong Police Force (**Section 6.1**)
- To understand public attitudes towards the Movement (**Section 6.2**)
- To understand public attitudes towards the escalation of force on the part of the protesters and police (**Section 6.3**)
- To understand public participation in the Movement (**Section 6.4**)

4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1 On-site Protest Surveys

4.1.1 Survey Overview

By December 2019, we conducted 26 on-site protest surveys on the following dates: June 9, June 12, June 16, June 17, June 21, June 26, July 1, July 14, July 21, July 27, August 4 (two surveys), August 10, August 11, August 13, August 16, August 18, August 25, August 31, September 8, September 15, September 28, October 1, October 14, October 20 and December 8. A total of 17,233 respondents were interviewed.

Due to resource constraints and based on our judgement of the scale and importance of the protests, our surveys have not covered every protest event. However, they have covered most of the large-scale protests and rallies between June and December.

4.1.2 Types of Protests

The protests covered in this report can be categorised into three types. **Type I** comprises ***mass rallies*** that begin with protesters assembling at an assembly point before following a specific route to a designated destination. **Type II** comprises ***static demonstrations*** that entail protesters gathering at a specific location. **Type III** comprises ***fluid demonstrations***, in which protesters first gather at a specific location, then become more mobile and unpredictable, spontaneously moving to various locations like wildcat strikes. Table 1 summarises the basic information about each on-site protest survey.

Table 1. Overview of On-site Protest Surveys (June to December 2019)

Date of protest	**Location**	**Protest type**	**Sample size**				**Response rate**	**Standard error**
			Total	**Paper-based sample**	**Online-based sample (face-to-face)**	**Online-based sample (leaflet)**		
June 9	Victoria Park -- CGO	I	285	285	NA	NA	74.0%	5.8%
June 12	CGO	III	175	90	85	NA	NA	7.4%
June 16	Victoria Park -- CGO	I	875	610	265	NA	89.0%	3.3%
June 17	CGO, Police HQ and Revenue Tower	III	717	119	598	NA	91.5%	3.7%
June 21	CGO	III	316	132	184	NA	87.8%	5.5%
June 26	Edinburgh Place	II	418	254	164	NA	90.7%	4.8%
July 1	Victoria Park -- CGO	I	1,169	483	686	NA	83.1%	2.9%
July 14	Shatin	I	546	292	254	NA	87.8%	4.2%
July 21	Victoria Park -- Southern playground	I	680	405	275	NA	90.8%	3.8%
July 27	Yuen Long	I	235	NA	NA	235	13.1%	6.4%
August 4	Tseung Kwan O	I	717	142	64	511	85.6% / 17.0%	3.7%
August 4	Sai Wan	II	555	111	106	338	92.7% / 16.9%	4.2%
August 10	Airport	II	2,309	73	NA	2,236	NA	2.0%
August 11	Sham Shui Po	I	636	82	112	442	NA	3.9%
August 13	Airport	II	485	NA	NA	485	NA	4.5%
August 16	Chater Garden	II	632	NA	NA	632	15.8%	3.9%
August 18	Victoria Park	II	806	147	73	586	82.8% / 18.3%	3.5%
August 25	Kwai Fong -- Tsuen Wan	I	372	68	7	297	91.5% / 9.3%	5.1%
August 31	Central and Sheung Wan	III	527	NA	NA	527	13.2%	4.3%
September 8	Chater Garden -- US consulate	I	337	74	32	231	94.6% / 14.4%	5.3%
September 15	Causeway Bay, Wan Chai and Central	III	911	178	209	524	83.8% / 13.1%	3.3%
September 28	CGO	II	405	NA	NA	405	10.1%	4.9%
October 1	Causeway Bay, Wan Chai, Central and various districts	III	640	NA	NA	640	13.3%	3.9%
October 14	Chater Garden	II	662	NA	NA	662	16.6%	3.8%
October 20	Tsim Sha Tsui	III	921	NA	NA	921	19.2%	3.2%
December 8	Victoria Park – Chater Garden	I	902	156	144	602	88.0% / 15.1%	3.0%

Note:
(a) In the cells that contain two response rates, the former figure is the response rate of paper-based samples and online-based (face-to-face) samples, and the latter figure is the response rate of online-based (leaflet) samples.
(b) Four on-site protest surveys had no response rates. For the June 12 and August 11 surveys, response rates were not calculated due to the chaotic situations in the protests where interviewers were unable to accurately count the number of rejection cases. For the August 10 and August 13 surveys at airport, response rates also could not be calculated due to fieldwork obstacles.

4.1.3 Sampling Method

Following the well-established practice of on-site protest surveys in Hong Kong, we adopted systematic sampling to select respondents at protest sites. Generally, our interviewers were asked to invite every 10th protester they saw within a designated area/route to participate in the survey. If the invitation was turned down, they then would ask the next 10th person, etc. However, because each protest had unique spatial dynamics, it was necessary to make slight adjustments in the sampling. The protests can be categorised into three types, each entailing a different sampling arrangement.

- **Mass rallies (Type I)**: We first divide the area where the rally begins into different zones, and we also designate several destinations along the protest route. Each interviewer is assigned to a specific zone where he or she begins to conduct the survey. He or she is instructed to follow the protest crowd within the designated zone and walk until reaching his or her assigned destination. Along this route, the interviewer continues to conduct the survey following the sampling procedure.
- **Static demonstrations (Type II)**: We divide the area where the rally begins into different zones. Each interviewer is assigned to a specific zone where he or she walks roughly (in circles) to conduct the survey following the sampling procedure.
- **Fluid demonstrations (Type III)**: This method is similar to Type II, but because of these protests' fluidity, the fieldwork supervisor monitors the on-site situation and redeploys interviewers to different locations.

During each protest, the fieldwork team was led by two to three supervisors. The number of interviewers varied from 10 to 25, depending on the expected protest turnout. Interviewers were asked to switch on their live location function on WhatsApp so that their current locations could be monitored. This was to facilitate the redeployment of interviewers to new locations if needed. The interviewers could be recognised easily and identified, as all of them were required to carry an interviewer badge issued by the School of Journalism and Communication of CUHK.

4.1.4 Survey Administration Methods

From June to early August, the fieldwork team surveyed protest participants through two options: 1) an online-based questionnaire using QR codes or 2) a paper-based questionnaire. Interviewees usually were approached with the first option. If they accepted the survey request, they would scan a QR code presented by the interviewer using their own phones, then finish it on their own without any help from the interviewer. If they were interested in the survey, but declined the use of an online-based questionnaire, interviewees would be presented with the second option: the paper-based questionnaire. The interviewer would read out each question, then fill in the questionnaire together with the interviewee. This conventional face-to-face interview typically takes roughly 10 minutes. The interviewer recorded any rejections of both options (i.e., refusal to participate in the survey altogether).

The combination of the two survey options aims to strike a balance between getting a large-enough sample size and ensuring that the sample is representative of the protest participants. Using online-based questionnaires helps achieve the first objective. Given that protests usually were announced on short notice, the research team encountered difficulties in building a large team of interviewers to ensure a significant sample size. Therefore, an important task was to maximise the sample size, even with a small team of interviewers. Using online survey software, Qualtrics, the online-based questionnaires — which interviewees completed on their own — could reduce the time interviewers needed to solicit responses, thereby resulting in larger sample sizes.

However, online-based questionnaires have limitations. First, people who are less tech-savvy are more likely to decline the survey request. Even if they might have started the online survey with the help of interviewers, they are more likely to drop out during the process. Second, because protesting has become an increasingly risky activity in Hong Kong’s present political climate, some participants worried that filling out online questionnaires through their own mobile phones might elicit legal or political repercussions. These two limitations systematically may exclude a portion of protest participants, thereby

resulting in response biases. A final limitation is that online-based questionnaires hinge on having a dependable Internet connection. However, during large protests, Internet connections often become slow and unstable. Signals may jam, and authorities might interfere with service.

Therefore, we use face-to-face, paper-based questionnaires to circumvent these limitations. Paper-based questionnaires take substantially more time to complete, but the upside is that they will not exclude people who are not used to technology, or who are worried about the risk of leaving digital footprints. Obviously, Internet connection quality does not affect them. Thus, the use of paper-based questionnaires can ensure that at least a portion of the sample is representative of the protest participants, compared with the sample collected through the online-based survey.

All the protest events were surveyed using the aforementioned method, except the July 27 mass rally in Yuen Long, which was unique because it received a Letter of Objection from the police, making the protest 'illegal'. The protest also took place a week after thugs dressed in white shirts, who widely were suspected of being triad members, launched an indiscriminate attack against citizens in the Yuen Long MTR station. Because of concerns over safety (especially with rumours that the white-shirt thugs might appear again), we decided to change our survey approach from face-to-face surveys to post-hoc surveys. We dispatched four veteran helpers to distribute 1,800 leaflets containing a QR code that was linked to an online survey. The response rate, as expected, was much lower than the previous approach, but we still were able to collect roughly 235 responses (13% response rate) by noon the next day.

We later learned that the leaflet-surveying method was effective in reducing selection bias caused by helpers when they select interviewees because distributed leaflets may reach more protesters and avoid systematically excluding certain types of protesters. As a result, we combined this approach with our standard approach at the Tseung Kwan O rally and the Sai Wan demonstration on August 4. The results showed that using leaflets significantly can increase the sample size. To be sure, this method did have certain obvious

limitations: It does not have a vigorous sampling procedure, and the response rate depends entirely on protesters' willingness to participate in the survey. Another problem with this method is that some passionate protesters may spread the leaflets to people who did not participate in the protests. To solve this problem, we added a screening question in the survey to identify eligible target respondents (which mainly asked respondents to indicate the exact time and place of their protest participation). Also, we set a time limit for the survey, usually 24 hours after the protest ended.

Throughout August and September, we largely combined the three survey methods to conduct the fieldwork, but in October, the situation changed. Police started to object to mass assemblies more frequently, so we shifted to a leaflet-only surveying method due to safety concerns.

Finally, one important point to acknowledge is that despite proper sampling procedures, a potential limitation exists tied to our recruitment of survey respondents, in that our surveys may have excluded militant protesters who were on the protest frontlines. This is especially plausible in fluid demonstrations, which often involved violent confrontations with police. To protect interviewers' safety, we advised them not to conduct surveys on the frontlines, thereby undermining their chances of interviewing militant protesters. For example, in the June 21 survey, although we asked the interviewers to conduct interviews outside Police Headquarters (at that time surrounded by protesters), the interviewers probably could not reach these protesters, who stood closest to the front door of the police station. Moreover, militant protesters often were tense and dressed in protective gear. Thus, they were less likely to accept survey requests compared with 'ordinary' protesters. As a result, militant protesters were likely to be somewhat under-represented in our samples.

4.1.5 Weighting

Interviewers were tasked with entering data from completed questionnaires through the online system within two days after a protest. All collected data through the leaflet method would be ready one to two days after the protest. The dataset would be cleaned before any analysis.

Table 1 provides a breakdown of sample sizes recruited through the three survey methods. Generally, we found that interviewees who completed the online-based questionnaires were younger and more educated -- an indication of technology's exclusionary impact. If such differences between the sub-samples are statistically significant, we would weigh the sample based on the data collected through the paper-based questionnaires, which is more likely to be representative of the protester population, to mitigate response bias.

4.1.6 Questionnaire Design

When designing the questionnaire, we tried to maintain a sense of consistency to render the survey data comparable across all surveys spanning about six months of data collection. Across the 26 surveys, some common sets of questions were used that enabled tracking changes to protesters' profiles, attitudes and behaviours as the Movement evolved.

However, we also were mindful of the need for flexibility in questionnaire design. As the Movement progressed, the question list always had to be revised accordingly to keep abreast of the latest developments. Therefore, each survey may contain some idiosyncratic sets of questions that helped capture that particular protest's uniqueness. Nevertheless, as this report's goal is to depict an overall picture of the Movement, we mainly have drawn on the core common questions for analysis.

4.2 Telephone Surveys

4.2.1 Survey Overview

From May to October 2019, CCPOS conducted five waves of population telephone surveys to gauge public views on the Fugitive Offenders Bill and the Movement (see Table 2). The target respondents were Hong Kong residents ages 15 and up (Cantonese speakers). The sample sizes ranged from roughly 600 to 1,000, and the response rates were 40% or above. The sampling errors were no more than ± 4.0%.

Table 2. Overview of different waves of telephone surveys

	First wave (May 23 – June 5)	Second wave (June 17 – June 20)	Third wave (August 7 – August 13)	Fourth wave (September 5 – September 11)	Fifth wave (October 8 – October 14)	Sixth wave (November 7 – December 13)
Target respondents	Hong Kong residents ages 15 and up (Cantonese speakers)					
Sample size	1,048	635	842	623	751	2,008
Response rate	40%	43%	46%	41%	44%	43%
Sampling error	Within ± 3.0%	Within ± 3.9%	Within ± 3.4%	Within ± 3.9%	Within ± 3.6%	Within ±2.2%

Note: The calculation of response rate is based on APPOR's RR3.

To continue monitoring public opinion, IPCC tasked CCPOS with conducting a more updated, large-scale survey. The commissioned telephone survey was conducted from November 7 to December 13. A total of 2,008 Cantonese-speaking Hong Kong residents ages 15 and up were interviewed (see the demographic distribution in the Appendix, Section 8.2.3). The response rate was 43% (see the calculation in the Appendix, Section 8.2.1). At a confidence level of 95%, the sampling error was within ±2.2%.

All our telephone surveys were conducted by interviewers using a computer-assisted telephone interview (CATI) system. Random sampling was used to select target respondents. The survey was conducted in a mixed landline telephone and mobile phone mode. Telephone numbers assigned to telecommunication services providers were obtained from the Numbering Plan provided by the Office of the Communications Authority (OFCA). When conducting the telephone survey, the telephone numbers were selected

randomly from this database. For the landline telephone survey, after making successful telephone contact with a household, if there was more than one resident at home who was eligible for an interview, we employed the 'Next Birthday Rule' method, in which the eligible member whose birthday would come soonest was chosen. For the mobile phone survey, those who answered the call would be asked to indicate their eligibility, then were invited for an interview.

To ensure sample representativeness, the obtained sample data were weighted based on three demographic variables (age, gender and education) in accordance with the latest population data released by the Census and Statistics Department, HKSAR Government.

4.2.2 Quality Control Measures

All CCPOS' telephone interviewers, who mainly are university students, are well-trained and highly capable of conducting telephone interviews in Cantonese. To become our interviewers, the students had to go through two rounds of training sessions. First, they attended a 90-minute training session to learn basic knowledge about public opinion surveys and special techniques and the proper demeanour needed to do telephone interviews. Second, before any fieldwork, they received an intensive briefing to study the survey questionnaire thoroughly. The two rounds of training ensured that the interviewing process was implemented at a high quality level.

To control for fieldwork quality, our CATI system allowed fieldwork supervisors to perform real-time monitoring of the interviews, i.e., the supervisor could listen to conversations between interviewers and interviewees. At the same time, the supervisors also could monitor the interviewers' computer stations to check data-input accuracy.

4.2.3 Questionnaire Design

The commissioned survey used several themes, including public views on the police and on protesters, media consumption habits and political participation. The questionnaire was designed and structured accordingly (see the questionnaire in the Appendix, Section 8.2.2).

Some of the questions were tracking questions that we use in previous waves of the survey. These tracking questions allow us to do longitudinal public-opinion comparisons in different time frames throughout the Movement.

To test the reliability and validity of the questionnaire in the commissioned survey, a pilot study of 50 cases was conducted before formal data collection began. Some minor revisions were made afterward to finalise the questionnaire.

4.3 Supplementary Digital Data

To aid our interpretation of the survey data, we used digital methods to gather some online data as a supplement. Web data extraction and keyword searches were performed on LIHKG, a main discussion and organising platform heavily used by protesters in the Movement, to chart and identify some prominent online narratives about the Movement from early June to mid-October. The keyword data could be treated informally as 'online public opinion', which will provide additional insights on protesters and the general public's thoughts during different stages of the Movement.

4.4 Data Reporting

All reported data in the report are data after weighting (if applicable). Not all percentage data will add up to 100% due to rounding and weighting. In addition, the percentages of the answer choices in multiple-response questions will not add up to 100% because respondents were allowed to choose more than one answer choice.

For clarity, individual percentages sometimes may be grouped for analysis (e.g., the grouping of 'somewhat agree' and 'strongly agree' into the broadly-defined 'agree'). In some situations, the summation of individual percentages may not match the combined figure, also due to rounding.

The report's main body mostly will highlight and discuss key survey findings. Full statistical results are attached in the Appendix section.

5. ON-SITE PROTEST SURVEYS

5.1 Who Protests?

5.1.1 Demographics

Gender

Across the 26 on-site protest surveys, the percentage of male respondents, ranging from 40.5% to 64.2%, generally was higher than that of females, which ranged from 34.4% to 59.5% (see Table 3). While there were more male respondents than female respondents from early June to mid-August, the gender composition has become more even since mid-August onward.

Table 3. Respondents' gender composition

Date of Protest	Male	Female	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
June 9	64.2%	34.4%	1.4%	100% (285)
June 12	53.8%	46.2%	0.0%	100% (175)
June 16	50.5%	49.5%	0.0%	100% (875)
June 17	50.5%	49.5%	0.0%	100% (717)
June 21	56.4%	43.6%	0.0%	100% (316)
June 26	42.6%	57.4%	0.0%	100% (418)
July 1	53.0%	47.0%	0.0%	100% (1,169)
July 14	56.8%	43.2%	0.0%	100% (546)
July 21	51.7%	48.3%	0.0%	100% (680)
July 27	56.6%	43.4%	0.0%	100% (235)
August 4 (TKO)	61.0%	39.0%	0.0%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	54.1%	45.9%	0.0%	100% (555)
August 10	40.5%	59.5%	0.0%	100% (2,309)
August 11	58.5%	41.5%	0.0%	100% (636)
August 13	49.3%	50.7%	0.0%	100% (485)
August 16	56.2%	43.8%	0.0%	100% (632)
August 18	46.0%	54.0%	0.0%	100% (806)
August 25	51.6%	48.4%	0.0%	100% (372)
August 31	51.4%	48.6%	0.0%	100% (527)
September 8	47.8%	52.2%	0.0%	100% (337)
September 15	51.0%	49.0%	0.0%	100% (911)
September 28	51.1%	48.9%	0.0%	100% (405)
October 1	55.3%	44.7%	0.0%	100% (640)
October 14	47.0%	53.0%	0.0%	100% (662)
October 20	48.2%	51.8%	0.0%	100% (921)
December 8	51.4%	48.6%	0.0%	100% (902)

Age

Our data have supported the widely held perception that young people were the major force in the Movement. Although it is a community-wide movement, most of our survey respondents were young people. Across the 26 surveys, the percentage of respondents below age 35 ranged from 41.6% to a staggering 93.8% (over 60% in most of the surveys) (see Table 4). Middle-age respondents (ages 35-49) comprised 5.2% to 33.9% of the sample. The more senior respondents (ages 50 and up) accounted for a smaller portion of the sample (no more than 30% in any survey).

Table 4. Respondents' age composition

Date of protest	34 or below	35-49	50 or above	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
June 9	51.2%	16.5%	28.4%	3.9%	100% (285)
June 12	87.5%	8.9%	2.5%	1.1%	100% (175)
June 16	63.0%	18.6%	18.3%	0.1%	100% (875)
June 17	85.7%	8.3%	5.2%	0.9%	100% (717)
June 21	93.8%	5.2%	0.0%	1.0%	100% (316)
June 26	88.5%	8.4%	1.9%	1.2%	100% (418)
July 1	60.9%	18.4%	19.5%	1.3%	100% (1,169)
July 14	62.0%	18.9%	17.7%	1.4%	100% (546)
July 21	63.3%	14.3%	19.9%	2.6%	100% (680)
July 27	69.8%	22.1%	7.2%	0.9%	100% (235)
August 4 (TKO)	67.4%	19.3%	13.3%	0.0%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	68.3%	15.9%	15.7%	0.1%	100% (555)
August 10	77.6%	15.8%	6.2%	0.4%	100% (2,309)
August 11	68.0%	14.6%	17.0%	0.4%	100% (636)
August 13	85.4%	12.2%	2.5%	0.0%	100% (485)
August 16	85.4%	9.5%	4.3%	0.8%	100% (632)
August 18	74.8%	12.3%	12.3%	0.6%	100% (806)
August 25	72.6%	14.0%	13.4%	0.0%	100% (372)
August 31	75.1%	17.3%	7.6%	0.0%	100% (527)
September 8	65.9%	19.0%	12.5%	2.7%	100% (337)
September 15	69.8%	17.3%	11.5%	2.3%	100% (911)
September 28	52.3%	28.9%	18.8%	0.0%	100% (405)
October 1	41.6%	33.9%	24.2%	0.3%	100% (640)
October 14	63.1%	24.5%	11.9%	0.5%	100% (662)
October 20	57.3%	26.5%	16.2%	0.0%	100% (921)
December 8	71.0%	15.8%	12.9%	0.4%	100% (902)

A further age breakdown of the young protesters illustrates that the 20-24 and 25-29 age groups were the most active (see Table 5). The proportions of the former group ranged from 9.4% to 54.2%, but most were roughly 20% to 30%, whereas the latter group's proportions ranged from 11.6% to 34.2%, but most were roughly 10% to 20%. Participation by respondents under age 20 also was

notable, accounting for a few percentages to over one-fifth (22.5%) of the protester population throughout the Movement.

Table 5. Proportion of younger respondents (below age 35)

Date of protest	19 or below	20-24	25-29	30-34
June 9	10.5%	20.7%	11.6%	8.4%
June 12	6.3%	27.9%	34.2%	19.0%
June 16	15.6%	16.3%	18.3%	12.9%
June 17	15.5%	33.0%	25.8%	11.4%
June 21	14.6%	54.2%	16.4%	8.6%
June 26	11.2%	40.9%	23.7%	12.7%
July 1	12.9%	18.6%	18.3%	11.0%
July 14	7.3%	23.9%	18.5%	12.3%
July 21	11.9%	23.3%	17.5%	10.6%
July 27	6.0%	26.0%	19.6%	18.3%
August 4 (TKO)	8.6%	27.9%	20.5%	10.5%
August 4 (SW)	6.8%	28.7%	21.4%	11.4%
August 10	11.0%	25.8%	26.5%	14.2%
August 11	13.4%	20.6%	24.3%	9.7%
August 13	22.5%	34.4%	18.8%	9.7%
August 16	10.1%	36.4%	25.0%	13.9%
August 18	8.2%	25.5%	27.9%	13.1%
August 25	11.0%	25.3%	22.0%	14.2%
August 31	16.1%	29.6%	19.7%	9.7%
September 8	3.3%	29.4%	21.4%	11.9%
September 15	10.1%	26.6%	19.8%	12.4%
September 28	5.2%	17.3%	16.0%	13.8%
October 1	3.3%	9.4%	14.7%	14.2%
October 14	6.5%	21.6%	19.5%	15.6%
October 20	7.3%	18.3%	16.6%	15.1%
December 8	16.5%	22.2%	22.2%	10.0%

Education level

Survey respondents' education level generally was high. Table 6 shows that across the 26 surveys, an overwhelming majority of respondents (ranging from 66.8% to 88.5%) reported having received a tertiary education. Specifically, in more than half the surveys, over 80% of respondents indicated that they have received a tertiary education. Much fewer respondents (ranging from 10.5% to 31.0%) cited their highest educational attainment as secondary school. In addition, only a very small numbers of respondents (no more than 4.0%) cited an education level of primary school or below.

Table 6. Respondents' education level

Date of Protest	Primary or below	Secondary	Tertiary or above	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
June 9	2.8%	25.6%	70.5%	1.1%	100% (285)

June 12	0.0%	13.8%	86.3%	0.0%	100% (175)
June 16	1.4%	30.3%	68.2%	0.1%	100% (875)
June 17	0.0%	15.8%	84.1%	0.1%	100% (717)
June 21	0.9%	17.9%	81.2%	0.0%	100% (316)
June 26	0.2%	10.5%	88.5%	0.7%	100% (418)
July 1	1.6%	28.3%	70.0%	0.0%	100% (1,169)
July 14	2.3%	29.2%	68.6%	0.0%	100% (546)
July 21	1.6%	28.9%	69.4%	0.2%	100% (680)
July 27	0.4%	12.8%	86.4%	0.4%	100% (235)
August 4 (TKO)	0.2%	22.8%	76.8%	0.2%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	0.8%	21.3%	77.8%	0.1%	100% (555)
August 10	0.2%	17.3%	82.1%	0.3%	100% (2,309)
August 11	1.8%	31.0%	66.8%	0.4%	100% (636)
August 13	0.0%	20.8%	79.0%	0.2%	100% (485)
August 16	0.2%	11.6%	87.7%	0.6%	100% (632)
August 18	0.4%	20.4%	79.0%	0.3%	100% (806)
August 25	0.0%	20.4%	79.6%	0.0%	100% (372)
August 31	0.0%	14.6%	85.4%	0.0%	100% (527)
September 8	0.3%	13.9%	85.5%	0.3%	100% (337)
September 15	0.2%	16.1%	83.2%	0.4%	100% (911)
September 28	0.5%	16.0%	83.5%	0.0%	100% (405)
October 1	0.2%	15.5%	84.2%	0.2%	100% (640)
October 14	0.5%	14.4%	85.2%	0.0%	100% (662)
October 20	0.0%	16.4%	83.5%	0.1%	100% (921)
December 8	0.7%	30.9%	68.1%	0.3%	100% (902)

Socioeconomic status

As survey respondents usually are reluctant to reveal information about their incomes, we asked them to self-report their families' socioeconomic status instead. The answer options are 'upper-class', 'middle-class' and 'lower-class'.

Across the 26 surveys, only a minimal number of respondents (less than 2%) identified themselves as upper-class (see Table 7). Generally speaking, middle-class and lower-class protesters comprised the principal participants of the Movement. More specifically, more middle-class than lower-class respondents participated. Throughout the Movement, 41.9% to 64.9% of respondents identified themselves as middle-class, whereas 28.1% to 48.6% identified themselves as lower-class.

Table 7. Respondents' socioeconomic status

Date of Protest	Upper class	Middle class	Lower class	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
June 9	1.8%	64.9%	28.1%	5.3%	100% (285)
June 12	0.0%	43.1%	48.6%	8.3%	100% (175)
June 16	0.5%	55.2%	42.5%	1.8%	100% (875)

June 17	0.6%	41.9%	46.0%	11.4%	100% (717)
June 21	1.2%	42.9%	48.4%	7.4%	100% (316)
June 26	1.0%	41.9%	46.4%	10.8%	100% (418)
July 1	0.7%	52.1%	38.4%	8.8%	100% (1,169)
July 14	1.0%	46.9%	45.0%	7.1%	100% (546)
July 21	1.1%	48.4%	42.9%	7.5%	100% (680)
July 27	0.9%	50.6%	40.0%	8.5%	100% (235)
August 4 (TKO)	0.7%	54.0%	37.3%	8.0%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	0.3%	58.8%	33.2%	7.7%	100% (555)
August 10	0.5%	47.8%	41.6%	10.1%	100% (2,309)
August 11	0.7%	43.8%	46.5%	9.0%	100% (636)
August 13	0.8%	43.5%	43.5%	12.2%	100% (485)
August 16	1.1%	46.5%	45.1%	7.3%	100% (632)
August 18	0.8%	47.8%	41.4%	9.9%	100% (806)
August 25	0.8%	50.5%	39.2%	9.4%	100% (372)
August 31	0.9%	48.8%	42.9%	7.4%	100% (527)
September 8	0.3%	46.9%	40.7%	12.2%	100% (337)
September 15	0.7%	46.2%	41.5%	11.6%	100% (911)
September 28	0.7%	54.1%	34.6%	10.6%	100% (405)
October 1	0.6%	62.0%	30.6%	6.7%	100% (640)
October 14	0.8%	48.5%	44.0%	6.8%	100% (662)
October 20	0.3%	59.9%	34.2%	5.5%	100% (921)
December 8	0.7%	50.9%	38.5%	9.8%	100% (902)

5.1.2 Political Orientation

Respondents were asked to indicate their political orientation from a range of options. For presentational clarity, we grouped the answering categories into: 'pro-establishment'; 'moderate democrat'; 'radical democrat'; 'localist'; 'centrist'; 'no political affiliation'; and 'other'. The findings are illustrated in Table 8.

Generally, moderate democrats comprised the Movement's core participants. Throughout the Movement, they have accounted for roughly 30% to 40% of total respondents.

After moderate democrats, localists comprised the second most prominent protest constituency. Localists can be defined broadly as people who not only support democracy, but also stress protecting Hong Kong's local interests *vis-à-vis* mainland China. Except for the August 16 protest (which reported an exceptionally high volume of localist involvement, at 52.5%), localists comprised roughly 20% to 40% of the protester population throughout the Movement.

Across the 26 surveys, we have seen a gradual increase in the proportion of respondents identifying themselves as radical democrats, rising from 3.2% on June 9 to 7.5% on June 17. Thereafter, the proportion plateaued at a steady level in July and early August, then rose to roughly 10% around mid-August, then 15.5% in December.

Conversely, the proportion of centrists and people with no political affiliation has dropped over this same period. During the Movement's early stages, the proportion was roughly 20%, except for the June 12 assembly, when it rose to 38.9%. However, the number of centrists/no political affiliation has declined over time as the Movement continued. In September and October, fewer than 10% of respondents were centrists/no political affiliation. The percentage sank to its lowest level, at 4.9%, in December. This drop in proportions of centrists/no political affiliation may be the result of two developments: It could

reflect a decline in centrists'/non-affiliated citizens' participation level in the Movement, but it also could be the result of protest participants shifting their self-reported political affiliation from 'centrist/no political affiliation' to other categories over time.

Some respondents (0.8% to 12.6%) chose 'other' as their political affiliation, and even fewer respondents cited affiliation with the pro-establishment camp. Pro-establishment supporters accounted for no more than 1% of respondents across all surveys, which is understandable considering that the Movement has been an oppositional movement challenging government authorities.

Table 8. Respondents' political orientation

Date of protest	Pro-establishment	Moderate democrat	Radical democrat	Localist	Centrist/No political affiliation	Other	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
June 9	0.4%	43.2%	3.2%	27.0%	21.1%	NA	5.3%	100% (285)
June 12	0.0%	29.5%	2.1%	25.4%	38.9%	4.0%	0.0%	100% (175)
June 16	0.4%	41.1%	3.4%	18.0%	21.3%	12.6%	3.2%	100% (875)
June 17	0.4%	31.6%	7.5%	26.0%	21.2%	4.5%	8.8%	100% (717)
June 21	0.0%	29.8%	7.8%	28.6%	21.1%	3.0%	9.6%	100% (316)
June 26	0.5%	27.8%	8.4%	40.2%	12.0%	2.6%	8.6%	100% (418)
July 1	0.2%	43.0%	6.6%	24.5%	18.6%	1.6%	5.5%	100% (1,169)
July 14	0.0%	38.9%	9.7%	28.0%	14.6%	1.5%	7.3%	100% (546)
July 21	0.3%	44.9%	7.1%	27.0%	13.4%	1.2%	6.1%	100% (680)
July 27	0.0%	34.9%	8.5%	37.4%	8.9%	3.0%	7.2%	100% (235)
August 4 (TKO)	0.2%	38.2%	7.6%	35.1%	10.9%	3.1%	4.9%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	0.2%	35.1%	9.4%	39.5%	9.5%	0.8%	5.5%	100% (555)
August 10	0.2%	39.1%	7.7%	31.8%	11.5%	2.6%	7.2%	100% (2,309)
August 11	0.2%	32.3%	10.4%	37.0%	10.7%	2.7%	6.8%	100% (636)
August 13	0.0%	40.8%	9.7%	31.1%	10.7%	1.6%	6.0%	100% (485)
August 16	0.3%	25.8%	8.7%	52.5%	5.7%	2.7%	4.3%	100% (632)
August 18	0.0%	42.7%	7.7%	30.9%	12.0%	1.5%	5.2%	100% (806)
August 25	0.0%	34.1%	9.4%	36.6%	9.1%	1.9%	8.9%	100% (372)
August 31	0.0%	33.6%	9.9%	38.3%	9.9%	1.1%	7.2%	100% (527)
September 8	0.3%	34.7%	9.8%	39.2%	7.4%	3.3%	5.3%	100% (337)
September 15	0.0%	36.9%	11.2%	36.9%	7.2%	2.0%	5.8%	100% (911)
September 28	0.0%	41.5%	10.9%	37.5%	5.9%	1.5%	2.7%	100% (405)
October 1	0.2%	48.8%	9.2%	31.3%	6.3%	1.9%	2.5%	100% (640)
October 14	0.3%	35.2%	12.2%	38.7%	5.4%	1.4%	6.8%	100% (662)
October 20	0.1%	43.6%	11.5%	31.7%	5.8%	1.4%	5.9%	100% (921)
December 8	0.0%	33.7%	15.5%	38.2%	4.9%	1.0%	6.8%	100% (902)

Note: The 'Other' category was not included in the June 9 survey.

5.1.3 Social Movement Experiences

In recent years, Hong Kong has experienced several large-scale social movements, such as the anti-national education movement in 2012 and the Occupy Movement/Umbrella Movement in 2014. Participants in the current Movement also may have participated in these previous movements. With these two questions — (1) Would previous protest experiences affect participants in this Movement? (2) How many of the participants actually were 'amateurs' who had no prior protest experience? — in mind, the surveys asked respondents to indicate whether they participated in the Occupy Movement/Umbrella Movement in 2014 and when they joined a protest for the first time.

Table 9. Participatory experience in the Occupy Movement/Umbrella Movement

Date of protest	Yes	No/Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
June 9	61.8%	38.2%	100% (285)
June 12	76.6%	23.4%	100% (175)
June 16	44.3%	55.7%	100% (875)
June 17	72.5%	27.5%	100% (717)
June 21	64.0%	36.0%	100% (316)
June 26	72.7%	27.3%	100% (418)
July 1	55.3%	44.7%	100% (1,169)
July 14	59.3%	40.7%	100% (546)
July 21	52.9%	47.1%	100% (680)
July 27	67.2%	32.8%	100% (235)
August 4 (TKO)	57.8%	42.2%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	60.2%	39.8%	100% (555)
August 10	61.9%	38.1%	100% (2,309)
August 11	60.6%	39.4%	100% (636)
August 13	57.5%	42.5%	100% (485)
August 16	70.9%	29.1%	100% (632)
August 18	59.3%	40.7%	100% (806)
August 25	64.8%	35.2%	100% (372)
August 31	62.6%	37.4%	100% (527)
September 28	70.4%	29.6%	100% (405)
October 1	63.1%	36.9%	100% (640)
October 14	65.6%	34.4%	100% (662)
October 20	58.7%	41.3%	100% (921)
December 8	54.0%	46.0%	100% (902)

Question: Did you participate in the Occupy Movement/Umbrella Movement of 2014?

Table 9 shows that most participants in the Movement also participated in the 2014 Occupy Movement/Umbrella Movement. Except for the June 16 protest, the proportion of respondents who had such experience totalled above 50% in all other surveys.

To investigate participants' protest-participation history further, respondents also were asked to indicate the first-ever protest in which they participated. The answer options included the annual 'June Fourth vigil commemoration', the annual 'July 1 rally', the 'July 1 rally of 2019', the 'anti-XRL movement of 2009-2010', the 'anti-national education movement in 2012', the 'Occupy Movement/Umbrella Movement in 2014', the ''Liberation' protests in 2015', the 'Mong Kok unrest in 2016' and the 'anti-extradition bill movement in 2019'.

As shown in Table 10, the June Fourth vigil commemoration was the first protest experience for 15.4% to 33.3% of respondents. The Occupy/ Umbrella Movement's importance was similar to that of June Fourth, cited as the first protest experience for 17.0% to 28.5% of respondents. The anti-national education movement of 2012 and the annual July 1 rally were the first protest experiences for 4.2% to 11.7% and 11.1% to 20.4% of respondents, respectively. Notably, a considerable portion of respondents did not participate in any social movements prior to the Movement. In our on-site surveys, these respondents accounted for 12.7% to 28.6% of respondents.

Table 10. Respondents' first protest experiences

Date of protest	June Fourth commemoration	July 1 rally	July 1 rally 2019	Anti-XRL movement 2009-2010	Anti-national education movement 2012	Umbrella Movement 2014	'Liberation' protests in different districts in HK 2015	Mong Kok unrest 2016	Anti-extradition bill movement 2019	Other	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
June 12	25.2%	16.5%	NA	0.6%	8.0%	28.5%	0.5%	0.0%	14.6%	2.1%	4.1%	100% (175)
June 17	29.3%	12.1%	NA	1.3%	9.2%	23.9%	0.1%	0.1%	13.9%	7.6%	2.6%	100% (717)
June 21	25.4%	11.1%	NA	0.9%	9.3%	25.3%	0.0%	0.0%	22.5%	3.5%	2.0%	100% (316)
June 26	20.8%	17.7%	NA	2.4%	11.7%	25.8%	0.2%	0.2%	14.1%	5.5%	1.4%	100% (418)
July 1	23.8%	18.5%	5.8%	1.4%	5.9%	17.0%	0.1%	0.1%	19.7%	5.6%	2.1%	100% (1,169)
July 14	30.2%	20.4%	NA	1.2%	7.1%	17.8%	0.1%	0.2%	12.7%	8.6%	1.7%	100% (546)
September 28	31.6%	15.8%	0.0%	0.5%	7.4%	19.8%	0.0%	0.5%	16.0%	6.9%	1.5%	100% (405)
October 1	33.3%	20.2%	0.0%	1.1%	4.2%	13.6%	0.2%	0.0%	17.7%	7.3%	2.5%	100% (640)
October 14	23.6%	15.4%	0.0%	0.5%	8.2%	23.9%	0.0%	0.2%	19.6%	6.9%	1.8%	100% (662)
October 20	24.3%	16.9%	0.0%	0.9%	4.9%	20.0%	0.1%	0.1%	22.7%	7.2%	2.9%	100% (921)
December 8	15.4%	13.5%	NA	1.1%	6.6%	26.8%	0.5%	0.2%	28.6%	4.2%	3.1%	100% (902)

Question: 'What was your first experience with protest participation?'

5.2 Why Protest?

5.2.1 Protest Motivations

One of the main foci of the on-site protest surveys is to determine why people participated in the Movement. In the surveys, we asked respondents to rate the importance of different motivations that propelled them to join the protests on a five-point Likert scale, from 'not important at all' to 'very important'. Not surprisingly, respondents tended to agree with most of the motivations specified in the questionnaire. Therefore, to obtain a better understanding of the relative importance of various motivations, Table 11 presents the percentages of respondents who chose the 'very important' option.

Among all motivations, 'call for the withdrawal of the Fugitive Offenders Bill' always has been one of the most important reasons that respondents cited for participating in the protests. The percentage of respondents who viewed it as 'very important' ranged from 85.1% to 94.8% between June and August. Thus, despite the fact that the government repeatedly stated that the bill was 'suspended' or 'dead', the protesters' demand that the bill be completely withdrawn remained strong until the SAR government announced the withdrawal of the bill in September.

Concern over police conduct has been a recurring issue in the Movement. Many participants were compelled to join the protests to voice their criticisms against the police. Our survey found that 'express dissatisfaction with the police's handling of the protests' (84.6% to 98.3%), 'express dissatisfaction with police charging arrested protesters for rioting' (88.4% to 91.0%) and 'call for establishment of an independent commission of inquiry' (81.0% to 94.9%) were all viewed as very important protest motivations by an overwhelming majority of respondents.

'Strive for Hong Kong's democracy/dual universal suffrage' was one of the Movement's core demands. The percentage of respondents who viewed this cause as 'very important' has increased over time. While in early and mid-July,

82.5% and 74.9% of respondents viewed this cause as 'very important', respectively, the percentage rose to roughly 90% by December.

Our early surveys also included other items, such as 'raise international attention' and 'call for the withdrawal of the "riot" characterisation of the June 12 protest/or certain protests'. For the former, 74.8% to 79.6% of respondents viewed this motivation as 'very important' in June and early July. The percentage jumped to 91.4% on September 8 because of the nature of that protest event. On that day, protesters congregated in Central and marched toward the US consulate in Hong Kong to call for U.S. support for the Movement. Overall, it showed that respondents believed that gaining attention, or even support, from the world would be important to the Movement. For the latter, over 80% of respondents consistently viewed this motivation as important during July and August. The percentage dropped to 73.9% in September, but bounced back to 82.7% in December.

Finally, among all major motivations, a 'call for the resignation of Carrie Lam or major officials' was a relatively less-important incentive for people to join the protests. Across the surveys from June to December, 40.4% to 65.3% of respondents viewed it as 'very important'.

As protesters' demands and the political atmosphere have been changing since the beginning of large-scale protests in June, the list of protest motivations had to be updated to keep abreast of new developments. For October and December, we revised the questions and added some new items.

As shown in Table 12, among new protest motivations, the most important were that the 'Hong Kong government does not listen to public opinion' and 'defend civil liberties', with over 90% of respondents saying that both were very important causes. In October, over 70% of respondents viewed the cause of a 'call for disbanding the police force' as 'very important'. In December, 84.5% of respondents agreed that the cause of a 'call for reform of the police force' was 'very important'.

Even though for months, the Hong Kong government has tried to suggest that the root causes of public grievances were mainly related to deep-seated economic problems, such as economic inequality, our survey data did not provide strong evidence to support these claims. Less than 70% of respondents viewed 'Hong Kong's governance only serves the interests of the few' as a very important reason to join the protests, and less than half the respondents (27.3% to 42.7%) viewed 'gradual lacking of upward mobility in Hong Kong' as a very important protest motivation.

Comparatively, respondents attached more importance to political causes in the Movement: 76.4% to 85.3% of respondents viewed 'lack of representativeness in Hong Kong's political system' as a very important protest motivation, and over 90% (91.4% and 92.1%) viewed 'the implementation of "one country, two systems" has not fulfilled original promises' as a very important reason for them to participate in the protests.

Table 11. Importance of different protest motivations

Date of protest	Call for the withdrawal of the Fugitive Offenders Bill	Call for the resignation of Carrie Lam or major officials	Express dissatisfaction with the police's handling of the protests	Express dissatisfaction with police charging the arrested protesters for rioting	Strive for Hong Kong's democracy/ dual universal suffrage	Call for establishment of an independent commission of inquiry	Raise international attention	Call for the withdrawal of the 'riot' characterisation of the June 12 protest/or certain protests	(Sample size)
June 9	92.6%	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	79.6%	NA	(285)
June 16	94.8%	63.5%	89.8%	NA	NA	NA	79.4%	NA	(875)
July 1	89.4%	47.4%	84.6%	NA	82.5%	NA	74.8%	NA	(1,169)
July 14	88.0%	46.8%	90.4%	NA	74.9%	NA	NA	85.0%	(546)
July 21	87.1%	54.8%	90.9%	NA	87.2%	92.5%	NA	86.4%	(680)
July 27	85.1%	55.7%	98.3%	NA	88.1%	94.9%	NA	83.8%	(235)
August 4 (TKO)	87.3%	51.0%	95.4%	90.1%	85.0%	92.8%	NA	85.9%	(717)
August 4 (SW)	85.9%	49.4%	95.1%	91.0%	88.2%	91.1%	NA	85.3%	(555)
August 10	94.1%	50.8%	95.3%	90.7%	89.9%	94.7%	NA	NA	(2,309)
August 11	91.9%	50.2%	93.4%	89.1%	87.1%	92.2%	NA	NA	(636)
August 13	89.7%	51.5%	95.5%	88.7%	87.0%	90.5%	NA	NA	(485)
August 16	85.1%	41.0%	91.6%	88.4%	91.1%	87.5%	NA	NA	(632)
September 8	NA	40.4%	85.5%	NA	91.4%	81.0%	91.4%	73.9%	(337)
October 14	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	90.8%	NA	NA	(662)
October 20	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	91.6%	NA	NA	(921)
December 8	NA	65.3%	92.9%	NA	88.3%	92.0%	NA	82.7%	(902)

Question: How important are the following objectives to your participation in today's protest?
Note:
(a) The shown figures are the percentages of 'very important' responses.
(b) For 'strive for Hong Kong's democracy/dual universal suffrage', the question's wording on the July 14 survey is 'strive for dual universal suffrage'. For all other surveys, the question's wording is 'strive for Hong Kong's democracy'.
(c) For 'call for the withdrawal of the "riot" characterisation of the June 12 protest/or certain protests', the question's wording is 'call for the withdrawal of the "riot" characterisation of the June 12 protest' in the July and August surveys. For the September 8 and December 8 surveys, the question's wording is 'call for withdrawal of the "riot" characterisation of certain protests'.

Table 12. Importance of different protest motivations in the later stages of the Movement

Date of protest	Lack of representativeness in Hong Kong's political system	The implementation of 'one country, two systems' has not fulfilled original promises	Hong Kong's governance only serves the interests of the few	Hong Kong government does not listen to public opinion	Gradual lacking of upward mobility in Hong Kong	Call for disbanding/ reform of the police force	Defend civil liberties	(Sample size)
October 1	85.3%	91.4%	69.5%	92.8%	42.7%	NA	NA	(640)
October 14	76.4%	92.1%	67.5%	93.7%	42.0%	76.9%	NA	(662)
October 20	76.8%	NA	NA	94.6%	27.3%	73.4%	93.9%	(921)
December 8	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	84.5%	NA	(902)

Question: How important are the following objectives to your participation in today's protest?
Note:
(a) The shown figures are percentages of 'very important' responses.
(b) For 'Call for disbanding/reform of the police force', the question's wording on the December 8 survey is 'Call for reform of the police force'. For all other surveys, the question's wording is 'Call for disbanding of the police force'.

5.2.2 Changes in Demands

Despite the government's announcement of the bill's suspension on June 15, the Movement has continued to evolve. As illustrated in the previous section, as the Movement progressed, protesters have incorporated more demands into the Movement, such as striving for Hong Kong's democracy and protesting against police handling of the protests. And as the protests have spread into different districts, community issues also have been brought to the fore. For example, the Tuen Mun protest on July 6 was linked to the noise nuisance issue in the park, while the rally in Sheung Shui on July 14 targeted parallel traders.

Against this backdrop, from mid-July to mid-August, we asked respondents how they thought about the change in demands. Specifically, respondents were asked to what extent they agreed with the shift in demands from 'withdraw the Fugitive Offenders Bill' to other issues, namely 'restart political reform', 'focus on police brutality' and 'focus on community issues' (see Table 13).

Table 13. Views on changes in movement demands

Date of protest	Restart political reform	Focus on police brutality	Focus on community issues	(Sample size)
July 21	64.1%	79.2%	40.1%	(680)
July 27	65.5%	80.9%	37.9%	(235)
August 4 (TKO)	68.1%	84.6%	45.3%	(717)
August 4 (SW)	73.7%	86.4%	46.4%	(555)
August 10	62.3%	76.2%	36.7%	(2,309)
August 11	66.2%	79.4%	37.7%	(636)
August 13	59.8%	79.2%	37.9%	(485)
August 16	72.9%	79.6%	35.3%	(632)

Question: As the government announced the "suspension" of the bill, how much do you agree with the shift in demand from "withdraw the Fugitive Offenders Bill" to "restart political reform"/ "focus on police brutality"/ "focus on community issues"?
Note: The shown figures are the combined percentages of 'agree' and 'strongly agree' responses.

Most respondents agreed ('agreed' or 'strongly agreed') to shift the demand to 'restart political reform' and 'focus on police brutality'. Across the surveys, 59.8% to 73.7% of respondents agreed to shift the demand to 'restart political reform', and 76.2% to 86.4% of respondents agreed to shift the demand to 'focus on police brutality'. Meanwhile, fewer respondents (35.3% to 46.4%) agreed to shift the demand to 'focus on community issues'.

As illustrated, police brutality was ranked higher than political reform or community issues. The issue of police brutality has received strong support among protesters.

5.2.3 Political Slogans

Throughout the Movement, participants have created numerous slogans to express the Movement's spirit. In a sense, political slogans are a form of collective political expression and an embodiment of political demands. By looking at the slogans' content, we can discern protesters' concerns.

In the early to mid-August surveys, we included questions to ask respondents to evaluate the following slogans' representativeness:

- 'No rioters, only tyranny' (沒有暴徒，只有暴政)
- 'Hong Kong police consciously violating the law' (香港警察，知法犯法)
- 'Don't snitch, don't split up' (不篤灰，不割席)
- 'Liberate Hong Kong, revolution of our times' (光復香港，時代革命)
- 'Climbing mountains together, making your own efforts' (兄弟爬山，各自努力)
- 'Up and down together' (齊上齊落)
- 'Hong Kong people, add oil' (香港人加油)
- 'We want universal suffrage' (我要真普選)

It can be inferred that the higher the evaluated representativeness, the greater the importance attached to the cause of the slogan by respondents.

Table 14 shows that, 'No rioters, only tyranny' and 'Hong Kong police consciously violating the law' are the Movement's most representative slogans. Roughly 90% of respondents said these two slogans were 'very representative'. These findings again attest to the fact that public dissatisfaction with the government and police, especially regarding how they have handled the protests, mainly has driven the Movement.

From early to mid-August, a surge occurred in perceived representativeness of 'liberate Hong Kong, revolution of our times'. In early August surveys, roughly

70% of respondents viewed this slogan as ‘very representative’, with the percentage rising to 81.5% in the August 16 survey.

Other popular slogans also have resonated with protesters, with 63.7% to 82.0% viewing ‘don’t snitch, don’t split up’ as ‘very representative’; 60.8% to 78.8% viewing ‘climbing mountains together, making your own efforts’ as ‘very representative’; and 73.8% to 78.8% viewing ‘up and down together’ as ‘very representative’.

The call for political reform is one of the Movement’s five core demands. Our surveys found that roughly half the respondents viewed the slogan ‘we want universal suffrage’ as ‘very representative’.

Table 14. Political slogans' representativeness

Date of protest	'No rioters, only tyranny'	'Hong Kong police consciously violating the law'	'We want universal suffrage'	'Don't snitch, don't split up'	'Climbing mountains together, making your own efforts'	'Up and down together'	'Liberate Hong Kong, revolution of our times'	'Hong Kong people, add oil'	(Sample size)
August 4 (TKO)	92.3%	89.9%	49.4%	63.7%	63.8%	73.9%	67.5%	76.8%	(717)
August 4 (SW)	91.9%	91.0%	53.7%	67.4%	67.5%	76.6%	71.1%	80.6%	(555)
August 10	92.2%	87.4%	50.7%	70.0%	67.3%	74.8%	67.0%	77.0%	(2,309)
August 11	89.4%	85.6%	56.8%	71.1%	69.4%	78.8%	65.3%	74.2%	(636)
August 13	91.8%	90.9%	45.8%	69.1%	60.8%	73.8%	73.6%	70.7%	(485)
August 16	88.8%	86.4%	51.3%	82.0%	78.8%	78.0%	81.5%	63.8%	(632)

Question: To what extent do you think the following slogans can represent the anti-extradition bill movement?
Note: The shown figures are the percentages of 'very representative' responses.

5.3 How to Protest?

5.3.1 Protest Actions

The Movement has involved a variety of protest activities. Throughout the Movement, participants have devised numerous repertoires to make their voices heard and pressure the government to heed their demands. In the surveys, we asked respondents to indicate what protest actions they have undertaken since the beginning of the Movement.

As shown in Table 15(a), the three most common protest actions were related to expressing opinions, including 'join online petitions' (mostly around 80% to 90% of respondents have undertaken this action), 'share pro-movement promotional materials online' (roughly 70% to 80%) and 'express supportive opinions online' (also roughly 70% to 80%). These all were online activities, indicating digital media's importance in this Movement.

Apart from expressing themselves online, many participants also have expressed their opinions in public spaces. Roughly 60% to 70% of survey respondents indicated that they have expressed opinions on Lennon Walls.

Some less-common actions were resource-oriented, including 'distribute resources at protest sites' (ranging from 34.8% to 63.9%), 'donate money to organisations at protest sites' (22.3% to 59.3%), 'donate money to online crowdfunding activities' (28.7% to 54.5%) and 'donate resources other than money' (38.6% to 56.5%).

Although the Movement has witnessed police-protester confrontations on an unprecedented scale, our survey data suggest that only a small portion of protest participants actually has engaged in radical actions, such as 'standing on the frontlines to impede police actions' (3.1% to 20.3%). This demonstrates that peaceful protesters comprised the Movement's principal participants.

As the Movement evolved, more new protest actions have emerged. Since mid-September, we have added new questions to the surveys. Table 15(b) shows that since September onward, roughly 90% of respondents have boycotted pro-government shops for their siding with the government. Also, roughly 70% to 80% of respondents have patronised pro-movement shops as a tribute to their support for the Movement. In addition, roughly 80% of respondents have joined public activities to sing the protest song 'Glory to Hong Kong'. Furthermore, 57.7% of respondents have joined labour strikes, 33.9% have joined flash-mob protests (such as 'lunch together') and even fewer respondents (17.5% to 24.8%) have protested in front of police stations.

Throughout the Movement, only a very small portion of respondents (below 6%) has not participated in any of the above activities.

Table 15(a). Protest actions that respondents have undertaken

Date of protest	Donate money to organisations at protest sites	Donate money to online crowdfunding activities	Donate resources other than money	Distribute resources at protest sites	Express opinions on Lennon Walls	Share pro-movement promotional materials online	Express supportive opinions online	Join online petitions	(Sample size)
July 27	35.7%	43.4%	41.7%	50.2%	61.3%	71.9%	73.6%	81.3%	(235)
August 4 (TKO)	30.7%	36.0%	40.5%	41.7%	60.1%	61.5%	64.9%	72.1%	(717)
August 4 (SW)	40.6%	38.6%	45.4%	49.1%	63.6%	69.5%	68.5%	77.8%	(555)
August 10	28.5%	37.9%	47.1%	49.3%	69.3%	74.0%	73.1%	79.9%	(2,309)
August 11	30.9%	37.5%	45.0%	52.5%	66.5%	66.9%	71.0%	72.1%	(636)
August 13	22.3%	28.7%	48.5%	59.0%	68.7%	77.1%	78.8%	83.3%	(485)
August 16	35.4%	54.0%	56.5%	63.9%	70.3%	86.7%	83.5%	91.3%	(632)
August 18	31.0%	39.2%	40.7%	43.2%	59.7%	74.6%	72.0%	78.8%	(806)
August 25	35.2%	41.1%	48.9%	48.7%	67.5%	79.0%	73.1%	85.2%	(372)
August 31	32.6%	38.0%	42.7%	51.6%	66.0%	79.9%	78.2%	87.7%	(527)
September 8	34.7%	40.4%	40.1%	47.2%	66.8%	81.3%	76.9%	85.8%	(337)
September 15	42.2%	46.7%	43.7%	46.0%	67.6%	78.2%	74.4%	79.6%	(911)
September 28	59.3%	51.9%	46.2%	50.6%	69.1%	82.7%	74.1%	89.6%	(405)
October 1	53.1%	47.2%	38.6%	34.8%	61.6%	74.5%	67.3%	81.7%	(640)
October 14	42.1%	54.5%	47.3%	52.3%	67.2%	83.7%	79.3%	90.3%	(662)
October 20	44.2%	48.2%	41.0%	39.4%	56.6%	78.4%	72.4%	86.3%	(921)
December 8	44.5%	41.7%	47.3%	53.5%	60.7%	75.4%	71.2%	79.1%	(902)

Question: Throughout the Movement, since June up till now, have you ever participated in the following activities?

Table 15(b). Protest actions that respondents have undertaken (Continued)

Date of protest	Standing on the frontlines to impede police actions	Protesting in front of police stations in any districts	Singing 'Glory to Hong Kong' in public	Shouting movement slogans at home	Joining 'human chains'	Patronising pro-movement shops	Boycotting pro-government shops	Flash mob protest (e.g., 'lunch together')	Joining any labour strikes	Have not joined any of the listed activities	(Sample size)
July 27	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	4.3%	(235)
August 4 (TKO)	9.5%	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	5.9%	(717)
August 4 (SW)	11.6%	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	2.9%	(555)
August 10	8.3%	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	2.2%	(2,309)
August 11	14.1%	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	3.4%	(636)
August 13	16.3%	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	2.3%	(485)
August 16	20.3%	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1.6%	(632)
August 18	8.9%	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	2.9%	(806)
August 25	12.1%	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1.9%	(372)
August 31	9.3%	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1.7%	(527)
September 8	8.3%	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	2.1%	(337)
September 15	9.0%	NA	78.2%	55.3%	64.0%	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.7%	(911)
September 28	9.1%	NA	80.5%	53.6%	64.9%	69.9%	86.2%	NA	NA	0.0%	(405)
October 1	3.1%	NA	77.0%	48.6%	61.4%	68.4%	83.4%	NA	NA	0.6%	(640)
October 14	12.7%	24.8%	86.1%	52.6%	64.0%	86.4%	89.7%	NA	NA	0.2%	(662)
October 20	6.5%	17.5%	79.4%	47.0%	57.8%	81.3%	88.5%	NA	NA	0.4%	(921)
December 8	13.5%	NA	78.9%	53.7%	61.3%	NA	NA	33.9%	57.7%	1.6%	(902)

Question: Throughout the Movement since June up till now, have you ever participated in the following activities?

5.3.2 Decentralised Organising

Unlike the previous large-scale social movements in Hong Kong, the Movement has been characterised as having no 'central stage' (無大台). The lack of a 'central stage' does not mean the absence of or little importance given to social movement organisations. Rather, it means that the Movement has been decentralised in nature, lacking a single, centralised mechanism to organise, coordinate and direct the Movement. Traditionally, political parties and groups mainly have organised social movements in Hong Kong, but the present Movement has encompassed not only the protests that established groups have organised, but also various kinds of collective actions that ordinary citizens have initiated via digital platforms such as social media and online discussion forums. It is this synergistic combination of traditional protests and new forms of collective actions that has made the Movement so sustainable and dynamic so far.

To examine how the protesters perceive the decentralised organising feature of the Movement, in our late June surveys, we asked protest participants to evaluate different organisations and platforms' importance in the movement. For organisations, we included the following items: 'Civil Human Rights Front', 'university student unions', 'pan-democratic parties' and 'civic organisations'. For platforms, the most popular digital media platforms were included as answer options, including 'LIHKG', 'Facebook', 'Instagram' and 'Telegram'.

Table 16 shows that most respondents viewed all the aforementioned organisations and platforms as important ('somewhat important' or 'very important'). Over 70% of respondents viewed 'Civil Human Rights Front', 'university student unions' and 'civil organisations' as important, while over 60% viewed pan-democratic parties as important.

However, respondents suggested that digital media platforms were more important in the Movement. An overwhelming majority of respondents (84.8% to 91.6%) viewed LIHKG, a major online discussion forum in the Movement, as important. Roughly 80% of respondents viewed Telegram as important. In

addition, many respondents also perceived other social media as important. In the June 21 survey, 85.1% of respondents viewed social media (Facebook, Instagram, etc.) as important. In the June 26 survey, we separated Facebook and Instagram into two questions. Comparatively, Facebook (75.1%) was viewed as more important than Instagram (55.3%).

Table 16. Organisations and platforms' importance in the Movement

	June 21	June 26
Organisations		
Civil Human Rights Front	72.6%	72.2%
University student unions	77.8%	73.0%
Pan-democratic parties	61.4%	62.2%
Civic organisations	70.2%	74.2%
Digital media platforms		
LIHKG	84.8%	91.6%
Social media (Facebook, Instagram, etc.)	85.1%	NA
Facebook	NA	75.1%
Instagram	NA	55.3%
Telegram	81.8%	78.2%
(Sample size)	(316)	(418)

Question: How important are the roles of the following organisations and platforms to this Movement?

Note: The shown figures are the combined percentages of 'somewhat important' and 'very important' responses.

Digital media's centrality in the Movement has paved the way for decentralised organising, in which ordinary citizens could use the aforementioned platforms to mobilise and organise protest events in their own ways.

5.3.3 Digital Media Usage

As illustrated in the previous section, digital media have played an important role in the Movement. Digital media's importance can be seen in two aspects. First and foremost, digital media have served as a vital hub of movement information for protesters in the Movement. According to our survey data, protesters have relied on digital media heavily (i.e., online news media and social media) for information about the Movement, much more than on traditional media.

As shown in Table 17, online news media were the most important source of movement-related information for protesters. In the first four surveys from June 26 to July 21, 83.4% to 89.0% of respondents often ('quite often' or 'very often') received movement news from online news media such as *StandNews* and *In-Media*. The percentages surpassed 90% in late July and have remained at this high level throughout the Movement.

The second and third most important information channels were Facebook and online forums (e.g., LIHKG). From June to December, 77.9% to 90.2% of respondents often received movement-related information from Facebook. Meanwhile, 55.2% to 87.4% of respondents often received such information from online forums, especially LIHKG.

Apart from Facebook and online forums, other social media platforms also were important sources of information for protesters. Across the surveys, 52.5% to 74.2% of respondents often received movement-related information from WhatsApp, 39.7% to 72.6% from Instagram and 31.9% to 76.3% from Telegram.

Compared with many digital media, traditional media were a less important information source for protesters. Across all surveys, the percentages of respondents who often received movement-related information from traditional media (e.g., newspapers and TV) ranged from 44.5% to 63.1%.

Table 17. Channels for receiving movement information

Date of protest	Traditional media (e.g., newspapers and TV)	Online news media (e.g., *StandNews*, *In-Media*)	Facebook	Instagram	WhatsApp	Telegram	Online forums (e.g., LIHKG)	(Sample size)
June 26	44.5%	89.0%	79.4%	56.0%	53.8%	51.0%	73.9%	(418)
July 1	61.3%	83.4%	77.9%	51.2%	55.2%	31.9%	55.2%	(1,169)
July 14	59.3%	87.9%	81.1%	48.6%	60.1%	42.4%	66.9%	(546)
July 21	59.1%	87.7%	79.7%	49.3%	52.5%	42.1%	64.5%	(680)
July 27	60.4%	96.2%	90.2%	52.8%	70.6%	55.3%	76.6%	(235)
August 4 (TKO)	61.1%	95.4%	87.8%	55.5%	65.2%	55.5%	75.0%	(717)
August 4 (SW)	62.2%	96.3%	85.8%	55.1%	64.0%	58.3%	75.0%	(555)
August 10	56.0%	97.4%	87.9%	60.1%	64.3%	62.8%	83.3%	(2,309)
August 11	55.4%	95.2%	85.8%	48.6%	65.3%	62.9%	80.2%	(636)
August 13	63.1%	96.7%	82.9%	72.6%	68.2%	68.5%	87.4%	(485)
August 16	50.6%	96.8%	87.2%	60.1%	60.6%	75.9%	86.2%	(632)
August 18	61.2%	95.0%	84.6%	55.2%	66.9%	57.3%	74.4%	(806)
August 25	61.3%	95.7%	86.0%	58.3%	65.6%	63.4%	73.1%	(372)
August 31	60.3%	96.4%	84.4%	60.3%	60.7%	67.0%	82.5%	(527)
September 8	52.2%	95.5%	86.4%	54.0%	60.8%	65.0%	81.0%	(337)
September 15	58.6%	96.8%	85.9%	58.8%	63.9%	71.1%	81.3%	(911)
September 28	58.0%	97.3%	85.7%	43.7%	61.0%	65.4%	72.3%	(405)
October 1	60.8%	95.8%	86.3%	39.7%	69.8%	60.0%	69.5%	(640)
October 14	57.4%	97.1%	89.3%	54.8%	74.2%	76.3%	76.1%	(662)
October 20	59.3%	97.3%	84.8%	50.9%	65.9%	66.0%	77.3%	(921)
December 8	58.2%	94.5%	79.2%	63.3%	60.8%	72.8%	73.9%	(902)

Question: How often do you receive information about the anti-extradition bill movement through the following platforms?
Note: The shown figures are the combined percentages of 'quite often' and 'very often' responses.

The second indicator that digital media have played an important role in the Movement is that, apart from being a source of information, they also have served as a platform through which people can participate in the Movement. As already discussed earlier, our survey data suggest that the protesters extensively used digital media to express their opinions. Our surveys have contained other data to corroborate this finding.

In two surveys in late June, we asked respondents to indicate whether they have 'distributed' movement information in different online platforms (see Table 18). Roughly two-thirds of respondents (57.4% to 62.4%) have distributed related information on WhatsApp, while over half (51.7% to 53.3%) have done so on Facebook. Comparatively, in terms of information distribution, usage of other platforms (Instagram, Telegram and LIHKG) generally was lower.

Table 18. Distribution of movement information on different platforms

	June 21	June 26
Facebook	53.3%	51.7%
Instagram	54.5%	45.0%
WhatsApp	62.4%	57.4%
Telegram	37.4%	33.7%
LIHKG	43.5%	34.2%
(Sample size)	(316)	(418)

Question: How often do you distribute information about the anti-extradition bill movement through the following platforms?
Note: The shown figures comprise the combined percentages of 'quite often' and 'very often' responses.

In the June 26 survey, we added two more questions to delve further into the use of Telegram and LIHKG by protesters. As shown in Table 19, at that time, the usage of LIHKG generally was higher than that of Telegram. The percentages of respondents who read information and voted on movement issues on LIHKG were greater than those for Telegram. In addition, more respondents shared LIHKG content on other platforms than they did with Telegram content.

Due to the platforms' different affordances, respondents also have performed some unique actions on Telegram and LIHKG. For example, some respondents used Telegram to 'chat about issues related to the Movement' (28.2%), 'deliberate on movement actions' (19.4%), 'enrol in working groups' (16.5%)

and 'create groups about the Movement' (8.9%). And on LIHKG, some respondents have 'boost(ed) posts' (33.0%) and 'create(d) posts' (10.8%).

Table 19. Use of Telegram and LIHKG

	Telegram	LIHKG
Read information	64.6%	80.4%
Vote on movement issues	23.0%	24.9%
Share content on other platforms (e.g., FB and IG)	33.3%	50.2%
Chat about issues related to the Movement	28.2%	NA
Create groups about the Movement	8.9%	NA
Enrol in working groups	16.5%	NA
Deliberate on movement actions	19.4%	NA
Create posts	NA	10.8%
Boost posts	NA	33.0%
Don't know/Not applicable	28.5%	13.6%
(Sample size)	(418)	(418)

Question: 'Have you ever used Telegram/LIHKG to do the following activities?'
Note: This question was asked only in the June 26 survey.

5.4 Attitudes Towards Protests

5.4.1 Radicalisation

Over the past six months, whether the protests would escalate or radicalise was one of the major concerns within Hong Kong society and the international community. To study the protesters' changing views on radicalisation, our surveys included some statements expressing different purposes and outcomes of radicalisation. Respondents were asked to indicate how much they agreed or disagreed with these statements. The statements include the following:

- 'Radical protests could make the government heed public opinion'
- 'Radical protests could alienate the general public'
- 'The maximum impact could be achieved only when peaceful assembly and confrontational actions work together'
- 'When the government fails to listen, the use of radical tactics by protesters is understandable'

Table 20 summarises the protesters' views on radicalisation. Several implications can be drawn from the findings. First, as the Movement continued, the protesters increasingly have believed in the efficacy of radical protests. In seven surveys conducted between June 12 and July 27, the percentage of respondents who agreed ('agreed' or 'strongly agreed') with the notion of 'radical protests could make the government heed public opinion' increased from 38.2% to 65.5%. Though the percentage dropped to roughly 50% in August, it bounced back to over 60% in later surveys from September to December.

Second, the protesters have become less worried about backlash over radical protests. When asked about whether 'radical protests could alienate the general public', at first, roughly 50% to 60% of respondents agreed with this notion in June. However, the percentage dropped sharply, to roughly 30% in late July. The figure has remained quite steady ever since. Even after months of violent confrontations between the protesters and police, as of December, only roughly

a quarter of respondents (26.7%) agreed that radical protests could alienate the general public.

Third, the protesters have viewed radical protests as beneficial to the Movement. Across all surveys, 71.0% to 91.9% of respondents agreed that 'the maximum impact could be achieved only when peaceful assembly and confrontational actions work together'. It has been indicated that the overwhelming majority of protesters held a positive view towards the synergy between the peaceful and radical camps in the Movement.

Fourth, the protesters have become more sympathetic towards the use of radical tactics. Our surveys asked respondents the extent to which they would agree with the statement, 'When the government fails to listen, the use of radical tactics by protesters is understandable'. The percentage of respondents who agreed with this notion significantly increased over time. When the question was first asked on June 16, only 69.1% of respondents said that they agreed with it; on July 1, the percentage rose to 83.5%, and since then, it has exceeded 90%.

All in all, although the Movement has become increasingly violent in its later stages, the above findings suggest that the heightened radicalisation level has not diminished protesters' support. On the contrary, the interviewed protesters actually have become more tolerant towards the use of radical protests and more positive about their impacts.

Table 20. Views on Radicalisation

Date of protest	'Radical protests could make the government heed public opinion'	'Radical protests could alienate the general public'	'The maximum impact could be achieved only when peaceful assembly and confrontational actions work together'	'When the government fails to listen, the use of radical tactics by protesters is understandable'	(Sample size)
June 12	38.2%	52.6%	NA	NA	(175)
June 16	NA	NA	NA	69.1%	(875)
June 17	53.2%	61.2%	79.6%	NA	(717)
June 21	61.7%	56.6%	89.0%	NA	(316)
June 26	56.2%	47.1%	84.9%	NA	(418)
July 1	40.5%	54.9%	71.0%	83.5%	(1,169)
July 21	54.3%	33.1%	81.7%	94.7%	(680)
July 27	65.5%	32.3%	86.0%	95.3%	(235)
August 4 (TKO)	50.0%	35.7%	86.7%	95.9%	(717)
August 4 (SW)	47.2%	33.8%	88.5%	93.1%	(555)
August 10	45.4%	42.9%	88.0%	95.3%	(2,309)
August 11	50.8%	39.4%	86.6%	94.2%	(636)
August 13	40.6%	42.7%	85.8%	94.6%	(485)
August 16	54.7%	38.4%	91.9%	97.6%	(632)
August 18	48.9%	37.4%	86.1%	94.1%	(806)
August 25	55.4%	24.5%	89.8%	94.6%	(372)
September 15	62.1%	27.7%	89.1%	91.9%	(911)
October 14	66.2%	35.8%	90.3%	98.2%	(662)
October 20	62.3%	30.0%	90.7%	97.5%	(921)
December 8	65.2%	26.7%	90.2%	97.5%	(902)

Question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement?
Note: The shown figures are the combined percentages of the 'agree' and 'strongly agree' responses.

5.4.2 Persistence

Apart from a heightened radicalisation level, another unique characteristic of the Movement is its persistence. While the government announced the suspension of the Fugitive Offenders Bill on June 15, the Movement did not die down immediately. Instead, the activists and citizens have continued to organise numerous events and actions with broader demands.

From late June to late August, our surveys posed the following question to protesters: 'If the government decides to only "suspend" the bill, but not make any further concessions, what should be the next step for the Movement?' Three answer options presented to them included 'escalate the Movement', 'sustain its current form and mobilise from time to time' and 'suspend the Movement and leave time for society to recover'.

Table 21 shows that, across all surveys, only a very tiny portion of respondents (no more than 5.1%) indicated that they wanted to suspend the Movement. The overwhelming majority of respondents wanted to carry on to fight for broader demands, although they were split over appropriate protest approaches. Except for the July 1 rally, roughly half the respondents believed they should 'escalate the Movement', with the percentage rising to 61.3% in late August. And roughly 40% of respondents thought that the Movement should 'sustain its current form and mobilise from time to time' across the surveys. These differences indicate internal tension between the Movement's moderate and radical camps, but they have decided to continue working together despite their differences.

Table 21. Views on the way forward for the Movement

Date of protest	Escalate the Movement	Sustain its current form and mobilise from time to time	Suspend the Movement and leave time for society to recover	(Sample size)
June 21	46.1%	43.5%	2.2%	(316)
June 26	48.8%	41.1%	1.4%	(418)
July 1	39.1%	45.1%	5.1%	(1,169)
July 14	50.9%	43.0%	0.3%	(546)
July 27	49.4%	44.3%	1.3%	(235)
August 4 (TKO)	50.7%	41.0%	0.7%	(717)
August 4 (SW)	54.1%	38.7%	1.9%	(555)
August 10	48.9%	45.6%	1.0%	(2,309)
August 11	51.2%	38.3%	2.5%	(636)

August 13	55.5%	39.4%	1.0%	(485)
August 16	56.0%	40.7%	0.9%	(632)
August 18	44.4%	50.5%	1.0%	(806)
August 25	61.3%	34.9%	1.1%	(372)

Question: If the government decides to only 'suspend' the bill, but not make any further concessions, what should be the next step for the Movement?
Note: The percentages of 'don't know/refuse to answer' responses are excluded from the figure.

Besides the protesters' own determination to strive for all five core demands, the ways in which the government and police have handled the protests also may have contributed to the Movement's persistence. As the Movement continued, the police have stepped up their efforts to crack down on protesters. However, this hardline strategy largely failed to dissolve the tensions and pacify the situation, and only served to energise the protesters. In the August surveys, we asked respondents how the police's mass-scale arrests would affect their motivation to participate in the protests. A very high percentage of respondents (72.6% to 80.4%) said that such repressive policing strategies actually would strengthen ('slightly increase' or 'hugely increase') their motivation to protest, while less than one-tenth of respondents (5.4% to 9.2%) said it would weaken their motivation (see Table 22). In any event, the Movement's persistence is due partly to the backlash from government and police strategies in handling the protests.

Table 22. Responses to police's mass-scale arrests

Date of protest	Hugely decrease/ Slightly decrease	So-so	Hugely increase/ Slightly increase	(Sample size)
August 10	8.4%	13.1%	76.5%	(2,309)
August 11	5.4%	18.6%	74.2%	(636)
August 13	7.8%	11.5%	80.0%	(485)
August 16	9.2%	16.3%	72.6%	(632)
August 18	6.2%	12.3%	80.4%	(806)
August 25	6.5%	15.1%	78.2%	(372)

Question: How will the police's mass-scale arrests of protesters affect your motivation to participate in protests?
Note: The percentages of 'don't know/refuse to answer' responses are excluded from the figure.

In addition, another reason why the protesters have persisted for such a long time also could be because they feared the potential repercussions should the Movement fail. During the later stages of the Movement in September and October, our surveys posed this question to protesters: 'If the Movement ends up with no more concrete results, how likely are the following things to happen?' They were asked to evaluate possibilities on a five-point Likert scale, from 'not

possible at all' to 'very possible'. Generally, the protesters were very pessimistic about Hong Kong's future.

Table 23 shows that 82.5% to 91.5% of respondents thought that if the Movement did not make further gains, it would be 'very possible' that the police would pose threats to Hong Kong people's daily lives, with 72.4% to 91.6% of respondents believing that the government would take mass-scale political revenge against the protesters, 75.4% to 93.7% envisioning a significant erosion of political and civil liberties in Hong Kong, 70.9% to 84.4% expecting that Beijing actively would interfere with Hong Kong's affairs; 60.8% to 74.9% viewing it as very possible that Hong Kong would become an ordinary Chinese city; and 57.0% to 60.3% anticipating that Hong Kong would be taken over by gangsters. However, despite these potential difficulties, only 30.1% to 45.2% of respondents expected that many Hong Kong residents would become frustrated and give up the fight.

Table 23. Views on the Movement's repercussions

Date of protest	Gangsters will take over	The police will pose threats to Hong Kong people' daily lives	The government will take mass-scale political revenge	Significant erosion of political and civil liberties in Hong Kong	Many Hong Kong people will become frustrated and give up the fight	Beijing will actively interfere with Hong Kong's affairs	Hong Kong will become an ordinary Chinese city	(Sample size)
September 8	NA	NA	72.4%	75.4%	40.4%	70.9%	60.8%	(337)
September 15	60.3%	84.7%	82.2%	84.7%	34.2%	71.4%	65.3%	(911)
September 28	57.0%	82.5%	91.6%	88.1%	30.1%	84.4%	71.6%	(405)
October 1	58.1%	86.6%	90.0%	91.6%	32.0%	80.6%	71.1%	(640)
October 14	60.3%	91.5%	91.2%	93.7%	45.2%	82.0%	74.9%	(662)

Question: If the Movement ends up with no more concrete results, how possible do you think it would be for the following developments to occur?
Note: Only the percentages of 'very possible' responses are provided.

5.4.3 Solidarity

In addition to an unprecedented level of radicalisation and persistence, the Movement also has been characterised as having a strong sense of solidarity hitherto unseen. The solidarity here refers specifically to the bonding between moderate and radical protesters who once had engaged in bitter battles with each other over their political approaches during and after the Umbrella Movement, but who have forged common ground during the present Movement.

The strong unity between the two protester camps indirectly, yet clearly, has been demonstrated in some of the political slogans adopted in the Movement, e.g., 'don't snitch, don't split up', 'climbing mountains together, making your own efforts' and 'up and down together'. As discussed earlier, most survey respondents viewed these slogans as 'very representative' of the Movement.

To examine this kind of solidarity, our surveys also included some statements describing the relationship between the peaceful and radical protesters. We asked respondents to indicate to what extent they agreed or disagreed with statements about their views towards the radical protesters. As Table 24 illustrates, from July to December, an overwhelming majority of respondents agreed ('agreed' or 'strongly agreed') with the following statements: 'I think they are speaking out on my behalf' (close to 100%), 'I think we are on the same boat' (close to 100%) and 'I think I am part of them' (roughly 80% to 90%). These results indicate that in respondents' minds, peaceful and radical protesters were in it together to fight for shared goals.

Furthermore, across the surveys, only roughly 30% of respondents agreed that while they identified with radical protesters' goals, they disapproved of their radical tactics. After changing the question's wording to 'It is difficult for me to approve of their radical tactics' in the December 8 survey, the percentage of respondents who agreed with this statement dropped significantly, to 10.8%.

Table 24. Views on the Movement's solidarity

Date of protest	'I identify with their goals, but I disapprove of their radical tactics'	'I think they are speaking out on my behalf'	'I think we are on the same boat'	'I think I am part of them'	(Sample size)
July 27	32.3%	96.6%	97.0%	86.8%	(235)
August 4 (TKO)	34.7%	95.1%	96.6%	88.6%	(717)
August 4 (SW)	34.2%	95.7%	95.8%	87.0%	(555)
August 10	29.8%	97.1%	97.4%	90.0%	(2,309)
August 11	27.5%	96.9%	98.6%	91.2%	(636)
August 13	32.8%	97.5%	97.5%	91.5%	(485)
August 16	22.0%	97.2%	98.4%	93.5%	(632)
August 18	37.2%	95.0%	97.4%	84.4%	(806)
August 25	26.1%	97.0%	97.0%	87.4%	(372)
August 31	29.8%	97.2%	98.7%	90.9%	(527)
October 14	31.3%	94.1%	97.6%	86.7%	(662)
October 20	30.6%	94.0%	98.2%	88.4%	(921)
December 8	10.8%*	95.8%	97.4%	84.4%	(902)

Question: In the past month or so, some protesters have adopted various radical and confrontational actions to express their demands. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

Note: The shown figures are the combined percentages of the 'agree' and 'strongly agree' responses.

* The question's wording in the December 8 survey is, 'It is difficult for me to approve of their radical tactics'.

6. TELEPHONE SURVEYS

6.1 Views on Police

6.1.1 Trust in Police

Since May 2019, our telephone surveys have been keeping track of public trust in the police. Survey respondents were asked to indicate their trust in the police on a scale of 0-10 points, with '0' meaning 'no trust at all', '5' meaning 'so-so' and '10' meaning 'total trust'. The higher the score, the higher the trust. As shown in Table 25, across the six surveys, the mean scores for public trust in the police were mostly under 5 ('so-so'), except for the survey's first wave (within a mean score of 5.60), which was conducted before the June 9 and June 12 protests. This suggests that Hong Kong's citizens consistently were leaning towards distrusting the police over the past several months once the Movement started. As the Movement evolved, the distrust has continued to grow, as indicated in the continuous drop in the mean score from 5.60 during the first wave to 2.60 during the fifth wave. The latest wave has witnessed a bounce back to 2.85, but that is still lower than earlier waves' trust levels.

When viewed in terms of percentage, we can see an increase in the proportion of respondents who indicated their distrust in the police (providing a score of 0 to 4). The distrust percentage was 26.3% during the first wave in late May and early June, but surged significantly to 46.6% during the second wave in mid-June, and to 60% to 70% during subsequent waves. More specifically, a closer look at the percentages reveals a dramatic increase in respondents who expressed no trust at all in the police. Before the June 9 protest, just 6.5% of respondents gave a 0 score during the first wave, but after the June 9 and June 12 protests, the percentage of 0 scores rose to 22.5% during the second wave. The number surged to 42.7% during the third wave in August. Entering September and beyond, the '0' score percentages climbed to about 50%.

To examine whether any differences exist between respondents from different backgrounds, we performed subgroup analysis for the last wave of the survey based on gender, age, education level, occupation status, family income level, political orientation and attitude towards the Movement (see full results in the Appendix, Section 8.2.4, Table 1). The results indicated that the following subgroups trusted the police the most in terms of mean score:

- Females (3.04)
- People ages 60 and up (3.82)
- People with a Form 3 secondary education or below (3.29)
- People not in the workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees) (3.55)
- People with a monthly family income level of HK$14,999 or below (4.28)
- People who identify themselves as pro-establishment (8.43)
- People who are opposed to the Movement (8.45)

Conversely, the following subgroups showed the lowest trust in the police:

- Males (2.64)
- People ages 15-29 (1.30)
- People with a tertiary education (2.32)
- Students (1.54)
- People with a monthly family income level of HK$40,000-59,999 (2.21)
- People who identify themselves as localists (0.56)
- People who support the Movement (0.90)

Table 25. Public trust in Hong Kong police

	First wave (May 23 – June 5)		Second wave (June 17 – June 20)		Third wave (August 7 – August 13)		Fourth wave (September 5 – September 11)		Fifth wave (October 8 – October 14)		Sixth wave (November 7 – December 13)	
0 No trust at all	6.5%		22.5%		42.7%		48.3%		51.5%		47.5%	
1	2.3%		3.6%		5.5%		5.7%		5.5%		5.4%	
2	4.3%		6.6%		7.8%		7.1%		5.6%		5.5%	
3	8.5%	26.3%	9.6%	46.6%	6.0%	65.5%	5.0%	69.0%	4.9%	71.8%	6.1%	66.4%
4	4.8%		4.3%		3.6%		2.8%		4.2%		1.9%	
5 So-so	25.2%		18.8%		9.8%		6.5%		7.5%		12.7%	
6	10.5%		3.3%		2.3%		1.3%		3.2%		1.9%	
7	11.1%		7.7%		4.9%		2.7%		2.0%		2.3%	
8	12.0%		7.8%		5.3%		7.1%		4.2%		5.1%	
9	3.8%	47.7%	2.6%	33.9%	2.7%	24.2%	2.6%	23.9%	1.4%	20.1%	2.3%	20.5 %
10 Total trust	10.3%		12.4%		9.0%		10.2%		9.3%		8.9%	
Don't know/refuse to answer	0.8%		0.8%		0.5%		0.7%		0.5%		0.4%	
Total (Sample size)	100% (1,048)		100% (635)		100% (842)		100% (623)		100% (751)		100% (2,008)	
Mean (Sample size)	5.60 (1,039)		4.44 (630)		3.08 (838)		2.89 (619)		2.60 (747)		2.85 (2,000)	

Question: How high is your trust in the Hong Kong police? What score do you give them on a scale from 0 to 10, with '0' being 'no trust at all', '10' being 'total trust' and '5' being 'so-so'?
Note: 'Don't know/refuse to answer' responses are excluded from the calculation of the mean score.

6.1.2 Satisfaction with Police Performance

Respondents were asked to evaluate their satisfaction with police performance in three scenarios: during daily functions unrelated to public events; overall performance during the Movement; and specifically their performance while handling fierce conflicts during the Movement (see Table 26).

Regarding police performance while *conducting daily functions* unrelated to public events, 23.2% of respondents expressed satisfaction (very satisfactory/somewhat satisfactory), whereas 45.7% expressed dissatisfaction (very unsatisfactory/somewhat unsatisfactory). Roughly 3-in-10 respondents (28.9%) answered 'so-so', while some respondents (2.2%) answered 'don't know/refuse to answer'.

Regarding the police's *overall performance* during the Movement, 13.7% of respondents expressed satisfaction, whereas 72.6% expressed dissatisfaction. Over one-tenth (13.0%) responded 'so-so'. A tiny portion (0.7%) chose 'don't know/refuse to answer'.

When it comes to police performance while *handling fierce conflicts* during the Movement specifically, the opinion distribution was similar: 13.6% of respondents expressed satisfaction, whereas 70.6% expressed dissatisfaction. In addition, 14.8% responded 'so-so'. A few respondents (1.1%) answered 'don't know/refuse to answer'.

Overall, the public clearly was more dissatisfied with police performance during the Movement (overall or in specific conflict situations) than with their performance during daily functions.

Table 26. Public satisfaction with police performance

	Performance while conducting daily functions unrelated to public events		Overall performance during the anti-extradition bill movement		Performance while handling fierce conflicts during the anti-extradition bill movement	
Very satisfied	8.9%	23.2%	6.8%	13.7%	6.7%	13.6%
Somewhat satisfied	14.3%		6.9%		6.9%	
So-so	28.9%		13.0%		14.8%	
Somewhat dissatisfied	12.7%	45.7%	13.0%	72.6%	15.4%	70.6%
Very dissatisfied	33.0%		59.6%		55.2%	
Don't know/refuse to answer	2.2%		0.7%		1.1%	
Total (Sample size)	100% (2,008)		100% (2,008)		100% (2,008)	

Questions:
(a) Generally speaking, are you satisfied with police performance in conducting daily functions unrelated to public events? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, so-so, somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?
(b) Are you satisfied with the police's overall performance during the anti-extradition bill movement? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, so-so, somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?
(c) Are you satisfied with police performance in handling fierce conflicts during the anti-extradition bill movement? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, so-so, somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?

Subgroup analysis found that the following subgroups expressed lower satisfaction with *police performance while conducting daily functions unrelated to public events* in terms of unsatisfactory (very unsatisfactory/somewhat unsatisfactory) percentages (see full results in the Appendix, Section 8.2.4, Table 2):

- Males (48.0%)
- People ages 15-29 (63.7%)
- People with a tertiary education (51.1%)
- Students (62.2%)
- People with a monthly family income of HK$40,000-59,999 (50.2%)
- People who identify themselves as localists (75.1%)
- People who support the Movement (64.4%)

Similarly, the following subgroups expressed lower satisfaction with *overall police performance* during the Movement (see full results in the Appendix, Section 8.2.4, Table 3):

- People ages 15-29 (90.8%)
- People with a tertiary education (81.6%)
- Students (89.7%)

- People with a monthly family income of HK$40,000-59,999 (80.2%)
- People who identify themselves as localists (97.6%)
- People who support the Movement (96.8%)

Moreover, the following subgroups also expressed lower satisfaction with police *performance while handling fierce conflicts* during the Movement (see full results in the Appendix, Section 8.2.4, Table 4):

- People ages 15-29 (88.2%)
- People with a tertiary education (78.9%)
- Students (85.8%)
- People with a monthly family income of HK$40,000-59,999 (78.4%)
- People who identify themselves as localists (96.2%)
- People who support the Movement (94.9%)

Respondents explained their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with *the police's overall performance* during the Movement in a follow-up, open-ended question. Their answers were categorised for analysis. Respondents who were satisfied with the police's *overall performance* (n=275) indicated the following reasons (see Table 27): 'maintain public safety and order/protect people's livelihoods' (33.1%); 'the police have exercised restraint/their performance meets the standards' (32.8%); 'they perform their job according to the law/they have a duty to conduct law enforcement' (23.8%); and 'there is a need to deal with the protesters' (9.2%). Some respondents indicated other reasons (3.8%) or answered 'don't know/refuse to answer' (2.8%).

Table 27. Reasons for satisfaction with the police's overall performance

Maintain public safety and order/protect people's livelihoods	33.1%
The police have exercised restraint/their performance meets the standards	32.8%
They perform their job according to the law/they have a duty to conduct law enforcement	23.8%
There is a need to deal with the protesters	9.2%
Others	3.8%
Don't know/refuse to answer	2.8%
(Sample size)	(275)

Question: Please briefly explain why you are satisfied with the police.

Respondents who expressed dissatisfaction with the police's overall performance during the Movement (n=1,458) indicated the following reasons

for dissatisfaction (see Table 28): 'use of excessive force/too violent' (69.5%); 'abuse of power/violation of protocol' (13.2%); 'arbitrary arrest' (12.6%); 'lying/poor response to public criticisms' (12.5%); 'unfair or selective law enforcement' (7.8%); 'excessive use of tear gas' (6.2%); 'bad attitude/emotionally out of control' (4.6%); 'hiding identity (i.e., non-disclosure of Police Warrant Card and police identification number/wearing masks)' (2.7%); 'poor or unreasonable handling of the protests' (1.5%); or 'unable to control the protests or deal with the protesters' (1.3%). Some respondents suggested other reasons (4.5%) or answered 'don't know/refuse to answer' (1.8%).

Table 28. Reasons for dissatisfaction with the police's overall performance

Use of excessive force/too violent	69.5%
Abuse of power/violation of protocol	13.2%
Arbitrary arrest	12.6%
Lying/poor response to public criticisms	12.5%
Unfair or selective law enforcement	7.8%
Excessive use of tear gas	6.2%
Bad attitude/emotionally out of control	4.6%
Hiding identity (i.e., non-disclosure of Police Warrant Card and police identification number/wearing masks)	2.7%
Poor or unreasonable handling of the protests	1.5%
Unable to control the protests or deal with the protesters	1.3%
Others	4.5%
Don't know/refuse to answer	1.8%
(Sample size)	(1,458)

Question: Please briefly explain why you are dissatisfied with the police.

6.1.3 Acceptance of Police Actions

Throughout the Movement, the police have carried out a range of operations to handle the protests. Respondents were asked to indicate to what extent they accepted police performance in specific operations on a scale of 0 to 10 points, with '0' meaning 'very unacceptable', '5' meaning 'so-so' and '10' meaning 'very acceptable', i.e., the higher the score, the higher the acceptability.

Table 29 illustrates the mean scores on police performance in various operations, ranging from 1.66 to 2.79. That the scores were all under 3 suggests that the public largely disagreed with many police actions during the Movement. Comparatively, the most acceptable action was 'arrest operations at protest scenes' (2.79), followed by 'performing searches and arrests on public transport' (2.68), 'dispersing protesters by tear gas, rubber bullets, pepper spray, etc.' (2.54), 'disguising as different identities at protest scenes' (2.33), 'dealing with journalists in conflict situations' (2.32) and 'handling conflicts between people with different political views' (2.19).

Overall, the most unacceptable actions to respondents were 'non-disclosure of police identification numbers on uniforms' (1.78) and 'firing live rounds during confrontations' (1.66). A look at the percentages reveals that roughly 70% of respondents viewed these two actions as 'very unacceptable' (69.3% and 73.4%); such percentages were higher than those for other actions.

Generally speaking, subgroup analysis illustrated that younger people, people with higher education levels, students, localists, people with higher family income and movement supporters demonstrated a lower level of acceptance of the aforementioned police actions (see full results in the Appendix, Section 8.2.4, Tables 5-12).

Table 29. Acceptance of police performance during different operations

	Performing searches and arrests on public transport	Non-disclosure of police identification numbers on uniforms	Handling conflicts between people with different political views	Disguising as different identities at protest scenes	Dispersing protesters with tear gas, rubber bullets, pepper spray, etc.	Firing live rounds during confrontations	Arrest actions at protest scenes	Dealing with journalists in conflict situations
0 Very unacceptable	50.0%	69.3%	56.2%	59.5%	50.8%	73.4%	45.3%	54.4%
1	3.7%	1.3%	3.1%	2.2%	6.2%	1.1%	6.2%	4.7%
2	6.0%	1.8%	4.4%	4.2%	7.9%	1.5%	7.5%	5.4%
3	5.2%	3.2%	5.4%	4.1%	5.1%	1.9%	7.5%	4.2%
4	2.8%	1.6%	2.1%	2.2%	2.3%	0.9%	2.1%	2.1%
	67.7%	77.3%	71.2%	72.1%	72.4%	78.9%	68.6%	70.8%
5 So-so	13.6%	7.2%	12.2%	8.5%	8.1%	4.7%	10.5%	11.8%
6	2.0%	1.5%	1.5%	1.5%	1.6%	1.7%	1.6%	1.7%
7	2.7%	2.1%	2.1%	2.5%	2.2%	1.7%	3.0%	1.9%
8	3.8%	2.3%	3.6%	3.5%	4.0%	2.0%	3.1%	3.7%
9	1.3%	0.9%	1.0%	0.7%	0.9%	1.1%	1.0%	1.2%
10 Very acceptable	8.3%	6.8%	5.3%	9.5%	9.8%	7.8%	10.6%	6.8%
	18.1%	13.6%	13.5%	17.7%	18.6%	14.2%	19.3%	15.3%
Don't know/refuse to answer	0.6%	1.9%	3.0%	1.7%	0.9%	2.2%	1.6%	2.1%
Total (Sample size)	100% (2,008)	100% (2,008)	100% (2,008)	100% (2,008)	100% (2,008)	100% (2,008)	100% (2,008)	100% (2,008)
Mean (Sample size)	2.68 (1,996)	1.78 ((1,969)	2.19 (1,947)	2.33 (1,974)	2.54 (1,990)	1.66 (1,964)	2.79 (1,976)	2.32 (1,966)

Question: We would like to know to what extent you accept police performance in various aspects of handling the protests, on a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 being 'very unacceptable', 10 being 'very acceptance' and 5 being 'so-so'.
Note: 'Don't know/refuse to answer' responses are excluded from the calculation of the mean score.

6.1.4 Changes in Image of the Police

After witnessing or experiencing how the police have been handling the protests for months, most respondents (68.8%) said that their image of the police has worsened (much worse/a little bit worse). Only 7.2% said that their image of the police has improved (much better/a little bit better). Roughly one-fifth (22.3%) said 'no change'. A tiny portion (1.7%) indicated 'don't know/refuse to answer' (see Table 30).

Table 30. Changes in image of the police

Much better	4.6%	7.2%
A little bit better	2.7%	
No change	22.3%	
A little bit worse	6.0%	68.8%
Much worse	62.8%	
Don't know/refuse to answer	1.7%	
Total (Sample size)	100% (2,008)	

Question: Has your image of the police changed because of their performance in handling the anti-extradition bill movement since June? Is it much better, a little bit better, a little bit worse, much worse or no change?

Among all respondents, subgroup analysis found that the following groups tend to hold a poorer (much worse/a little bit worse) image of the police because of their performance in handling the protests during the Movement (see full results in the Appendix, Section 8.2.4, Table 13):

- People ages 15-29 (87.1%)
- People with a tertiary education (79.9%)
- Students (89.3%)
- People with a monthly family income of HK$40,000-59,999 (79.5%)
- People who identify themselves as pan-democrats (87.5%)
- People who support the Movement (88.8%)

Respondents who held a poorer image of the police (n=1,382) were asked to indicate what adversely affected their evaluation of police (see Table 31). The overwhelming majority of these respondents (82.2%) mentioned the July 21 incident in Yuen Long, while half the respondents (49.8%) cited the August 31 incident at Prince Edward MTR station. Close to two-fifths (38.3%) selected the incident on October 1, in which the police fired a live round at a protester.

About 3-in-10 respondents (29.0%) said that the handling of detained people at the San Uk Ling Holding Centre worsened their image of the police. Roughly one-fifth of respondents said that the two events on August 11 affected their image of the police negatively: 'A female protester suffered a severe eye injury' (22.3%) and the 'firing of tear gas at Kwai Fong MTR station' (18.6%).

Fewer respondents highlighted the events happening during the early phase of the Movement, such as the dispersion of the protesters who surrounded the Legislative Council on June 12 (13.5%) and the dispersion of the protesters who occupied the Legislative Council on July 1-2 (9.8%). In addition, a small portion of respondents suggested other events (3.8%) or answered 'don't know/refuse to answer' (1.4%).

Table 31. Events or issues that have caused deterioration in image of the police

White-shirted people attacking citizens in Yuen Long on July 21	82.2%
Arrest operations at Prince Edward MTR station on August 31	49.8%
Firing of a live round at a protester on October 1	38.3%
The handling of detained people at the San Uk Ling Holding Centre	29.0%
A female protester suffering a severe eye injury on August 11	22.3%
Firing of tear gas at Kwai Fong MTR station on August 11	18.6%
Dispersion of protesters surrounding the Legislative Council on June 12	13.5%
Dispersion of protesters occupying the Legislative Council on July 1-2	9.8%
Others	3.8%
Don't know/refuse to answer	1.4%
(Sample size)	(1,382)

Question: Have any of the following events caused significant deterioration in your image of the police?
Note: Respondents could choose more than one answer; therefore, the percentages do not add up to 100%.

There were some subgroup differences in terms of what caused the deterioration in image of the police. For example, females attached more importance to the firing of a live round and the handling of detained people at the San Uk Ling Holding Centre than males did. In addition, older respondents attached less importance to the 721 incident, a female protester's eye injury and the firing of a live round. However, people with a higher education level viewed nearly all the aforementioned events as highly important (see full results in the Appendix, Section 8.2.4, Table 14).

In the same vein, respondents who had a better image of the police (n=146) were asked to explain the reasons for that (see Table 32). About two-thirds

(67.6%) pointed out that the police officers performed their job conscientiously and dutifully despite difficulties. Roughly two-fifths appreciated the police more because they had to endure insults from protesters (40.3%), as well as harassment and doxing of themselves and their families (38.5%). Over one-fifth (23.8%) suggested that their image of the police has improved as a result of police getting injured on duty. No respondents suggested other reasons, and a tiny portion (0.5%) answered 'don't know/refuse to answer'.

Table 32. Events or issues that have led to improvement in police image

Have performed the job conscientiously and dutifully despite difficulties	67.6%
Had to endure insults made by protesters	40.3%
Had to endure harassment and doxing of themselves and their families	38.5%
Have suffered injuries while on duty	23.8%
Others	0.0%
Don't know/refuse to answer	0.5%
(Sample size)	(146)

Question: Have any of the following police performances led to improvement in your image of them?
Note: Respondents could choose more than one answer; therefore, the percentages do not add up to 100%.

Subgroup analysis found that females attached more importance to the reason 'Had to endure harassment and the doxing of themselves and their families' than males did. In addition, highly educated people attached more importance to 'Have performed the job conscientiously and dutifully despite difficulties' (see full results in the Appendix, Section 8.2.4, Table 15).

6.2 Views on Protesters and the Movement

6.2.1 Support for the Movement

After several months of conflicts, respondents were asked to express their attitudes towards the Movement (see Table 33). Over three-fifths of respondents (62.3%) said that they supported (very supportive/somewhat supportive) the Movement. Close to one-fifth (18.0%) said they were against (very against/somewhat against) the Movement. Another nearly one-fifth (17.9%) answered 'half-half'. The remaining respondents (1.8%) answered 'don't know/refuse to answer'

Table 33. Support for the Movement

Very supportive	37.9%	62.3%
Somewhat supportive	24.4%	
Half-half	17.9%	
Somewhat against	5.7%	18.0%
Very against	12.3%	
Don't know/refuse to answer	1.8%	
Total (Sample size)	100% (2,008)	

Question: Do you support the anti-extradition bill movement? Are you very supportive, somewhat supportive, half-half, somewhat against or very against?

Among all respondents, the following subgroups were more inclined to support the Movement (see full results in the Appendix, Section 8.2.4, Table 16):

- People ages 15-29 (84.9%)
- People with a tertiary education (72.4%)
- Students (83.8%)
- People with a monthly family income of HK$60,000 or above (71.3%)
- People who identify themselves as localists (94.6%)

Respondents were asked to explain their support or opposition to the Movement in a follow-up, open-ended question. Their answers were categorised for analysis. Respondents who supported the Movement (n=1,251) indicated the following reasons (see Table 34): 'dissatisfied with Hong Kong SAR government or the central government' (33.5%); 'oppose the Fugitive Offenders Bill' (29.0%); 'protect and strive for democracy, freedom, justice and rights' (28.0%); 'identify with the Movement/protesters' demands and ideas'

(11.5%); 'dissatisfied with the police' (10.5%); 'protect "one country, two systems" ' (4.2%); 'dissatisfied with current social and political conditions' (2.0%); and 'support young people and the protesters' (0.9%). Some respondents mentioned other reasons (0.4%) or answered 'don't know/refuse to answer' (4.5%).

Table 34. Reasons for supporting the Movement

Dissatisfied with Hong Kong SAR government or the central government	33.5%
Oppose the Fugitive Offenders Bill	29.0%
Protect and strive for democracy, freedom, justice and rights	28.0%
Identify with the Movement/protesters' demands and ideas	11.5%
Dissatisfied with the police	10.5%
Protect 'one country, two systems'	4.2%
Dissatisfied with current social and political conditions	2.0%
Support young people and the protesters	0.9%
Others	0.4%
Don't know/refuse to answer	4.5%
(Sample size)	(1,251)

Question: Please briefly explain why you support the anti-extradition bill movement.

Conversely, respondents who were against the Movement (n=362) cited the following reasons: 'oppose protesters' damage to society or harming citizens' (46.2%); 'oppose protesters' use of violence or illegal acts' (25.7%); 'do not disapprove of the Fugitive Offenders Bill' (16.7%); 'do not identify with the protesters' demands or their ways of protesting' (14.6%). Some respondents highlighted other reasons (2.8%) or answered 'don't know/refuse to answer' (4.3%).

Table 35. Reasons for opposing the Movement

Oppose protesters' damage to society or harming citizens	46.2%
Oppose protesters' use of violence or illegal acts	25.7%
Do not disapprove of the Fugitive Offenders Bill	16.7%
Do not identify with protesters' demands or their ways of protesting	14.6%
Others	2.8%
Don't know/refuse to answer	4.3%
(Sample size)	(362)

Question: Please briefly explain why you are against the anti-extradition bill movement.

Given that Hong Kong SAR government already announced the withdrawal of the Fugitive Offenders Bill in September, most respondents (70.0%) still thought that the protesters should continue to strive to force the government to meet other demands. Roughly a quarter (24.4%) thought that the protesters should not continue. The remaining 5.7% answered 'don't know/refuse to answer' (see Table 36).

Table 36. Views on whether the Movement should continue

Should	70.0%
Should not	24.4%
Don't know/refuse to answer	5.7%
Total (Sample size)	100% (2,008)

Question: The SAR government announced the withdrawal of the Fugitive Offenders Bill earlier. Do you think the protesters should continue to protest and force the government to fulfil other demands?

The following respondent subgroups were more inclined to think that the protesters should continue the Movement (see full results in the Appendix, Section 8.2.4, Table 17):

- People ages 15-29 (89.5%)
- People with a tertiary education (77.7%)
- Students (88.3%)
- People with a monthly family income of HK$40,000-59,999 (77.5%)
- People who identify themselves as localists (96.0%)
- People who support the Movement (93.8%)

6.2.2 Acceptance of Protest Actions

The Movement has witnessed a proliferation of protest repertoires rarely seen in Hong Kong. Respondents were asked to indicate to what extent they accepted various protest actions on a scale of 0 to 10, with '0' meaning 'very unacceptable', '5' meaning 'so-so' and '10' meaning 'very acceptable', i.e., the higher the score, the higher the acceptability.

Table 37 illustrates the mean scores of different protest actions' acceptability, which ranged from 3.92 to 5.20. Only two actions received a mean score of over 5 ('so-so'): 'non-cooperation movement, such as obstructing the operation of MTR and government departments' (5.20) and 'besieging and attacking government buildings, such as police stations and central government offices, etc.' (5.13). It shows that the general public leaned slightly toward accepting the use of these two repertoires in the Movement.

Most other protest actions had received a mean score over 4, which included 'occupying the airport' (4.73), 'vandalising specific stores' (4.57), 'use of weapons to attack police officers, such as steel pipes, slingshots, throwing bricks, etc.' (4.35), 'damaging MTR facilities and traffic lights, etc.' (4.26) and 'hurling petrol bombs at police officers or police stations' (4.16).

The protest action that respondents viewed as most unacceptable was 'use of force during conflicts against people with different views' (3.92), the only action with a mean score below 4.

Generally speaking, subgroup analysis illustrated that older people, people with lower education levels, people not in the workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees, etc.), people who identified themselves as pro-establishment, people with lower family incomes and people who were against the Movement tended not to accept the aforementioned protest actions (see full results in the Appendix, Section 8.2.4, Tables 18-25).

Table 37. Acceptance of protest actions

	Non-cooperation movement, such as obstructing the operation of MTR and government departments	Occupying the airport	Damaging MTR facilities and traffic lights, etc.	Vandalising specific stores	Use of force during conflicts against people with different views	Besieging and attacking government buildings, such as police stations and central government offices, etc.	Hurling petrol bombs at police officers or police stations	Use of weapons to attack police officers, such as steel pipes, slingshots, throwing bricks, etc.
0 Very unacceptable	21.4%	26.9%	31.7%	30.2%	33.0%	23.4%	33.7%	30.6%
1	1.1%	0.7%	1.2%	1.1%	1.4%	1.7%	1.0%	1.4%
2	2.4%	3.1%	2.6%	2.2%	3.9%	3.5%	4.4%	3.8%
3	3.8%	5.7%	6.0%	6.3%	6.9%	4.8%	6.0%	6.4%
4	2.7%	2.6%	4.0%	3.2%	3.3%	2.7%	3.3%	3.1%
	31.3%	39.0%	45.6%	43.0%	48.4%	36.0%	48.5%	45.2%
5 So-so	25.7%	21.6%	19.0%	18.5%	21.4%	19.2%	17.1%	18.1%
6	3.8%	4.3%	4.3%	3.5%	3.4%	4.2%	3.7%	4.4%
7	7.1%	6.2%	6.8%	5.9%	5.4%	7.2%	5.1%	5.6%
8	11.4%	9.6%	7.7%	9.1%	7.7%	9.1%	6.8%	6.9%
9	3.4%	3.2%	3.2%	3.3%	2.6%	3.6%	2.8%	2.8%
10 Very acceptable	16.6%	15.2%	12.1%	15.8%	9.1%	19.8%	14.6%	15.0%
	42.2%	38.4%	34.1%	37.6%	28.1%	43.9%	32.9%	34.7%
Don't know/refuse to answer	0.8%	1.0%	1.2%	1.0%	2.0%	0.9%	1.5%	2.0%
Total (Sample size)	100% (2,008)	100% (2,008)	100% (2,008)	100% (2,008)	100% (2,008)	100% (2,008)	100% (2,008)	100% (2,008)
Mean (Sample size)	5.20 (1,993)	4.73 (1,988)	4.26 (1,983)	4.57 (1,988)	3.92 (1,967)	5.13 (1,990)	4.16 (1,978)	4.35 (1,969)

Question: In the anti-extradition bill movement, the protesters have carried out different actions to fight for their demands. We would like to know to what extent you accept the different actions. You can provide a score on a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 meaning 'very unacceptable', 10 meaning 'very acceptable' and 5 meaning 'so-so'.
Note: 'Don't know/refuse to answer' responses are excluded from the calculation of the mean score.

6.2.3 Views on Protest Radicalisation

Protest radicalisation was a hallmark of the Movement. The use of radical tactics has stirred up huge controversies in society. To examine public opinion on this issue, our surveys included several statements describing the justifiability and efficacy of radical protests and asked respondents to express their opinions on these statements.

First, beginning from the second wave of the surveys, we asked respondents whether they agreed with the notion that 'when participating in protests in Hong Kong, it is a must to uphold the peaceful and non-violent principle' (see Table 38). Across the five surveys, most respondents agreed (strongly agree/somewhat agree) with this statement. The agreeing percentage was the highest during the second wave in June (82.8%), then dropped to roughly 70% (66.8% to 71.7%) in subsequent waves from August onward. Meanwhile, the disagreeing and 'so-so' percentages both increased after the second wave. While in June, 6.2% of respondents disagreed (strongly disagree/somewhat disagree) that the peaceful and non-violent principle must be adhered to, the percentage rose to roughly or over 10% (9.6% to 13.5%) in the later stages. During the same period of time, those who said 'so-so' increased from 10.4% in June to nearly 20% (17.7% to 19.2%) in later stages.

Table 38. Views on upholding the peaceful and non-violent principle

	Second wave (June 17 – June 20)		Third wave (August 7 – August 13)		Fourth wave (September 8 – September 11)		Fifth wave (October 8 – October 14)		Sixth wave (November 7 – December 13)	
Strongly agree	65.0%	82.8%	52.3%	71.7%	47.8%	69.4%	45.7%	66.8%	42.2%	68.1%
Somewhat agree	17.9%		19.3%		21.6%		21.1%		25.9%	
So-so	10.4%		17.7%		18.3%		19.2%		18.7%	
Somewhat disagree	4.1%	6.2%	6.5%	9.6%	7.2%	10.5%	9.0%	13.5%	9.0%	12.5%
Strongly disagree	2.1%		3.1%		3.4%		4.5%		3.5%	
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	0.6%		1.0%		1.7%		0.5%		0.8%	
Total (Sample size)	100% (635)		100% (842)		100% (623)		100% (751)		100% (2,008)	

Question: Do you agree that 'when participating in protests in Hong Kong, it is a must to uphold the peaceful and non-violent principle'? Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, so-so, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree?

In early September, the Hong Kong government announced the withdrawal of the Fugitive Offenders Bill, but staunchly rejected other demands from protesters. Therefore, since the fourth wave of surveys in September, we

included the statement 'When large-scale peaceful protests fail to make the government respond to demands, it is understandable for protesters to carry out radical actions' (see Table 39). As illustrated, most respondents agreed with this statement, and the agreeing percentage has increased over time as the Movement continued: from 55.7% during the fourth wave to 59.2% during the fifth wave, and up to 68.4% during the last wave. Conversely, the percentage of those who disagreed with the statement was maintained, at roughly 27% in the first two surveys (26.9% and 27.4%), but it dropped to 18.6% during the last round.

Table 39. Views on the justifiability of radical protests

	Fourth wave (September 5 – September 11)		Fifth wave (October 8 – October 14)		Sixth wave (November 7 – December 13)	
Strongly agree	27.5%	55.7%	32.9%	59.2%	39.3%	68.4%
Somewhat agree	28.2%		26.3%		29.1%	
So-so	15.2%		13.1%		12.1%	
Somewhat disagree	6.0%	26.9%	6.8%	27.4%	6.5%	18.6%
Strongly disagree	20.9%		20.7%		12.0%	
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	2.2%		0.2%		1.0%	
Total (Sample size)	100% (623)		100% (751)		100% (2,008)	

Question: Do you agree that 'when large-scale peaceful protests fail to make the government respond to demands, it is understandable for the protesters to carry out radical actions'? Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, so-so, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree?

As radical protests have become a regular phenomenon during the Movement's latest phase, we added another statement to the last wave of surveys: 'Radical protests are more effective than peaceful, rational and non-violent protests' (see Table 40). While respondents largely sympathised with the protesters' use of radical actions, public opinion was divided over the efficacy of radical protests. While 37.7% of respondents agreed that radical protests could be more effective than peaceful protests, 33.5% disagreed with this notion. In addition, 27.1% answered 'so-so' and 1.7% responded 'don't know/refuse to answer'.

Table 40. Views on radical protests' efficacy

Strongly agree	12.8%	37.7%
Somewhat agree	24.9%	
So-so	27.1%	
Somewhat disagree	12.8%	33.5%
Strongly disagree	20.7%	
Don't know/refuse to answer	1.7%	
Total (Sample size)	100% (2,008)	

Question: Do you agree that 'radical protests are more effective than peaceful, rational and non-violent protests'? Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, so-so, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree?

Subgroup analysis found that the following groups of respondents were more inclined to agree (strongly agree/somewhat agree) that it is necessary to uphold the peaceful and non-violent principle in protests (see full results in the Appendix, Section 8.2.4, Table 26):

- Females (70.7%)
- People ages 60 and up (81.2%)
- People with a Form 3 secondary education or below (79.2%)
- People not in the workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees) (78.9%)
- People with a monthly family income of HK$14,999 or below (80.1%)
- People who identify themselves as pro-establishment (92.4%)
- People who are against the Movement (94.4%)

A larger proportion of the following subgroups tended to agree (strongly agree/somewhat agree) that it was understandable for the protesters to engage in radical actions should the government fail to listen (see full results in the Appendix, Section 8.2.4, Table 27):

- People ages 15-29 (86.2%)
- People with a tertiary education (74.0%)
- Students (84.1%)
- People with a monthly family income of HK$40,000-59,999 (75.7%)
- People who identify themselves as localists (92.9%)
- People who supported the Movement (91.5%)

Similarly, a larger proportion of the following subgroups tended to agree (strongly agree/somewhat agree) that radical protests are more effective than

peaceful, rational and non-violent protests (see full results in the Appendix, Section 8.2.4, Table 28):

- Males (40.3%)
- People ages 15-29 (60.6%)
- People with a tertiary education (45.5%)
- Students (58.9%)
- People with a monthly family income of HK$60,000 or above (44.8%)
- People who identify themselves as localists (71.4%)
- People who support the Movement (54.8%)

6.2.4 Changes in Image of the Movement

Apart from asking respondents to evaluate the change in their perceptions of police's image as a result of the Movement, a similar question was asked about the protesters/Movement (see Table 41). Over half the respondents (52.0%) said their image of the Movement has remained unchanged despite protesters' use of violence. Roughly 3-in-10 respondents (33.9%) developed a poorer image of the Movement, whereas roughly one-tenth (11.0%) cited an improved image. Some respondents (3.1%) answered 'don't know/refuse to answer'.

Table 41. Changes in image of the Movement

Much better	5.4%	11.0%
A little bit better	5.6%	
No change	52.0%	
A little bit worse	14.1%	33.9%
Much worse	19.9%	
Don't know/refuse to answer	3.1%	
Total (Sample size)	100% (2,008)	

Question: Has your image of the Movement changed because of protesters' use of force during the anti-extradition bill movement? Is it much better, a little bit better, a little bit worse, much worse or no change?

Among all respondents, subgroup analysis found that the following groups were more inclined to indicate that their image of the Movement has worsened due to protesters' use of violence (see full results in the Appendix, Section 8.2.4, Table 29):

- Females (34.4%)
- People ages 40-49 (41.0%)
- People with a Form 4-7 secondary education (34.5%)
- Managers and administrators (39.6%)
- People with a monthly family income of HK$25,000-39,999 (37.5%)
- People who identify themselves as pro-establishment (75.7%)
- People who are against the Movement (72.6%)

Respondents who had a poorer image of the Movement (n=681) were asked to indicate what mainly led to their negative evaluation (see Table 42). Over half of these respondents (52.7%) opined that the protesters' use of force against people with different views during conflicts significantly undermined their image of the protesters. Over two-fifths highlighted the following causes:

'damaging MTR facilities and traffic lights, etc.' (45.5%); 'arson' (44.7%); and 'hurling petrol bombs' (42.5%).

Roughly 3-in-10 respondents attributed the negative evaluation to 'vandalising specific stores' (30.4%) and 'occupying the airport' (27.5%). In addition, 24.5% and 18.5% mentioned 'violent attacks on police officers' and 'non-cooperation movement', respectively. A small number of respondents answered 'Other' reasons (1.1%) or 'don't know/refuse to answer' (2.2%).

Table 42. Protesters' actions that have caused deterioration in their image of the Movement

Use of force against people with different views during conflicts	52.7%
Damaging MTR facilities and traffic lights, etc.	45.5%
Arson	44.7%
Hurling petrol bombs	42.5%
Vandalising specific stores	30.4%
Occupying the airport	27.5%
Violent attacks on police officers	24.5%
Non-cooperation movement	18.5%
Other	1.1%
Don't know/refuse to answer	2.2%
(Sample size)	(681)

Question: Are there any protesters' actions that have caused significant deterioration in your image of the anti-extradition bill movement?
Note: Respondents could choose more than one answer; therefore, the percentages do not add up to 100%.

Some subgroup differences existed in terms of what caused deterioration in respondents' image of the Movement. For example, older respondents put more emphasis on most of the protest actions than young respondents did. Meanwhile, people with lower education levels focussed on 'occupying the airport' more often (see full results in the Appendix, Section 8.2.4, Table 30).

6.3 Views on Escalation of Force

As the Movement continued for months, violence on the part of police and protesters escalated. Beginning from the third wave of surveys in August, we presented a pair of parallel statements – 'the police have used excessive force' and 'the protesters have used excessive force' – to respondents and asked for their views.

6.3.1 Views on Use of Force by Police

Public opinion on whether the police have used excessive force has been fairly stable over the past few months (see Table 43). Across the four waves of surveys from early August to mid-December, roughly 70% of respondents (67.7% to 71.7%) agreed (strongly agree/somewhat agree) that the police have used excessive force in handling the protests, whereas roughly one-fifth (17.4% to 22.7%) disagreed (strongly disagree/somewhat disagree) with that statement. Meanwhile, roughly one-tenth (7.3% to 10.5%) answered 'so-so'. Few respondents (0.4% to 1.2%) answered 'don't know/refuse to answer'.

Table 43. Police use of excessive force

	Third wave (August 7 – August 13)		Fourth wave (September 5 – September 11)		Fifth wave (October 8 – October 14)		Sixth wave (November 7 – December 13)	
Strongly agree	51.4%	67.7%	57.1%	71.7%	53.7%	69.0%	58.1%	71.1%
Somewhat agree	16.3%		14.6%		15.3%		13.0%	
So-so	8.3%		7.3%		9.5%		10.5%	
Somewhat disagree	7.7%	22.7%	5.9%	20.6%	5.7%	20.6%	5.9%	17.4%
Strongly disagree	15.1%		14.7%		14.9%		11.5%	
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	1.2%		0.4%		0.9%		1.0%	
Total (Sample size)	100% (842)		100% (623)		100% (751)		100% (2,008)	

Question: Do you agree with the statement, 'The police have used excessive force'? Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, so-so, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree?

Subgroup analysis of the last wave of surveys revealed that the following subgroups were more inclined to agree (strongly agree/somewhat) that the police have used excessive force (see full results in the Appendix, Section 8.2.4, Table 31):

- People ages 15-29 (91.2%)
- People with a tertiary education (79.6%)

- Students (91.7%)
- People with a monthly family income of HK$40,000-59,999 (80.4%)
- People who identify themselves as localists (95.1%)
- People who support the Movement (93.5%)

In the final wave of surveys, respondents who agreed that the police have used excessive force (n=1,428) were asked whether they personally had experienced or witnessed any event involving the use of excessive police force. As shown in Table 44, 67.5% of respondents said 'no', whereas 32.3% answered 'yes'. The remaining respondents (0.2%) answered 'don't know/refuse to answer'.

Table 44. Personal experience with or witnessing of excessive police force

No	67.5%
Yes	32.3%
Don't know/refuse to answer	0.2%
Total (Sample size)	100% (1,428)

Question: Have you personally experienced or witnessed any event involving the use of excessive police force?

Subgroup analysis found that a larger proportion of the following groups personally experienced or witnessed events involving the use of excessive police force (see full results in the Appendix, Section 8.2.4, Table 32):

- Males (38.6%)
- People ages 15-29 (48.6%)
- People with a tertiary education (40.6%)
- Students (49.0%)
- People with a monthly family income level of HK$60,000 or above (40.5%)
- People who identify themselves as localists (51.2%)
- People who support the Movement (35.6%)

6.3.2 Views on Use of Force by Protesters

Comparatively, fewer respondents thought that the protesters have used excessive force during the Movement (see Table 45). Across the four surveys, 32.8% to 41.4% agreed that the protesters have used excessive force, whereas 29.3% to 37.4% disagreed with this notion. Meanwhile, roughly 26.6% to 29.4% said 'so-so'. In addition, a tiny portion (0.6% to 2.5%) answered 'don't know/refuse to answer'. A closer look at the numbers suggests a shift in public opinion in November and December. While during the first three waves, roughly two-fifths of respondents (39.4% to 41.4%) agreed that the protesters used excessive force, the percentage dropped to 32.8% during the latest wave. At the same time, the disagreeing percentage increased from roughly 30% (29.3% to 31.5%) during the first three waves to 37.4% during the last wave. Hence, the last wave of surveys was the first time that the disagreeing percentage outweighed the agreeing percentage.

Table 45. Protesters' use of excessive force

	Third wave (August 7 – August 13)		Fourth wave (September 5 – September 11)		Fifth wave (October 8 – October 14)		Sixth wave (November 7 – December 13)	
Strongly agree	22.1%	39.5%	21.2%	39.4%	22.0%	41.4%	17.1%	32.8%
Somewhat agree	17.4%		18.2%		19.4%		15.7%	
So-so	29.4%		26.6%		28.7%		28.3%	
Somewhat disagree	14.7%	29.8%	16.1%	31.5%	13.8%	29.3%	17.2%	37.4%
Strongly disagree	15.0%		15.4%		15.5%		20.2%	
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	1.4%		2.5%		0.6%		1.5%	
Total (Sample size)	100% (842)		100% (623)		100% (751)		100% (2,008)	

Question: Do you agree with the statement that 'the protesters have used excessive force'? Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, so-so, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree?

Subgroup analysis of the last wave of surveys illustrated that the following subgroups were more inclined to agree (strongly agree/somewhat agree) that the protesters have used excessive force (see full results in the Appendix, Section 8.2.4, Table 33):

- People ages 40-49 (41.3%)
- People with a Form 4-7 secondary education (37.7%)
- People not in the workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees) (36.3%)
- People with a monthly family income of HK$25,000-39,999 (36.0%)

- People who identify themselves as pro-establishment (86.7%)
- People who are against the Movement (86.0%)

6.3.3 Accountability

When asked about who should bear the most responsibility for the escalation in violence, across three survey waves, most respondents (50.5% to 58.9%) attributed the blame to the SAR government (see Table 46). As the Movement evolved, more and more respondents blamed the SAR government, while barely half the respondents (50.5%) said so during the fourth wave, with the percentage increasing to 58.9% during the latest wave.

Across three survey waves, roughly one-fifth of respondents said the Central government (17.8% to 23.8%) and Hong Kong police (18.1% to 22.5%) should be held accountable.

In addition, roughly one-tenth of respondents opined the protesters (9.6% to 12.7%) and foreign forces (9.4% to 11.6%) should be held most accountable for violence. Moreover, less than one-tenth blamed politicians: pan-democratic legislators (6.8% to 9.8%) and pro-establishment legislators (4.9% to 7.0%). No respondents cited other actors, and some respondents (2.5% to 5.7%) answered 'don't know/refuse to answer'.

Table 46. Accountability for escalation of violence

	Fourth wave (September 5 – September 11)	Fifth wave (October 8 – October 14)	Sixth wave (November 7 – December 13)
Central government	17.8%	19.3%	23.8%
SAR government	50.5%	52.5%	58.9%
Hong Kong police	18.5%	18.1%	22.5%
Pro-establishment legislators	4.9%	5.4%	7.0%
Pan-democratic legislators	9.8%	8.4%	6.8%
Protesters	12.7%	9.6%	11.0%
Foreign forces	11.6%	9.4%	9.9%
Others	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Don't know/refuse to answer	2.5%	5.7%	3.4%
(Sample size)	(623)	(751)	(2,008)

Question: There has been an escalation of violence by both the police and protesters. Who do you think should bear the most responsibility for the violent conflicts?

Some subgroup differences were notable in terms of attribution of responsibility. For example, females blamed the SAR government more than males did. Younger respondents laid the most blame on the SAR government and the police, while older respondents placed more blame on protesters and

foreign forces. In addition, highly educated people blamed the Central government, SAR government, police and pro-establishment legislators the most (see full results in the Appendix, Section 8.2.4, Table 34).

6.4 News Acquisition and Political Participation

6.4.1 News Acquisition

The Movement has revealed that Hong Kong has a vibrant information landscape. Over the past several months, people could acquire lots of movement-related information from numerous channels on a daily basis.

As shown in Table 47, most respondents said that 'news coverage by traditional media' (56.5%) and 'live media broadcasts' (55.2%) were important channels for them to receive information about the Movement. Over two-fifths (44.8%) mentioned 'text reporting by online media'; roughly 3-in-10 (29.2%) cited 'social media'; 14.5% and 10.4% highlighted 'LIHKG' and 'information forwarded by family members or peers' respectively; and 10.2% cited 'Telegram'. Some respondents suggested other channels (1.5%) or answered 'don't know/refuse to answer' (1.0%).

Table 47. Important channels for receiving information about the Movement

News coverage by traditional media	56.5%
Media live broadcast	55.2%
Text reporting by online media	44.8%
Social media	29.2%
LIHKG	14.5%
Information forwarded by family members or peers	10.4%
Telegram	10.2%
Others	1.5%
Don't know/refuse to answer	1.0%
(Sample size)	(2,008)

Question: Which of the following channels are important for you to receive information about the anti-extradition bill movement?
Note: Respondents could choose up to three answers; therefore, the percentages do not add up to 100%.

A comparison of subgroups identified different news-acquisition patterns. For example, older people, lesser-educated and lower-income people, those not in the workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees), pro-establishment people and those who opposed the Movement tended to rely more on traditional media to receive information about the Movement. Meanwhile, younger people, students, highly educated and higher-income people, localists and movement supporters tended to receive information from social media, LIHKG and

Telegram more than other groups did (see full results in the Appendix, Section 8.2.4, Table 35).

As illustrated, despite the proliferation of information channels, media outlets have remained the most important news source for the public to receive movement-related information. When asked about their views on journalists' work in conflict situations during protests, most respondents said that it was more important for journalists to record on-site situations (71.2%) than to refrain from obstructing police work (23.9%) (see Table 48).

Table 48. Views on journalists' work in conflict situations

Recording on-site situations	71.2%
Refraining from obstructing police work	23.9%
Don't know/refuse to answer	4.9%
Total (Sample size)	100% (2,008)

Question: When journalists are covering news in conflict situations during protests, which of the following things do you think is more important: recording on-site situations or refraining from obstructing police work?

Among all respondents, the following subgroups attached more importance to the journalistic work of 'record(ing) on-site situations' (see full results in the Appendix, Section 8.2.4, Table 36):

- Males (73.4%)
- People ages 15-29 (90.5%)
- People with a tertiary education (80.3%)
- Students (90.6%)
- People with a monthly family income of HK$40,000-59,999 (78.2%)
- People who identify themselves as localists (95.8%)
- People who support the Movement (93.8%)

6.4.2 Political Participation

Finally, the survey examined political participation in relation to the controversies surrounding the Fugitive Offenders Bill. Respondents were asked whether they had participated in a range of activities during the Movement (see Table 49). Over two-fifths of respondents (43.2%) have participated in anti-extradition bill protests or rallies. Roughly 3-in-10 respondents (32.5%) have provided assistance to protesters (such as donating money or resources, or offering free rides, etc.) and have expressed feelings on Lennon Walls (27.2%). Less than one-fifth (16.3%) has participated in besieging or occupying actions, or has provided on-site support. Only a small portion of respondents (4.1%) has had verbal or physical conflicts with the police. In addition, 0.6% to 1.4% answered 'don't know/refuse to answer'.

Table 49. Participation in the Movement

	Participated in anti-extradition bill protests or rallies	Provided assistance to protesters, such as donating money or resources, or offering free rides, etc.	Expressed feelings on Lennon Walls	Participated in besieging or occupying actions, or provided on-site support	Participated in verbal or physical conflicts with police
Yes	43.2%	32.5%	27.2%	16.3%	4.1%
No	56.2%	66.3%	71.9%	82.3%	94.9%
Don't know/ Refuse to answer	0.6%	1.3%	0.9%	1.4%	1.0%
Total (Sample size)	100% (2,008)	100% (2,008)	100% (2,008)	100% (2,008)	100% (2,008)

Question: Have you done any of the following things during the anti-extradition bill movement?

Overall, over half the respondents (52.6%) have participated in at least one of the aforementioned activities during the Movement. Subgroup analysis found that males, young people, students, highly educated and higher-income people, localists and movement supporters generally were more active in participating in different movement activities (see full results in the Appendix, Section 8.2.4, Table 37; for the subgroup analysis of participation patterns for each activity, see the Appendix, Section 8.2.4, Tables 38-42).

The respondents (n=1,056) also were asked for the reasons why they participated in pro-movement activities (see Table 50). The distribution of

different reasons was fairly even. The following reasons all were chosen by roughly two-fifths of respondents: 'express dissatisfaction with the government's handling of the Fugitive Offenders Bill controversies' (40.0%); 'express dissatisfaction with overall governance' (39.4%); 'strive to get the government to meet the demands' (39.2%); and 'support young protesters' (38.4%). In addition, 34.6% and 14.7% aimed to 'express dissatisfaction with the police's handling of the protests' and 'raise international attention', respectively. No respondents cited any other reasons, and a tiny portion (0.2%) answered 'don't know/refuse to answer'.

Table 50. Reasons for participation in pro-movement activities

Express dissatisfaction with the government's handling of the Fugitive Offenders Bill controversies	40.0%
Express dissatisfaction with overall governance	39.4%
Strive to get the government to meet the demands	39.2%
Support young protesters	38.4%
Express dissatisfaction with the police's handling of the protests	34.6%
Raise international attention	14.7%
Others	0.0%
Don't know/refuse to answer	0.2%
(Sample size)	(1,056)

Question: What are the main reasons for your participation in these activities?
Note: Respondents could choose more than one answer; therefore, the percentages do not add up to 100%.

Some subgroup differences existed in terms of the reasons for participating in pro-movement activities. For example, females emphasised 'strive to get the government to meet the demands' and 'support young protesters', while younger respondents stressed 'strive to get the government to meet the demands,' as well as 'express dissatisfaction with the police's handling of the protests' and 'raise international attention'. Highly educated people attached more importance to nearly every reason for participation (see full results in the Appendix, Section 8.2.4, Table 43).

On the other hand, respondents also were asked to indicate whether they had participated in pro-government/pro-police activities (see Table 51). The overwhelming majority of respondents did not participate in related activities. Only 2.3% participated in pro-Fugitive Offenders Bill/pro-police protests or rallies, 0.8% participated in verbal or physical conflicts with protesters and

0.6% joined activities to express appreciation to police officers for their service, such as donating money or sending them fruit baskets and or other gifts, etc.

Table 51. Participation in pro-government/pro-police activities

	Participated in pro-Fugitive Offenders Bill/pro-police protests or rallies	Participated in verbal or physical conflicts with protesters	Expressed appreciation to police officers for their service, e.g., donating money or sending them fruit baskets or other gifts, etc.
Yes	2.3%	0.8%	0.6%
No	97.4%	99.1%	99.2%
Don't know/refuse to answer	0.3%	0.1%	0.2%
Total (Sample size)	100% (2,008)	100% (2,008)	100% (2,008)

Question: On the other hand, have you done the following things?

Overall, 3.3% of respondents have participated in at least one of the aforementioned pro-government/pro-police activities. Among all groups, older people, managers and administrators, pro-establishment people and those who opposed the Movement were more inclined toward joining pro-government/pro-police activities (see full results in the Appendix, Section 8.2.4, Table 44. For a subgroup analysis of each activity's participation pattern, see the Appendix, Section 8.2.4, Tables 45-47).

Because the telephone survey focussed more on the Movement, the questionnaire did not probe further into the reasons why people participated in pro-government/pro-police activities.

7. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION

This section aims to synthesise the research findings from both the on-site protest surveys and telephone surveys to provide a more organised account of public opinion during the Movement. We will supplement the survey data with the digital data extracted from LIHKG, an online discussion forum heavily used by protesters. As many of the events in the Movement were deliberated and organised online, it is useful to observe the online discussion as well.

In many aspects, the Movement is unlike any of the previous social movements in Hong Kong. The Movement's uniqueness lies in its (1) formation and mobilising structure, (2) motivation, (3) strategy, (4) interaction dynamics between police and protesters, and (5) emphasis on structural demands.

First, in terms of formation and mobilising structure, the Movement can be viewed as a community-wide movement with widespread involvement from members of the public. The Movement was grounded solidly in a majority opinion against the Fugitive Offenders Bill. Over time, while the Movement's goals have evolved, it has continued to receive significant public backing.

Our on-site protest surveys found that the protesters come from diverse demographic backgrounds – men and women, young and old, university and secondary school graduates, middle-class and grassroots. In terms of political orientation, except the pro-establishment citizens, the Movement has encompassed people from a very wide spectrum of political ideologies (self-identified) — moderate democrats, radical democrats, localists, centrists and those with no political affiliation. In terms of social movement experiences, the protesters included many veteran protest participants, as well as a considerable portion of novice participants.

The Movement's 'community-wide involvement' nature also is evident in the variety of protest events throughout the Movement. Apart from the mass events

that traditional social movement groups have organised (i.e., the huge demonstrations that the Civil Human Rights Front organised), the Movement is replete with numerous events organised by many different sectors/professions (e.g., the legal, medical, aviation and financial professions; civil servants; teachers; and journalists) and social groups (e.g., seniors, mothers, women, students and ethnic minorities). In addition, the diffusion of the Lennon Walls in different districts across the city is also indicative of the widespread participation of Hong Kong's population. According to the last wave of our telephone surveys, over half the respondents (52.6%) have participated in the Movement in one way or another.

Against this backdrop, media and anecdotal accounts have described the Movement as having 'no central stage', i.e., the Movement has been leaderless and decentralised. This structure has been sustained by the use of digital media. Our survey data show that digital media (particularly LIHKG, and social media like Facebook and Telegram) have served not only as information sources, but also as participatory platforms that have enabled the self-mobilisation of people from all walks of life.

Our surveys have also helped us to understand public views towards the Movement. As our latest telephone survey in November and December shows, most interviewed citizens (over 60%) pledged their support to the Movement even after a prolonged escalation of conflicts between protesters and police. And despite the withdrawal of the Fugitive Offenders Bill, 70% of respondents said the protesters should continue pressuring the government to yield to other demands. After a few months of developments, the Movement still enjoyed widespread public support.


Second, in terms of motivation, the Movement is multi-faceted in its demands, but the most important focus since mid-July has been on alleged police abuse of power. More survey respondents perceived that police, rather than protesters, had used excessive force, and the public viewed a wide range of police practices and actions as problematic.

The Movement originated from dissent against a single policy proposal, i.e., the unpopular Fugitive Offenders Bill. In the early stages of the Movement in June and early July, a 'call for the withdrawal of the Fugitive Offenders Bill' was the most important movement goal upheld by the protesters (i.e., 89.4% to 92.6% of our survey respondents viewed this goal as 'very important'). However, as soon as the government announced the 'suspension' of the bill in mid-June, the protesters started to incorporate more demands into the Movement, with concerns about the ways the police has handled the protests being the top priority. By mid-July (July 14), the percentage of respondents who agreed that 'express dissatisfaction with police's handling of the protests' was a very important protest motivation had surpassed that of calling for withdrawal of the Fugitive Offenders Bill (90.4% over 88.0%). This shows that the concern over police actions against the protests had become a very grave one among protesters.

Most notably, dissatisfaction with the police actions reached its peak in late July. During the July 27 protest in Yuen Long, nearly all protesters (98.3%) viewed it as very important to express their dissatisfaction with the police's handling of the protests, much higher than the percentage calling for withdrawal of the Fugitive Offenders Bill (85.1%). On that day, thousands of protesters marched to Yuen Long to join an unauthorised rally to protest against suspected collusion between the police and gangsters on July 21, in which both parties allegedly conspired to create a 'moment of no police', which allowed the gangsters to launch an indiscriminate attack freely on protesters and ordinary citizens on the streets and at the MTR station in Yuen Long. Recognising that police brutality had become a top movement agenda item, we added other police actions-related items, such as 'express dissatisfaction with police charging arrested protesters for rioting' and 'call for establishment of an independent commission of inquiry' in later surveys. Both causes have enjoyed widespread support among the interviewed protesters (roughly 90% of respondents mostly agreed that these two causes were 'very important').

To triangulate the on-site survey findings, we deployed digital methods to monitor the changes in corresponding online data. We found that our survey data largely coincided with the digital data gathered online. To observe the protesters' online opinions and sentiments towards the police, we analysed the discussion data (i.e., contents of posts) extracted from LIHKG. Figure 1 shows the percentage of posts on LIHKG that mentioned the term 'black cops' (黑警) from June to mid-October. In the Movement, the protesters consistently have accused the Hong Kong police officers of being 'black cops', referring to their frequent violation of standard police protocols in failing to approach the protests humanely and reasonably. As shown in Figure 1, mentions of the term 'black cops' started to increase around mid-June (especially after the June 12 clash), and despite some ups and downs, the term has continued to be a recurring discussion theme on LIHKG throughout the Movement.

Figure 1. Mentions of 'black cops' on LIHKG



Note: The percentage is calculated by dividing the number of posts that included the term 'black cops' by the overall number of posts on the given day.


Apart from the protesters, the general public also has expressed its dissatisfaction with the police. Our telephone surveys found that as the Movement evolved, members of the public had more distrust of the police, with most respondents (over 70%) dissatisfied with police performance in the Movement; they also disapproved of many police operations in responding to

the protests, especially firing live rounds at protesters and concealing police identification numbers on uniforms. Furthermore, while roughly 70% of respondents agreed that the police have used excessive force, only 30% to 40% of respondents accused the protesters of such actions.

Third, in terms of strategy, the Movement has witnessed an expansion, innovation and radicalisation of protest repertoires never seen in Hong Kong's recent history. Many citizens had reservations about some of the most radical tactics, but moderate protesters and a significant portion of the general public have expressed understanding and/or sympathy toward radical actions.

Overall, the Movement's protest strategy can be characterised by three defining features: fluidity; diversity; and radicalisation. With fluidity, the Movement has been practising the so-called 'be water' philosophy. Instead of occupying a particular location, like the Umbrella Movement in 2014, protesters this time made the protests more mobile, like wildcat strikes, thereby making their actions more unpredictable and more difficult for the government and police to target. Figure 2 shows the frequency of the term 'be water' on LIHKG. It illustrates that a continuing discussion of this tactic existed throughout the Movement. The discussion was the most heated during and in the aftermath of certain events, such as the Hong Kong Island protest on July 21, the Tseung Kwan O and Sai Wan protests on August 4, the airport sit-in on August 10 and the protests in Sham Shui Po and Eastern District on August 11 – when the tension between protesters and the police started to mount. In many situations, the online discussion of the 'be water' tactic was meant to be a reminder to frontline protesters, urging them to stay afloat and refrain from direct confrontations with police.

Figure 2. Mentions of 'be water' on LIHKG



Note: The percentage is calculated by dividing the number of posts that included the term 'be water' by the overall number of posts on the given day.

For diversity, the protest actions in the Movement were carried out in various forms: marches; rallies; sit-ins; wildcat actions; flash mobs; labour strikes; class boycotts; human chains; and mass singing in public, among other tactics. While some were typical protest actions (e.g., marches, rallies, sit-ins) in Hong Kong, some were new activities (e.g., human chains and mass singing in public). According to our surveys, respondents had engaged in a variety of protest actions in the past six months, though to varying degrees. The actions ranged from expressing opinions online or on Lennon Walls, and donating and distributing money and resources, to singing protest songs, joining human chains and clashing with the police. The proliferation of protest repertories demonstrates not only the Hong Kong protesters' creativity, but also their resolve in pursuing their demands in whatever possible ways they could think of.

For radicalisation, unlike previous large-scale social movements after the handover (e.g., the July 1 rally in 2003, the anti-national education movement in 2012, the Occupy/ Umbrella Movement in 2014), the Movement has seen a rare and sustained co-existence between peaceful actions and militant confrontations. Our survey data suggest a high level of acceptance of radical


actions by protesters throughout the Movement. Across the on-site protest surveys, most respondents thought that radical protests could pressure the government to listen to public opinion (roughly 50% to 60% in most surveys) and maximise the Movement's impact when conducted in conjunction with peaceful assemblies (roughly 80% to 90%), and that radical protests were justified and understandable when the government refused to listen to the people (mostly over 90%). In addition, as the Movement continued, fewer respondents were worried that radical protests could alienate the general public. The percentage was roughly 50% to 60% during the Movement's early stages, but it dropped to 20% to 40% during the later stages.

As the government continued to refuse to make further concessions and as the police stepped up their efforts to repress the Movement, the frontline protesters also increasingly have escalated their militant actions. During the early phases of the Movement (in June and July), the protesters mainly used umbrellas, threw bricks and set up roadblocks during the confrontational protests, but during the later stages, they started to use fire and petrol bombs, damage public transport facilities and private property, and attack counter-protesters or bystanders.

The radicalisation trend could be reflected in the surge of online discussions about radical tactics. For example, from August onward, the protesters started to call MTR the 'party rail' (黨鐵), accusing the corporation of serving the mainland authorities' interests to help suppress the Movement by closing its train stations in the face of protests (see Figure 3). Since then, MTR has become an attack target of the protesters. In August, the term 'fire magic' (火魔法), which is a euphemism for petrol bombs or arson, also gained more attention in online discussions (see Figure 4). Other popular terms, such as 'vigilantism' (私了), i.e., counter-attacking the people who harassed or attacked the protesters, started to surface online in September (see Figure 5), as well as 'renovation' (裝修), a euphemism for damaging shops or properties, which appeared in October (see Figure 6).


In fact, some of the aforementioned radical tactics had been adopted at various protests long before the related terms appeared online. Therefore, we could not equate the increase in online discussions about radical tactics exactly with the actual radicalisation of protest acts on the ground, as both might not coincide in the timeline. Rather, we might recognise the fact that the protesters and ordinary netizens have talked more openly about radical tactics online as a kind of discursive or cognitive radicalisation. It reasonably can be inferred that the more the people talked about radical tactics publicly and the more they legitimised their uses (using euphemisms to downplay the danger), the more they accepted the radical actions in their minds. Certainly, this hypothesis would require empirical proof through vigorous research, which is beyond this report's scope.

Figure 3. Mentions of 'party rail' on LIHKG




Note: The percentage is calculated by dividing the number of posts that included the term 'party rail' by the overall number of posts on the given day.

Figure 4. Mentions of 'fire magic' on LIHKG




Note: The percentage is calculated by dividing the number of posts that included the term 'fire magic' by the overall number of posts on the given day.

Figure 5. Mentions of 'vigilantism' on LIHKG



Note: The percentage is calculated by dividing the number of posts that included the term 'vigilantism' or the associated online slang ('lion bird 獅鳥') by the overall number of posts on the given day.

Figure 6. Mentions of 'renovation' on LIHKG



Note: The percentage is calculated by dividing the number of posts that included the term 'renovation' by the overall number of posts on the given day.

Despite the escalation in violence on the part of some radical protesters, the Movement largely remained united in the sense that the increased adoption of violent acts has not alienated moderate protesters. Across our on-site protest surveys from July to December, we discerned a consistently high level of solidarity among the protesters, with the overwhelming majority of respondents (over 90%) thinking that the radical protesters actually were speaking out on their behalf and that they were in the same boat with the radical protesters. They also felt that they were part of the radical protesters. These findings suggest that the movement slogans of 'climbing mountains together, making your own efforts' and 'don't snitch, don't split up' actually were effective in bridging non-violent and militant protesters.

Apart from the protesters themselves, a sense of solidarity also was found among the general public. The commissioned telephone survey found that while many respondents did not accept many of the radical actions, they did sympathise with the protesters. For example, most survey respondents agreed that it was understandable for protesters to engage in radical actions given that the government failed to listen. In addition, when asked about who should mainly take the blame for the violent conflicts, most respondents pointed to the

Hong Kong government; only a few respondents (roughly one-tenth) mainly blamed the protesters.


Fourth, perceptions of police misconduct and abuse of power were driven partly by the occurrence of key events between June and December 2019, with several events, such as the July 21 Yuen Long attack and the 831 Prince Edward Station incident, etc., playing a particularly important role in shaping public opinion and online discourse.

The commissioned telephone survey found that nearly 70% of respondents said that their image of the police has worsened because of their performance during the Movement. Chief among the events or issues that have caused deterioration in the image of police was the 721 incident (82.2%). Other critical events included the 831 incident (49.8%), the firing of live rounds at a protester on October 1 (38.3%) and the handling of detained people at the San Uk Ling Holding Centre (29.0%).

The digital data that we have gathered confirmed that some of the key defining events have fuelled online discussions about alleged police misconduct during various stages of the Movement. In fact, throughout the Movement, many controversies about the police's handling of the protests have become trending online discussion topics. As mentioned earlier, one of the most serious accusations made by the protesters against the police in the Movement was their alleged collusion with gangsters on July 21. Figure 7 shows that mentions of the term 'police-gangster collusion' (警黑勾結) only started to surface on LIHKG after the '721 incident'. After the police's arrest actions at the Prince Edward MTR station on August 31, where there were rumours that the protesters were killed by the police inside the station, the term 'beating people to death' (打死人) immediately became a hot issue on LIHKG (see Figure 8). In September, lots of rumours or not-yet-verified information also was circulated online that the arrested protesters were mistreated, tortured or even sexually assaulted by police at the San Uk Ling (新屋嶺) Holding Centre in New Territories North (see Figure 9). Regardless of these accusations' veracity, the


appearance of these negative and adversarial discourses *per se* pointed to the netizens' distrust in the police.

Figure 7. Mentions of 'police-gangster collusion' on LIHKG




Note: The percentage is calculated by dividing the number of posts that included the term 'police-gangster collusion' by the overall number of posts on the given day.

Figure 8. Mentions of 'beating people to death' on LIHKG



Note: The percentage is calculated by dividing the number of posts that included the term 'beating people to death' by the overall number of posts on the given day.

Figure 9. Mentions of 'San Uk Ling' on LIHKG



Note: The percentage is calculated by dividing the number of posts that included the term 'San Uk Ling' by the overall number of posts on the given day.

Altogether, the survey and digital data indicated the overwhelming importance of the issue of police abuse of power in the Movement. The shift in the Movement's focus from the Fugitive Offenders Bill to the police perhaps could explain why the Movement could have lasted for such a long time. While the demand for withdrawal of the bill is a static concern, dissatisfaction towards the police is a persistent dynamic between the police and the protesters, as well as the citizens at large. Whenever events appeared to involve police abuses of power, the Movement's momentum could be maintained or further energised. The on-site protest surveys found that a very high percentage of respondents (70% to 80%) indicated that, having seen the police's mass-scale arrests, they were, indeed, even more determined to participate in the protests.

Fifth, despite the event-driven character, public grievances and distrust toward the police and the government have accumulated to a crisis level. As a result, opinions among the public and the protesters have evolved over time to focus more and more on certain fundamental and structural issues, to the extent that there was significant support among the general public for restructuring the police force and political reform.

Until January 2020, the Movement already had lasted for over six months. The Movement's sustainability can be attributed partly to protesters' desire for institutional reform. The on-site protest surveys found that the main reasons why the protesters participated in the Movement were not only to express dissatisfaction with the ways the police have handled the protests and to call for establishment of an independent commission of inquiry to look into the police misconduct or specific critical events, but also to strive for reform or even for disbanding of the police force.

In addition, aside from the concerns over police misconduct, we also found that striving for Hong Kong's democracy/dual universal suffrage has been one of the top protest motivations (i.e., roughly 80% to 90% of interviewed protesters viewed this cause as 'very important'). However, quite surprisingly, while the protesters thought that the government should be held responsible for creating the most serious political crisis in Hong Kong since the handover, they did not see the resignation of Chief Executive Carrie Lam and other major officials as a very important goal (roughly 40% to 50% of respondents viewed this cause as 'very important'). The stark differences between calling for institutional reforms and officials' resignations are significant and notable, showing that protesters were seeking a fundamental overhaul of the political system, rather than some short-term quick fixes.

This commissioned research report has offered a holistic overview of public opinion on the Movement by examining the views of the protesters and general public. The *on-site protest surveys* have provided a rich descriptive account of several key aspects of the Movement (protesters' profiles, motivations that have driven the Movement, the ways in which the Movement has been organised and the protesters' views toward certain core features of this unprecedented social movement, namely radicalisation, persistence and solidarity), whereas the *telephone surveys* have captured the evolution of public opinion on the police, the protesters and the Movement, as well as on escalation of conflicts in the Movement.

Summarising all the findings, it would be fair to say that most of the Hong Kong public has been supportive of the Movement, though there can, indeed, be some disagreement regarding the legitimacy of specific protest tactics. More importantly, the Hong Kong public consistently has expressed deep concerns about police conduct throughout the past six months. And what started as a movement on a specific controversial policy has evolved into a broader call for democratic reform of Hong Kong's political system. Indeed, Hong Kong people's trust in the police force and the government has fallen to very low levels. Therefore, it is necessary for the government to take concrete and effective steps to listen to and engage with the public, and be proactive in addressing public concerns and demands.

8. APPENDIX

8.1 On-site Protest Surveys

8.1.1 Full Statistical Tables

Section 5.1.1 Demographics

Table 1. Age

Date of Protest	19 or below	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	50-54	55-59	60-64	65 or above	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
June 9	10.5%	20.7%	11.6%	8.4%	5.6%	6.3%	4.6%	8.4%	6.0%	6.7%	7.4%	3.9%	100% (285)
June 12	6.3%	27.9%	34.2%	19.0%	5.1%	2.5%	1.3%	0.8%	1.7%	0.0%	0.0%	1.1%	100% (175)
June 16	15.6%	16.3%	18.3%	12.9%	9.0%	5.4%	4.2%	6.6%	4.2%	2.7%	4.7%	0.1%	100% (875)
June 17	15.5%	33.0%	25.8%	11.4%	4.1%	2.1%	2.1%	2.1%	1.0%	1.4%	0.7%	0.9%	100% (717)
June 21	14.6%	54.2%	16.4%	8.6%	4.6%	0.0%	0.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.0%	100% (316)
June 26	11.2%	40.9%	23.7%	12.7%	4.1%	1.7%	2.6%	0.2%	1.2%	0.5%	0.0%	1.2%	100% (418)
July 1	12.9%	18.6%	18.3%	11.0%	6.1%	7.8%	4.5%	4.9%	6.1%	4.9%	3.6%	1.3%	100% (1,169)
July 14	7.3%	23.9%	18.5%	12.3%	8.5%	6.2%	4.2%	5.8%	4.2%	4.1%	3.6%	1.4%	100% (546)
July 21	11.9%	23.3%	17.5%	10.6%	5.6%	5.3%	3.4%	5.8%	5.6%	4.7%	3.8%	2.6%	100% (680)
July 27	6.0%	26.0%	19.6%	18.3%	8.1%	8.1%	6.0%	2.6%	2.6%	0.9%	1.3%	0.9%	100% (235)
August 4 (TKO)	8.6%	27.9%	20.5%	10.5%	8.0%	7.5%	3.8%	6.2%	3.0%	2.8%	1.3%	0.0%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	6.8%	28.7%	21.4%	11.4%	6.6%	5.3%	4.0%	7.0%	4.1%	3.7%	0.9%	0.1%	100% (555)
August 10	11.0%	25.8%	26.5%	14.2%	7.9%	4.7%	3.2%	2.6%	1.8%	1.3%	0.5%	0.4%	100% (2,309)
August 11	13.4%	20.6%	24.3%	9.7%	7.3%	3.6%	3.6%	8.5%	1.2%	5.7%	1.6%	0.4%	100% (636)
August 13	22.5%	34.4%	18.8%	9.7%	6.6%	3.1%	2.5%	0.8%	1.2%	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%	100% (485)
August 16	10.1%	36.4%	25.0%	13.9%	5.9%	1.7%	1.9%	1.9%	1.4%	0.6%	0.3%	0.8%	100% (632)
August 18	8.2%	25.5%	27.9%	13.1%	6.6%	4.9%	0.8%	4.1%	7.4%	0.7%	0.2%	0.6%	100% (806)
August 25	11.0%	25.3%	22.0%	14.2%	5.9%	5.6%	2.4%	5.1%	5.9%	1.1%	1.3%	0.0%	100% (372)

August 31	16.1%	29.6%	19.7%	9.7%	8.0%	4.6%	4.7%	4.4%	1.5%	1.1%	0.6%	0.0%	100% (527)
September 8	3.3%	29.4%	21.4%	11.9%	8.9%	5.3%	4.7%	4.7%	4.7%	1.2%	1.8%	2.7%	100% (337)
September 15	10.1%	26.6%	19.8%	12.4%	7.7%	5.6%	4.1%	5.6%	2.9%	2.5%	0.5%	2.3%	100% (911)
September 28	5.2%	17.3%	16.0%	13.8%	10.9%	7.9%	10.1%	6.7%	7.4%	3.5%	1.2%	0.0%	100% (405)
October 1	3.3%	9.4%	14.7%	14.2%	13.4%	10.6%	9.8%	9.2%	8.8%	4.5%	1.7%	0.3%	100% (640)
October 14	6.5%	21.6%	19.5%	15.6%	10.7%	6.5%	7.3%	5.4%	4.1%	1.2%	1.2%	0.5%	100% (662)
October 20	7.3%	18.3%	16.6%	15.1%	9.6%	9.3%	7.6%	6.4%	5.9%	2.8%	1.1%	0.0%	100% (921)
December 8	16.5%	22.2%	22.2%	10.0%	5.0%	5.7%	5.0%	2.9%	3.6%	4.3%	2.1%	0.4%	100% (902)

Section 5.2.1 Protest Motivations

Table 2. How important are the following objectives to your participation in today's protest? 'Call for withdrawal of the Fugitive Offenders Bill'

Date of protest	Not important at all	Somewhat unimportant	So-so	Somewhat important	Very important	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
June 9	1.1%	0.4%	1.1%	4.9%	92.6%	0.0%	100% (285)
June 16	0.1%	0.2%	0.7%	4.0%	94.8%	0.1%	100% (875)
July 1	0.3%	0.3%	1.3%	8.1%	89.4%	0.5%	100% (1,169)
July 14	0.2%	0.4%	1.2%	10.0%	88.0%	0.2%	100% (546)
July 21	0.8%	0.1%	2.1%	9.9%	87.1%	0.0%	100% (680)
July 27	0.9%	0.9%	4.3%	8.5%	85.1%	0.4%	100% (235)
August 4 (TKO)	0.8%	0.5%	3.1%	8.1%	87.3%	0.2%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	1.0%	0.8%	3.6%	8.5%	85.9%	0.2%	100% (555)
August 10	0.6%	0.4%	1.0%	3.7%	94.1%	0.1%	100% (2,309)
August 11	0.7%	0.4%	0.9%	6.0%	91.9%	0.2%	100% (636)
August 13	2.1%	0.2%	1.2%	6.6%	89.7%	0.2%	100% (485)
August 16	0.8%	1.4%	3.8%	8.7%	85.1%	0.2%	100% (632)

Table 3. How important are the following objectives to your participation in today's protest? 'Call for the resignation of Carrie Lam or major officials'

Date of protest	Not important at all	Somewhat unimportant	So-so	Somewhat important	Very important	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
June 16	0.6%	2.5%	12.2%	21.0%	63.5%	0.3%	100% (875)
July 1	1.6%	6.1%	17.5%	27.3%	47.4%	0.2%	100% (1,169)
July 14	1.5%	5.4%	20.1%	26.0%	46.8%	0.1%	100% (546)
July 21	2.1%	3.9%	14.4%	24.5%	54.8%	0.3%	100% (680)
July 27	3.4%	7.2%	12.8%	20.4%	55.7%	0.4%	100% (235)

August 4 (TKO)	2.8%	5.4%	16.0%	24.7%	51.0%	0.1%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	2.1%	7.2%	16.5%	24.6%	49.4%	0.2%	100% (555)
August 10	2.0%	5.8%	17.3%	24.0%	50.8%	0.0%	100% (2,309)
August 11	2.0%	5.0%	16.5%	26.1%	50.2%	0.1%	100% (636)
August 13	2.9%	4.9%	18.8%	21.9%	51.5%	0.0%	100% (485)
August 16	5.5%	8.7%	20.3%	24.4%	41.0%	0.2%	100% (632)
September 8	4.7%	11.9%	20.2%	22.8%	40.4%	0.0%	100% (337)
December 8	3.1%	3.2%	8.4%	19.5%	65.3%	0.4%	100% (902)

Table 4. How important are the following objectives to your participation in today's protest? 'Express dissatisfaction with the police's handling of the protests'

Date of protest	Not important at all	Somewhat unimportant	So-so	Somewhat important	Very important	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
June 16	0.1%	0.1%	1.3%	8.2%	89.8%	0.6%	100% (875)
July 1	0.4%	0.4%	1.4%	12.6%	84.6%	0.6%	100% (1,169)
July 14	0.2%	0.0%	0.4%	8.7%	90.4%	0.3%	100% (546)
July 21	0.7%	0.0%	1.0%	7.1%	90.9%	0.3%	100% (680)
July 27	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.9%	98.3%	0.9%	100% (235)
August 4 (TKO)	0.8%	0.0%	0.0%	3.1%	95.4%	0.7%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	1.2%	0.0%	0.0%	3.0%	95.1%	0.7%	100% (555)
August 10	0.6%	0.1%	0.3%	3.2%	95.3%	0.4%	100% (2,309)
August 11	0.6%	0.0%	0.1%	5.0%	93.4%	0.9%	100% (636)
August 13	2.3%	0.0%	0.0%	1.4%	95.5%	0.8%	100% (485)
August 16	1.1%	0.5%	1.6%	4.1%	91.6%	1.1%	100% (632)
September 8	0.6%	0.6%	3.0%	8.6%	85.5%	1.8%	100% (337)
December 8	2.8%	0.2%	0.2%	2.2%	92.9%	1.6%	100% (902)

Table 5. How important are the following objectives to your participation in today's protest? 'Express dissatisfaction with police charging arrested protesters for rioting'

Date of protest	Not important at all	Somewhat unimportant	So-so	Somewhat important	Very important	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
August 4 (TKO)	0.8%	0.1%	0.7%	7.8%	90.1%	0.6%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	1.0%	0.0%	0.8%	6.5%	91.0%	0.7%	100% (555)
August 10	0.6%	0.2%	1.2%	6.7%	90.7%	0.5%	100% (2,309)
August 11	0.6%	0.3%	1.1%	8.0%	89.1%	1.0%	100% (636)
August 13	2.1%	0.8%	0.6%	7.2%	88.7%	0.6%	100% (485)
August 16	1.1%	0.6%	1.9%	6.6%	88.4%	1.3%	100% (632)

Table 6. How important are the following objectives to your participation in today's protest? 'Strive for Hong Kong's democracy/dual universal suffrage'

Date of protest	Not important at all	Somewhat unimportant	So-so	Somewhat important	Very important	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
July 1	0.5%	1.0%	2.9%	12.0%	82.5%	1.1%	100% (1,169)
July 14	0.7%	0.2%	4.5%	19.3%	74.9%	0.4%	100% (546)
July 21	0.7%	0.1%	0.9%	10.8%	87.2%	0.3%	100% (680)
July 27	0.0%	0.0%	2.1%	8.9%	88.1%	0.9%	100% (235)
August 4 (TKO)	0.8%	0.0%	1.5%	12.1%	85.0%	0.7%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	0.8%	0.3%	2.0%	8.3%	88.2%	0.3%	100% (555)
August 10	0.6%	0.2%	0.9%	7.9%	89.9%	0.6%	100% (2,309)
August 11	0.6%	0.1%	1.1%	10.0%	87.1%	1.1%	100% (636)
August 13	2.1%	0.4%	2.1%	7.6%	87.0%	0.8%	100% (485)
August 16	1.1%	0.0%	0.5%	5.5%	91.1%	1.7%	100% (632)
September 8	0.6%	0.0%	0.0%	3.9%	91.4%	4.2%	100% (337)
December 8	2.6%	0.2%	0.5%	7.2%	88.3%	1.3%	100% (902)

Note: For the survey on July 14, the question's wording is 'strive for dual universal suffrage'. For all other surveys, the question's wording is 'strive for Hong Kong's democracy'.

Table 7. How important are the following objectives to your participation in today's protest? 'Call for establishment of an independent commission of inquiry'

Date of protest	Not important at all	Somewhat unimportant	So-so	Somewhat important	Very important	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
July 21	0.7%	0.1%	0.4%	5.6%	92.5%	0.6%	100% (680)
July 27	0.0%	0.4%	1.3%	2.6%	94.9%	0.9%	100% (235)
August 4 (TKO)	0.9%	0.3%	1.0%	4.5%	92.8%	0.6%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	1.0%	0.3%	1.3%	5.5%	91.1%	0.7%	100% (555)
August 10	0.6%	0.3%	0.6%	3.4%	94.7%	0.4%	100% (2,309)
August 11	0.7%	0.3%	0.6%	5.0%	92.2%	1.2%	100% (636)
August 13	2.7%	0.0%	1.0%	5.2%	90.5%	0.6%	100% (485)
August 16	1.6%	0.6%	3.2%	6.2%	87.5%	0.9%	100% (632)
September 8	0.6%	0.9%	3.3%	12.5%	81.0%	1.8%	100% (337)
October 14	2.1%	0.0%	1.4%	4.4%	90.8%	1.4%	100% (662)
October 20	1.2%	0.3%	1.8%	3.8%	91.6%	1.2%	100% (921)
December 8	2.6%	0.4%	0.4%	3.1%	92.0%	1.4%	100% (902)

Table 8. How important are the following objectives to your participation in today's protest? 'Raise international attention'

Date of protest	Not important at all	Somewhat unimportant	So-so	Somewhat important	Very important	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
June 9	1.4%	0.7%	3.9%	14.4%	79.6%	0.0%	100% (285)
June 16	0.2%	0.4%	3.1%	16.4%	79.4%	0.4%	100% (875)
July 1	0.7%	0.7%	4.7%	18.5%	74.8%	0.6%	100% (1,169)
September 8	0.6%	0.0%	0.9	3.0%	91.4%	4.2%	100% (337)

Table 9. How important are the following objectives to your participation in today's protest? 'Call for withdrawal of the "riot" characterisation of the June 12 protest/ or certain protests'

Date of protest	Not important at all	Somewhat unimportant	So-so	Somewhat important	Very important	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
July 14	0.2%	0.6%	3.0%	10.5%	85.0%	0.8%	100% (546)
July 21	0.9%	0.3%	0.9%	11.2%	86.4%	0.3%	100% (680)
July 27	0.4%	1.7%	5.1%	8.5%	83.8%	0.4%	100% (235)
August 4 (TKO)	0.8%	0.4%	2.1%	10.3%	85.9%	0.6%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	1.0%	0.7%	2.4%	9.9%	85.3%	0.7%	100% (555)
September 8	0.6%	1.5%	4.2%	18.7%	73.9%	1.2%	100% (337)
December 8	2.6%	0.4%	2.2%	10.6%	82.7%	1.4%	100% (902)

Note: For the surveys in July and August, the question's wording is 'call for the withdrawal of the "riot" characterization of the June 12 protest'. For the survey on September 8 and December 8, the question's wording is 'call for withdrawal of the "riot" characterization of certain protests'.

Table 10. How important are the following objectives to your participation in today's protest? 'Lack of representativeness in Hong Kong's political system'

Date of protest	Not important at all	Somewhat unimportant	So-so	Somewhat important	Very important	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
October 1	3.0%	0.2%	1.4%	9.4%	85.3%	0.8	100% (640)
October 14	2.1%	0.3%	2.6%	18.0%	76.4%	0.6%	100% (662)
October 20	1.2%	0.3%	2.1%	18.6%	76.8%	1.1%	100% (921)

Table 11. How important are the following objectives to your participation in today's protest? 'The implementation of "one country, two systems" has not fulfilled original promises'

Date of protest	Not important at all	Somewhat unimportant	So-so	Somewhat important	Very important	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
October 1	3.1%	0.0%	0.6%	4.1%	91.4%	0.8%	100% (640)
October 14	2.1%	0.0%	0.5%	5.0%	92.1%	0.3%	100% (662)

Table 12. How important are the following objectives to your participation in today's protest? 'Hong Kong's governance only serves the interests of the few'

Date of protest	Not important at all	Somewhat unimportant	So-so	Somewhat important	Very important	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
October 1	3.0%	1.7%	4.8%	19.5%	69.5%	1.4%	100% (640)
October 14	2.3%	1.2%	5.4%	23.0%	67.5%	0.6%	100% (662)

Table 13. How important are the following objectives to your participation in today's protest? 'Hong Kong government does not listen to public opinion'

Date of protest	Not important at all	Somewhat unimportant	So-so	Somewhat important	Very important	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
October 1	3.1%	0.0%	0.6%	1.6%	92.8%	1.9%	100% (640)
October 14	2.1%	0.0%	0.0%	3.2%	93.7%	1.1%	100% (662)
October 20	1.4%	0.0%	0.3%	2.7%	94.6%	1.0%	100% (921)

Table 14. How important are the following objectives to your participation in today's protest? 'Gradual lacking of upward mobility in Hong Kong'

Date of protest	Not important at all	Somewhat unimportant	So-so	Somewhat important	Very important	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
October 1	2.8%	4.2%	18.9%	29.8%	42.7%	1.6%	100% (640)
October 14	2.0%	5.0%	23.0%	27.6%	42.0%	0.5%	100% (662)
October 20	2.7%	9.3%	29.5%	30.1%	27.3%	1.1%	100% (921)

Table 15. How important are the following objectives to your participation in today's protest? 'Call for disbanding/reform of the police force'

Date of protest	Not important at all	Somewhat unimportant	So-so	Somewhat important	Very important	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
October 14	2.1%	1.2%	5.4%	13.0%	76.9%	1.4%	100% (662)
October 20	1.3%	2.0%	6.7%	15.1%	73.4%	1.5%	100% (921)
December 8	2.7%	0.3%	2.0%	8.9%	84.5%	1.7%	100% (902)

Note: The question's wording on the December 8 survey is 'Call for reform of the police force'. For all other surveys, the question's wording is 'Call for disbanding of the police force'.

Table 16. How important are the following objectives to your participation in today's protest? 'Defend civil liberties'

Date of protest	Not important at all	Somewhat unimportant	So-so	Somewhat important	Very important	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
October 20	1.2%	0.1%	0.7%	3.1%	93.9%	1.0%	100% (921)

Section 5.2.2 Changes in Movement Demands

Table 17. As the government announced the 'suspension' of the bill, how much do you agree with the shift in demand from 'withdraw the Fugitive Offenders Bill' to 'restart political reform'?

Date of protest	Strongly disagree	Disagree	So-so	Agree	Strongly agree	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
July 21	4.6%	5.9%	23.7%	26.4%	37.7%	1.8%	100% (680)
July 27	5.5%	6.0%	20.9%	18.3%	47.2%	2.1%	100% (235)
August 4 (TKO)	4.8%	5.7%	19.1%	24.1%	44.0%	2.4%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	4.1%	3.9%	17.1%	20.7%	53.0%	1.2%	100% (555)
August 10	6.5%	5.9%	22.0%	22.3%	40.0%	3.3%	100% (2,309)
August 11	7.0%	5.0%	19.1%	23.6%	42.5%	2.7%	100% (636)
August 13	9.1%	4.9%	21.9%	24.5%	35.3%	4.3%	100% (485)
August 16	4.0%	4.6%	16.8%	21.5%	51.4%	1.7%	100% (632)

Table 18. As the government announced the 'suspension' of the bill, how much do you agree with the shift in demand from 'withdraw the Fugitive Offenders Bill' to 'focus on police brutality'?

Date of protest	Strongly disagree	Disagree	So-so	Agree	Strongly agree	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
July 21	2.6%	3.6%	13.7%	23.1%	56.1%	0.9%	100% (680)
July 27	2.1%	3.8%	12.8%	13.6%	67.2%	0.4%	100% (235)
August 4 (TKO)	2.2%	2.7%	9.7%	15.7%	68.9%	0.8%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	2.5%	2.0%	8.5%	17.8%	68.6%	0.7%	100% (555)
August 10	5.0%	3.6%	14.2%	20.6%	55.7%	0.9%	100% (2,309)
August 11	3.5%	2.9%	13.4%	20.5%	58.9%	0.9%	100% (636)
August 13	5.8%	1.6%	12.4%	19.8%	59.4%	1.0%	100% (485)
August 16	3.3%	3.3%	13.0%	20.1%	59.5%	0.8%	100% (632)

Table 19. As the government announced the 'suspension' of the bill, how much do you agree with the shift in of demand from 'withdraw the Fugitive Offenders Bill' to 'focus on community issues'?

Date of protest	Strongly disagree	Disagree	So-so	Agree	Strongly agree	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
July 21	7.9%	14.5%	35.5%	20.6%	19.6%	2.0%	100% (680)
July 27	9.8%	14.0%	35.7%	18.3%	19.6%	2.6%	100% (235)
August 4 (TKO)	9.3%	10.1%	32.3%	25.2%	20.1%	3.1%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	8.2%	8.5%	34.5%	26.2%	20.3%	2.4%	100% (555)
August 10	11.1%	13.2%	35.9%	21.0%	15.7%	3.2%	100% (2,309)
August 11	10.0%	10.9%	38.1%	20.1%	17.6%	3.3%	100% (636)
August 13	14.0%	11.5%	32.6%	21.2%	16.7%	3.9%	100% (485)
August 16	12.7%	13.4%	36.7%	21.8%	13.4%	1.9%	100% (632)

Section 5.2.3 Political Slogans

Table 20. To what extent do you think the following slogans can represent the anti-extradition bill movement? 'We want universal suffrage' (我要直普選)

Date of protest	Not representative at all	Somewhat not representative	So-so	Somewhat representative	Very representative	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
August 4 (TKO)	0.6%	3.2%	17.7%	28.3%	49.4%	0.8%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	0.4%	3.5%	14.7%	27.7%	53.7%	0.0%	100% (555)
August 10	0.6%	3.3%	16.4%	28.4%	50.7%	0.6%	100% (2,309)
August 11	0.8%	2.0%	15.3%	24.6%	56.8%	0.4%	100% (636)
August 13	1.2%	5.2%	20.6%	25.6%	45.8%	1.6%	100% (485)
August 16	0.8%	3.6%	13.8%	29.6%	51.3%	0.9%	100% (632)

Table 21. To what extent do you think the following slogans can represent the anti-extradition bill movement? 'Don't snitch, don't split up' (不篤灰、不割席)

Date of protest	Not representative at all	Somewhat not representative	So-so	Somewhat representative	Very representative	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
August 4 (TKO)	0.6%	0.6%	10.6%	22.3%	63.7%	2.1%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	0.6%	1.2%	9.5%	19.9%	67.4%	1.5%	100% (555)
August 10	0.4%	0.9%	6.7%	21.0%	70.0%	1.0%	100% (2,309)
August 11	0.6%	1.2%	6.8%	18.9%	71.1%	1.4%	100% (636)
August 13	0.8%	1.6%	6.8%	21.0%	69.1%	0.6%	100% (485)
August 16	0.3%	0.2%	3.2%	13.6%	82.0%	0.8%	100% (632)

Table 22. To what extent do you think the following slogans can represent the anti-extradition bill movement? 'Climbing mountains together, making your own efforts' (兄弟爬山，各自努力)

Date of protest	Not representative at all	Somewhat not representative	So-so	Somewhat representative	Very representative	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
August 4 (TKO)	0.7%	1.5%	10.1%	21.4%	63.8%	2.4%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	0.9%	2.3%	8.1%	20.1%	67.5%	1.2%	100% (555)
August 10	0.7%	1.3%	8.4%	20.8%	67.3%	1.5%	100% (2,309)
August 11	1.2%	1.7%	7.9%	18.0%	69.4%	1.8%	100% (636)
August 13	1.4%	2.5%	10.3%	23.5%	60.8%	1.4%	100% (485)
August 16	0.5%	0.5%	4.4%	15.0%	78.8%	0.8%	100% (632)

Table 23. To what extent do you think the following slogans can represent the anti-extradition bill movement? 'Up and down together' (齊上齊落)

Date of protest	Not representative at all	Somewhat not representative	So-so	Somewhat representative	Very representative	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
August 4 (TKO)	0.6%	0.2%	4.2%	19.5%	73.9%	1.7%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	0.3%	1.3%	5.3%	15.9%	76.6%	0.5%	100% (555)
August 10	0.5%	0.3%	6.0%	17.5%	74.8%	1.0%	100% (2,309)
August 11	0.7%	0.1%	3.8%	15.4%	78.8%	1.2%	100% (636)
August 13	0.8%	1.0%	3.7%	19.2%	73.8%	1.4%	100% (485)
August 16	0.5%	0.3%	4.6%	15.8%	78.0%	0.8%	100% (632)

Table 24. To what extent do you think the following slogans can represent the anti-extradition bill movement? 'No rioters, only tyranny' (沒有暴徒，只有暴政)

Date of protest	Not representative at all	Somewhat not representative	So-so	Somewhat representative	Very representative	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
August 4 (TKO)	0.5%	0.0%	1.5%	5.2%	92.3%	0.5%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	7.0%	91.9%	0.5%	100% (555)
August 10	0.4%	0.1%	1.0%	5.8%	92.2%	0.5%	100% (2,309)
August 11	0.5%	0.1%	2.3%	7.0%	89.4%	0.7%	100% (636)
August 13	1.0%	0.2%	0.8%	5.6%	91.8%	0.6%	100% (485)
August 16	0.2%	0.6%	1.4%	8.2%	88.8%	0.8%	100% (632)

Table 25. To what extent do you think the following slogans can represent the anti-extradition bill movement? 'Hong Kong police consciously violating the law' (香港警察，知法犯法)

Date of protest	Not representative at all	Somewhat not representative	So-so	Somewhat representative	Very representative	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
August 4 (TKO)	0.4%	0.1%	1.4%	7.4%	89.9%	0.8%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	0.2%	0.4%	0.9%	6.5%	91.0%	1.0%	100% (555)
August 10	0.5%	0.1%	2.5%	9.1%	87.4%	0.4%	100% (2,309)
August 11	0.7%	0.1%	2.5%	9.7%	85.6%	1.3%	100% (636)
August 13	1.0%	0.0%	1.0%	6.4%	90.9%	0.6%	100% (485)
August 16	0.5%	0.5%	3.0%	8.9%	86.4%	0.8%	100% (632)

Table 26. To what extent do you think the following slogans can represent the anti-extradition bill movement? 'Liberate Hong Kong, revolution of our times' (光復香港，時代革命)

Date of protest	Not representative at all	Somewhat not representative	So-so	Somewhat representative	Very representative	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
August 4 (TKO)	1.1%	1.1%	11.5%	16.7%	67.5%	2.1%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	0.6%	1.0%	8.3%	17.0%	71.1%	1.9%	100% (555)
August 10	0.7%	2.6%	10.0%	18.5%	67.0%	1.2%	100% (2,309)
August 11	1.7%	2.1%	8.9%	19.6%	65.3%	2.4%	100% (636)
August 13	0.8%	1.4%	8.9%	14.4%	73.6%	0.8%	100% (485)
August 16	0.5%	0.3%	4.1%	12.7%	81.5%	0.9%	100% (632)

Table 27. To what extent do you think the following slogans can represent the anti-extradition bill movement? 'Hong Kong people, add oil' (香港人加油)

Date of protest	Not representative at all	Somewhat not representative	So-so	Somewhat representative	Very representative	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
August 4 (TKO)	0.3%	1.5%	7.8%	12.8%	76.8%	0.9%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	0.5%	1.0%	6.4%	10.5%	80.6%	1.0%	100% (555)
August 10	0.9%	2.0%	7.4%	12.1%	77.0%	0.6%	100% (2,309)
August 11	1.0%	2.2%	9.8%	12.0%	74.2%	0.7%	100% (636)
August 13	1.2%	2.1%	9.9%	15.3%	70.7%	0.8%	100% (485)
August 16	1.7%	2.4%	13.1%	18.0%	63.8%	0.9%	100% (632)

Section 5.3.2 Decentralised Organising

Table 28. How important are the roles of following organisations and platforms to this movement? (on June 21)

	Not important at all	Somewhat unimportant	So-so	Somewhat important	Very important	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
Civil Human Rights Front	1.2%	3.1%	20.9%	44.9%	27.8%	2.2%	100% (316)
University student unions	1.5%	1.7%	15.7%	45.6%	32.2%	3.3%	100% (316)
Pan-democratic parties	1.7%	6.6%	27.8%	39.1%	22.3%	2.5%	100% (316)
Civic organisations	0.8%	3.1%	21.8%	39.7%	30.5%	4.1%	100% (316)
LIHKG	0.4%	0.6%	8.6%	27.6%	57.2%	5.5%	100% (316)
Social media (Facebook, Instagram, etc.)	0.8%	0.9%	10.9%	30.7%	54.4%	2.3%	100% (316)
Telegram	0.7%	0.0%	11.4%	29.0%	52.8%	6.1%	100% (316)

Table 29. How important are the roles of following organisations and platforms to this movement? (on June 26)

	Not important at all	Somewhat unimportant	So-so	Somewhat important	Very important	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
Civil Human Rights Front	3.3%	3.1%	20.6%	44.7%	27.5%	0.7%	100% (418)
University student unions	1.2%	3.1%	21.1%	42.1%	30.9%	1.7%	100% (418)
Pan-democratic parties	2.9%	6.7%	27.0%	42.3%	19.9%	1.2%	100% (418)
Civic organisations	1.2%	3.1%	19.4%	45.2%	28.9%	2.2%	100% (418)
LIHKG	0.7%	0.0%	4.8%	22.2%	69.4%	2.9%	100% (418)
Facebook	1.9%	4.1%	16.0%	34.4%	40.7%	2.9%	100% (418)
Instagram	4.5%	7.9%	26.1%	30.6%	24.6%	6.2%	100% (418)
Telegram	2.4%	1.2%	8.4%	28.0%	50.2%	9.8%	100% (418)

Section 5.3.3 Digital Media Usage

Table 30. How often do you receive information about the anti-extradition bill movement through the following platforms? 'Traditional media (e.g., newspapers and TV)'

Date of protest	Never	Seldom	Occasionally	Quite often	Very often	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
June 26	7.4%	21.3%	24.6%	21.3%	23.2%	2.2%	100% (418)
July 1	5.0%	11.4%	21.9%	26.5%	34.9%	0.4%	100% (1,169)
July 14	3.8%	15.9%	20.4%	24.8%	34.5%	0.5%	100% (546)
July 21	6.3%	12.6%	21.1%	24.4%	34.7%	0.8%	100% (680)
July 27	6.4%	13.6%	19.6%	22.6%	37.9%	0.0%	100% (235)
August 4 (TKO)	4.8%	13.3%	20.7%	21.4%	39.7%	0.1%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	3.2%	18.2%	16.4%	22.4%	39.8%	0.0%	100% (555)
August 10	4.6%	15.0%	24.0%	21.3%	34.7%	0.3%	100% (2,309)
August 11	6.2%	15.2%	22.4%	19.1%	36.3%	0.8%	100% (636)
August 13	4.9%	12.6%	18.8%	22.3%	40.8%	0.6%	100% (485)
August 16	5.1%	18.7%	25.2%	21.5%	29.1%	0.5%	100% (632)
August 18	3.1%	13.7%	21.9%	25.5%	35.7%	0.2%	100% (806)
August 25	3.5%	15.3%	19.4%	23.9%	37.4%	0.5%	100% (372)
August 31	3.0%	14.8%	21.8%	19.0%	41.4%	0.0%	100% (527)
September 8	5.3%	17.2%	25.2%	20.2%	32.0%	0.0%	100% (337)
September 15	4.1%	14.5%	22.6%	21.5%	37.1%	0.2%	100% (911)
September 28	5.7%	13.3%	23.0%	20.5%	37.5%	0.0%	100% (405)
October 1	3.1%	15.2%	20.8%	19.8%	40.9%	0.2%	100% (640)
October 14	4.5%	14.8%	23.1%	22.5%	34.9%	0.2%	100% (662)
October 20	4.5%	16.2%	20.1%	25.2%	34.1%	0.0%	100% (921)
December 8	6.2%	16.8%	18.1%	21.5%	36.6%	0.7%	100% (902)

Table 31. How often do you receive information about the anti-extradition bill movement through the following platforms? 'Online news media (e.g., *StandNews*, *In-Media*)'

Date of protest	Never	Seldom	Occasionally	Quite often	Very often	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
June 26	1.7%	1.0%	6.9%	30.9%	58.1%	1.4%	100% (418)
July 1	4.2%	2.7%	8.7%	27.7%	55.7%	1.0%	100% (1,169)
July 14	2.7%	2.9%	6.4%	25.6%	62.3%	0.1%	100% (546)
July 21	2.4%	2.6%	6.2%	23.2%	64.5%	1.1%	100% (680)
July 27	0.0%	0.4%	3.4%	16.2%	80.0%	0.0%	100% (235)
August 4 (TKO)	0.0%	1.6%	2.8%	14.6%	80.8%	0.2%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	0.7%	0.4%	2.6%	13.0%	83.3%	0.0%	100% (555)
August 10	0.2%	0.4%	2.0%	16.2%	81.2%	0.0%	100% (2,309)
August 11	0.7%	0.5%	3.0%	20.0%	75.2%	0.6%	100% (636)
August 13	0.2%	0.2%	2.7%	14.8%	81.9%	0.2%	100% (485)
August 16	0.3%	0.0%	2.5%	13.4%	83.4%	0.3%	100% (632)
August 18	0.6%	0.8%	3.3%	18.2%	76.8%	0.3%	100% (806)
August 25	0.3%	0.3%	3.2%	20.2%	75.5%	0.5%	100% (372)
August 31	0.0%	0.2%	3.4%	15.4%	81.0%	0.0%	100% (527)
September 8	0.3%	0.6%	3.6%	19.3%	76.3%	0.0%	100% (337)
September 15	0.5%	0.4%	2.0%	18.4%	78.4%	0.2%	100% (911)
September 28	0.0%	0.7%	2.0%	15.3%	82.0%	0.0%	100% (405)
October 1	0.3%	1.1%	2.8%	17.0%	78.8%	0.0%	100% (640)
October 14	0.2%	0.0%	2.3%	15.7%	81.4%	0.5%	100% (662)
October 20	0.3%	0.4%	1.8%	17.6%	79.7%	0.1%	100% (921)
December 8	0.3%	1.0%	3.8%	15.3%	79.3%	0.5%	100% (902)

Table 32. How often do you receive information about the anti-extradition bill movement through the following platforms? 'Facebook'

Date of protest	Never	Seldom	Occasionally	Quite often	Very often	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
June 26	2.9%	5.7%	10.3%	21.1%	58.4%	1.7%	100% (418)
July 1	6.2%	4.2%	9.4%	20.9%	56.9%	2.4%	100% (1,169)
July 14	4.7%	5.6%	7.9%	24.1%	57.0%	0.6%	100% (546)
July 21	7.5%	4.0%	8.2%	21.2%	58.5%	0.6%	100% (680)
July 27	1.3%	3.0%	5.1%	14.5%	75.7%	0.4%	100% (235)
August 4 (TKO)	2.5%	3.8%	5.5%	16.9%	71.0%	0.4%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	4.8%	2.4%	6.9%	9.5%	76.2%	0.1%	100% (555)
August 10	2.7%	2.8%	6.2%	14.5%	73.5%	0.4%	100% (2,309)
August 11	4.3%	4.2%	4.4%	17.7%	68.1%	1.3%	100% (636)
August 13	2.3%	6.0%	8.5%	15.1%	67.8%	0.4%	100% (485)
August 16	1.4%	4.1%	6.6%	18.2%	69.0%	0.6%	100% (632)
August 18	4.5%	3.8%	6.9%	16.8%	67.9%	0.2%	100% (806)
August 25	3.0%	4.0%	6.5%	15.1%	71.0%	0.5%	100% (372)
August 31	3.4%	4.2%	7.6%	13.9%	70.6%	0.4%	100% (527)
September 8	2.7%	3.3%	7.4%	16.0%	70.3%	0.3%	100% (337)
September 15	3.3%	3.7%	6.6%	16.8%	69.2%	0.4%	100% (911)
September 28	3.0%	4.0%	7.4%	14.6%	71.1%	0.0%	100% (405)
October 1	4.1%	3.3%	6.3%	13.8%	72.5%	0.2%	100% (640)
October 14	2.0%	3.2%	5.0%	14.2%	75.1%	0.6%	100% (662)
October 20	3.7%	3.5%	7.4%	15.3%	69.5%	0.7%	100% (921)
December 8	5.1%	6.2%	8.5%	15.7%	63.5%	0.9%	100% (902)

Table 33. How often do you receive information about the anti-extradition bill movement through the following platforms? 'Instagram'

Date of protest	Never	Seldom	Occasionally	Quite often	Very often	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
June 26	7.7%	14.4%	17.5%	23.7%	32.3%	4.5%	100% (418)
July 1	19.0%	11.5%	12.9%	18.3%	32.8%	5.5%	100% (1,169)
July 14	19.9%	13.8%	15.3%	19.6%	29.0%	2.4%	100% (546)
July 21	23.7%	11.2%	13.0%	16.0%	33.3%	2.9%	100% (680)
July 27	17.9%	14.0%	14.9%	13.2%	39.6%	0.4%	100% (235)
August 4 (TKO)	17.9%	11.0%	14.5%	14.0%	41.4%	1.1%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	19.3%	11.8%	13.6%	12.4%	42.7%	0.3%	100% (555)
August 10	14.2%	10.7%	13.8%	15.1%	45.0%	1.3%	100% (2,309)
August 11	19.9%	11.8%	17.1%	11.8%	36.8%	2.5%	100% (636)
August 13	6.0%	8.2%	12.4%	13.6%	59.0%	0.8%	100% (485)
August 16	13.0%	13.0%	13.0%	16.6%	43.5%	0.9%	100% (632)
August 18	17.4%	12.9%	13.7%	13.5%	41.7%	0.8%	100% (806)
August 25	15.3%	12.4%	12.4%	18.3%	40.1%	1.6%	100% (372)
August 31	13.9%	12.3%	12.3%	16.1%	44.2%	1.1%	100% (527)
September 8	15.4%	15.1%	14.5%	17.5%	36.5%	0.9%	100% (337)
September 15	14.2%	12.4%	13.6%	16.0%	42.8%	1.0%	100% (911)
September 28	25.9%	14.6%	15.1%	11.9%	31.9%	0.7%	100% (405)
October 1	24.5%	17.3%	17.5%	10.5%	29.2%	0.9%	100% (640)
October 14	17.4%	13.3%	13.1%	13.6%	41.2%	1.4%	100% (662)
October 20	21.2%	12.2%	13.7%	13.0%	37.9%	2.1%	100% (921)
December 8	14.7%	7.9%	12.6%	14.1%	49.2%	1.4%	100% (902)

Table 34. How often do you receive information about the anti-extradition bill movement through the following platforms? 'WhatsApp'

Date of protest	Never	Seldom	Occasionally	Quite often	Very often	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
June 26	4.8%	15.8%	22.2%	25.1%	28.7%	3.3%	100% (418)
July 1	8.4%	12.4%	20.8%	24.6%	30.7%	3.3%	100% (1,169)
July 14	8.0%	12.6%	18.0%	25.1%	34.9%	1.4%	100% (546)
July 21	9.7%	14.2%	22.2%	21.6%	30.9%	1.3%	100% (680)
July 27	2.6%	7.2%	19.6%	17.0%	53.6%	0.0%	100% (235)
August 4 (TKO)	4.7%	11.1%	18.8%	20.5%	44.6%	0.2%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	5.8%	10.1%	19.8%	19.2%	44.9%	0.3%	100% (555)
August 10	3.8%	9.2%	22.3%	21.4%	43.0%	0.4%	100% (2,309)
August 11	5.4%	10.2%	17.6%	24.7%	40.6%	1.6%	100% (636)
August 13	2.9%	7.8%	20.6%	19.2%	49.1%	0.4%	100% (485)
August 16	4.9%	12.3%	21.7%	20.6%	40.0%	0.5%	100% (632)
August 18	2.6%	11.4%	18.6%	24.0%	42.9%	0.5%	100% (806)
August 25	3.5%	7.5%	22.0%	21.2%	44.4%	1.3%	100% (372)
August 31	3.6%	13.1%	22.2%	20.7%	40.0%	0.4%	100% (527)
September 8	3.0%	11.3%	24.6%	20.8%	40.1%	0.3%	100% (337)
September 15	3.6%	12.5%	19.4%	22.9%	40.9%	0.5%	100% (911)
September 28	4.4%	11.4%	23.2%	22.2%	38.8%	0.0%	100% (405)
October 1	2.7%	8.0%	19.4%	21.7%	48.1%	0.2%	100% (640)
October 14	1.7%	7.9%	15.7%	23.3%	50.9%	0.6%	100% (662)
October 20	4.1%	10.1%	19.7%	22.9%	43.0%	0.2%	100% (921)
December 8	4.5%	11.5%	22.6%	20.3%	40.4%	0.6%	100% (902)

Table 35. How often do you receive information about the anti-extradition bill movement through the following platforms? 'Telegram'

Date of protest	Never	Seldom	Occasionally	Quite often	Very often	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
June 26	18.7%	9.8%	12.7%	19.6%	31.3%	7.9%	100% (418)
July 1	34.7%	9.6%	11.1%	12.5%	19.4%	12.7%	100% (1,169)
July 14	30.1%	11.2%	12.5%	12.7%	29.7%	3.8%	100% (546)
July 21	35.0%	9.5%	10.0%	12.1%	30.0%	3.4%	100% (680)
July 27	26.0%	6.4%	11.5%	10.2%	45.1%	0.9%	100% (235)
August 4 (TKO)	23.6%	8.4%	10.8%	14.0%	41.4%	1.7%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	26.5%	5.7%	8.8%	10.0%	48.3%	0.7%	100% (555)
August 10	19.0%	6.1%	9.3%	13.7%	49.1%	2.8%	100% (2,309)
August 11	20.2%	5.0%	9.3%	13.7%	49.2%	2.6%	100% (636)
August 13	16.3%	6.2%	7.2%	11.1%	57.3%	1.9%	100% (485)
August 16	10.9%	4.3%	7.8%	14.1%	61.9%	1.1%	100% (632)
August 18	24.6%	7.6%	9.7%	15.4%	41.8%	0.8%	100% (806)
August 25	16.7%	6.7%	11.8%	14.8%	48.7%	1.3%	100% (372)
August 31	14.4%	6.8%	9.9%	13.7%	53.3%	1.9%	100% (527)
September 8	16.9%	6.2%	10.7%	12.2%	52.8%	1.2%	100% (337)
September 15	11.9%	5.6%	10.5%	15.6%	55.5%	0.9%	100% (911)
September 28	18.0%	5.2%	11.1%	15.3%	50.1%	0.2%	100% (405)
October 1	20.3%	7.8%	11.6%	14.4%	45.6%	0.3%	100% (640)
October 14	9.2%	3.9%	8.5%	14.4%	61.9%	2.1%	100% (662)
October 20	15.1%	6.3%	10.3%	14.4%	51.6%	2.3%	100% (921)
December 8	13.9%	4.0%	8.1%	13.1%	59.7%	1.1%	100% (902)

Table 36. How often do you receive information about the anti-extradition bill movement through the following platforms? 'Online forums (e.g., LIHKG)'

Date of protest	Never	Seldom	Occasionally	Quite often	Very often	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
June 26	6.2%	4.8%	10.3%	18.7%	55.3%	4.8%	100% (418)
July 1	17.1%	6.5%	14.8%	16.6%	38.6%	6.4%	100% (1,169)
July 14	12.5%	6.1%	12.9%	19.2%	47.7%	1.5%	100% (546)
July 21	14.9%	7.4%	10.3%	15.4%	49.1%	2.9%	100% (680)
July 27	7.2%	3.8%	11.9%	17.4%	59.1%	0.4%	100% (235)
August 4 (TKO)	6.8%	5.2%	12.3%	15.7%	59.3%	0.7%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	8.3%	5.0%	10.8%	14.8%	60.2%	0.9%	100% (555)
August 10	3.6%	2.4%	9.7%	16.2%	67.1%	1.0%	100% (2,309)
August 11	6.7%	3.7%	8.2%	17.6%	62.6%	1.3%	100% (636)
August 13	2.1%	3.5%	6.2%	15.3%	72.2%	0.8%	100% (485)
August 16	2.4%	2.2%	8.7%	13.9%	72.3%	0.5%	100% (632)
August 18	6.6%	6.3%	12.3%	17.0%	57.3%	0.4%	100% (806)
August 25	3.0%	6.2%	16.7%	17.5%	55.6%	1.1%	100% (372)
August 31	4.4%	3.0%	9.9%	16.7%	65.8%	0.2%	100% (527)
September 8	4.5%	5.3%	8.9%	19.6%	61.4%	0.3%	100% (337)
September 15	4.4%	3.4%	10.2%	18.9%	62.5%	0.7%	100% (911)
September 28	7.2%	5.4%	15.1%	16.3%	56.0%	0.0%	100% (405)
October 1	7.5%	6.6%	16.1%	19.1%	50.5%	0.3%	100% (640)
October 14	4.4%	4.7%	14.4%	18.0%	58.2%	0.5%	100% (662)
October 20	4.3%	4.6%	13.0%	19.9%	57.4%	0.8%	100% (921)
December 8	5.2%	6.3%	13.9%	18.1%	55.8%	0.8%	100% (902)

Table 37. How often do you distribute information about the anti-extradition bill movement through the following platforms? (on June 21)

	Never	Seldom	Occasionally	Quite often	Very often	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
Facebook	15.7%	12.7%	15.0%	17.7%	35.6%	3.2%	100% (316)
Instagram	9.9%	10.9%	21.1%	17.5%	37.1%	3.6%	100% (316)
WhatsApp	4.3%	8.8%	21.2%	27.9%	34.5%	3.3%	100% (316)
Telegram	25.1%	13.5%	16.7%	14.2%	23.2%	7.3%	100% (316)
LIHKG	21.2%	10.0%	17.0%	16.0%	27.6%	8.3%	100% (316)

Table 38. How often do you distribute information about the anti-extradition bill movement through the following platforms? (on June 26)

	Never	Seldom	Occasionally	Quite often	Very often	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
Facebook	18.4%	12.7%	15.3%	16.5%	35.2%	1.9%	100% (418)
Instagram	13.4%	14.6%	22.7%	16.7%	28.2%	4.3%	100% (418)
WhatsApp	5.7%	11.2%	23.2%	25.6%	31.8%	2.4%	100% (418)
Telegram	31.3%	10.3%	15.8%	12.0%	21.8%	8.9%	100% (418)
LIHKG	36.4%	8.9%	13.9%	10.3%	23.9%	6.7%	100% (418)

Section 5.4.1 Radicalization

Table 39. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 'Radical protests could make the government heed public opinion'

Date of protest	Strongly disagree	Disagree	So-so	Agree	Strongly agree	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
June 12	3.2%	14.2%	41.7%	33.0%	5.2%	2.7%	100% (175)
June 17	4.1%	13.1%	28.8%	39.9%	13.3%	0.8%	100% (717)
June 21	1.0%	8.1%	28.3%	47.4%	14.3%	0.9%	100% (316)
June 26	3.1%	11.2%	26.1%	40.7%	15.6%	3.3%	100% (418)
July 1	8.8%	17.8%	30.7%	29.0%	11.5%	2.2%	100% (1,169)
July 21	3.5%	9.8%	30.7%	36.3%	18.0%	1.7%	100% (680)
July 27	0.9%	4.3%	27.2%	36.6%	28.9%	2.1%	100% (235)
August 4 (TKO)	3.7%	8.7%	35.1%	33.4%	16.7%	2.5%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	3.5%	11.3%	36.4%	32.8%	14.5%	1.5%	100% (555)
August 10	4.0%	9.4%	38.4%	30.3%	15.1%	2.8%	100% (2,309)
August 11	3.4%	8.6%	34.8%	31.2%	19.6%	2.3%	100% (636)
August 13	3.5%	12.0%	40.6%	27.0%	13.6%	3.3%	100% (485)
August 16	2.1%	9.3%	31.3%	35.1%	19.6%	2.5%	100% (632)
August 18	3.8%	8.0%	36.9%	34.0%	14.9%	2.3%	100% (806)
August 25	2.2%	6.5%	33.9%	37.1%	18.3%	2.2%	100% (372)
September 15	3.0%	6.7%	25.4%	40.0%	22.2%	2.9%	100% (911)
October 14	0.5%	4.5%	26.6%	42.1%	24.0%	2.3%	100% (662)
October 20	1.5%	3.9%	29.5%	41.2%	21.2%	2.7%	100% (921)
December 8	1.1%	6.2%	25.9%	41.4%	23.8%	1.7%	100% (902)

Table 40. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? ‘Radical protests could alienate the general public’

Date of protest	Strongly disagree	Disagree	So-so	Agree	Strongly agree	Don’t know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
June 12	1.9%	9.9%	33.0%	47.1%	5.5%	2.6%	100% (175)
June 17	1.5%	7.0%	29.5%	50.7%	10.5%	0.9%	100% (717)
June 21	1.2%	8.8%	32.5%	47.8%	8.8%	0.9%	100% (316)
June 26	2.2%	12.2%	36.1%	40.9%	6.2%	2.4%	100% (418)
July 1	3.1%	9.1%	32.0%	42.6%	12.3%	0.9%	100% (1,169)
July 21	6.2%	14.5%	45.1%	28.3%	4.8%	1.2%	100% (680)
July 27	6.0%	15.3%	44.7%	23.4%	8.9%	1.7%	100% (235)
August 4 (TKO)	5.8%	15.1%	42.2%	28.4%	7.3%	1.2%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	3.8%	14.1%	47.2%	26.2%	7.6%	1.1%	100% (555)
August 10	3.9%	10.9%	40.9%	35.5%	7.4%	1.4%	100% (2,309)
August 11	5.1%	11.5%	42.7%	31.2%	8.3%	1.3%	100% (636)
August 13	3.5%	12.2%	41.0%	36.9%	5.8%	0.6%	100% (485)
August 16	4.6%	15.7%	40.7%	33.9%	4.6%	0.6%	100% (632)
August 18	4.2%	13.3%	43.8%	31.1%	6.3%	1.3%	100% (806)
August 25	5.1%	20.4%	48.1%	20.7%	3.8%	1.9%	100% (372)
September 15	7.2%	19.3%	43.9%	23.8%	3.8%	1.9%	100% (911)
October 14	3.3%	13.7%	46.4%	29.0%	6.8%	0.8%	100% (662)
October 20	5.3%	19.8%	44.0%	25.2%	4.8%	1.0%	100% (921)
December 8	8.6%	22.6%	41.2%	22.7%	4.1%	0.9%	100% (902)

Table 41. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 'The maximum impact could be achieved only when peaceful assembly and confrontational actions work together'

Date of protest	Strongly disagree	Disagree	So-so	Agree	Strongly agree	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
June 17	1.3%	3.2%	12.0%	33.4%	46.2%	3.9%	100% (717)
June 21	0.7%	1.1%	7.9%	36.0%	53.0%	1.3%	100% (316)
June 26	1.0%	3.6%	7.4%	33.5%	51.4%	3.1%	100% (418)
July 1	2.6%	7.0%	17.7%	27.3%	43.7%	1.6%	100% (1,169)
July 21	0.6%	2.2%	14.8%	29.2%	52.4%	0.8%	100% (680)
July 27	0.4%	2.1%	8.9%	18.3%	67.7%	2.6%	100% (235)
August 4 (TKO)	1.0%	1.2%	10.3%	23.5%	63.2%	0.8%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	0.2%	1.7%	9.0%	22.8%	65.7%	0.7%	100% (555)
August 10	0.6%	1.6%	8.4%	23.0%	64.9%	1.4%	100% (2,309)
August 11	0.5%	1.6%	10.1%	23.1%	63.5%	1.3%	100% (636)
August 13	0.0%	1.4%	12.2%	23.5%	62.3%	0.6%	100% (485)
August 16	0.3%	1.1%	5.5%	16.8%	75.2%	1.1%	100% (632)
August 18	0.2%	2.0%	10.3%	25.6%	60.5%	1.3%	100% (806)
August 25	0.5%	1.6%	7.0%	26.1%	63.7%	1.1%	100% (372)
September 15	0.9%	1.0%	6.3%	25.1%	64.0%	2.7%	100% (911)
October 14	0.6%	1.4%	7.1%	19.5%	70.8%	0.6%	100% (662)
October 20	0.2%	1.2%	7.6%	20.4%	70.2%	0.3%	100% (921)
December 8	0.6%	1.7%	6.8%	24.7%	65.5%	0.8%	100% (902)

Table 42. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 'When the government fails to listen, the use of radical tactics by protesters is understandable'

Date of protest	Strongly disagree	Disagree	So-so	Agree	Strongly agree	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
June 16	8.4%	4.1%	17.1%	32.4%	36.7%	1.4%	100% (875)
July 1	2.1%	2.8%	10.3%	28.8%	54.7%	1.3%	100% (1,169)
July 21	0.3%	0.5%	3.7%	25.8%	68.9%	0.9%	100% (680)
July 27	1.3%	0.4%	1.7%	10.6%	84.7%	1.3%	100% (235)
August 4 (TKO)	0.7%	0.2%	2.7%	17.0%	78.9%	0.4%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	0.9%	0.3%	4.8%	13.7%	79.4%	0.9%	100% (555)
August 10	0.3%	0.6%	3.2%	17.2%	78.2%	0.5%	100% (2,309)
August 11	0.0%	0.3%	5.0%	17.9%	76.3%	0.6%	100% (636)
August 13	0.2%	0.8%	3.7%	20.2%	74.4%	0.6%	100% (485)
August 16	0.0%	0.2%	1.4%	9.7%	88.0%	0.8%	100% (632)
August 18	0.5%	1.1%	4.2%	18.5%	75.7%	0.1%	100% (806)
August 25	1.6%	0.3%	2.2%	14.8%	79.8%	1.3%	100% (372)
September 15	0.7%	0.7%	2.4%	14.6%	77.3%	4.4%	100% (911)
October 14	0.0%	0.0%	1.7%	11.5%	86.7%	0.2%	100% (662)
October 20	0.3%	0.4%	1.4%	11.6%	85.9%	0.3%	100% (921)
December 8	0.1%	0.0%	1.9%	12.3%	85.2%	0.5%	100% (902)

Section 5.4.2 Persistence

Table 43. If the government decides to only 'suspend' the bill but not make any further concessions, what should be the next step for the movement?

Date of protest	'Escalate the movement'	'Sustain its current form and mobilise from time to time'	'Suspend the movement and leave time for society to recover'	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
June 21	46.1%	43.5%	2.2%	8.2%	100% (316)
June 26	48.8%	41.1%	1.4%	8.6%	100% (418)
July 1	39.1%	45.1%	5.1%	10.7%	100% (1,169)
July 14	50.9%	43.0%	0.3%	5.8%	100% (546)
July 27	49.4%	44.3%	1.3%	5.1%	100% (235)
August 4 (TKO)	50.7%	41.0%	0.7%	7.6%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	54.1%	38.7%	1.9%	5.3%	100% (555)
August 10	48.9%	45.6%	1.0%	4.5%	100% (2,309)
August 11	51.2%	38.3%	2.5%	8.0%	100% (636)
August 13	55.5%	39.4%	1.0%	4.1%	100% (485)
August 16	56.0%	40.7%	0.9%	2.4%	100% (632)
August 18	44.4%	50.5%	1.0%	4.1%	100% (806)
August 25	63.0%	34.9%	1.1%	2.7%	100% (372)

Table 44. How will the police's mass-scale arrests of protesters affect your motivation to participate in protests?

Date of protest	Hugely decrease	Slightly disagree	So-so	Slightly increase	Hugely increase	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
August 10	1.1%	7.2%	13.1%	22.0%	54.6%	2.0%	100% (2,309)
August 11	0.9%	4.5%	18.6%	23.5%	50.8%	1.8%	100% (636)
August 13	1.0%	6.8%	11.5%	20.2%	59.8%	0.6%	100% (485)
August 16	1.4%	7.8%	16.3%	22.3%	50.3%	1.9%	100% (632)
August 18	0.8%	5.4%	12.3%	20.4%	60.0%	1.1%	100% (806)
August 25	1.3%	5.1%	15.1%	22.6%	55.6%	0.3%	100% (372)

Table 45. If the movement ends up with no more concrete results, how possible do you think it would be for the following developments to occur? 'Gangsters will take over'

Date of protest	Not possible at all	A little bit possible	Half-half	Somewhat possible	Very possible	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
September 15	0.4%	4.2%	7.4%	27.0%	60.3%	0.8%	100% (911)
September 28	2.2%	5.4%	6.4%	27.9%	57.0%	1.0%	100% (405)
October 1	1.9%	3.4%	11.1%	25.3%	58.1%	0.2%	100% (640)
October 14	0.9%	3.6%	10.9%	23.7%	60.3%	0.6%	100% (662)

Table 46. If the movement ends up with no more concrete results, how possible do you think it would be for the following developments to occur? 'The police will pose threats to Hong Kong people's daily lives'

Date of protest	Not possible at all	A little bit possible	Half-half	Somewhat possible	Very possible	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
September 15	0.2%	0.4%	1.8%	12.7%	84.7%	0.1%	100% (911)
September 28	0.5%	1.2%	2.7%	12.8%	82.5%	0.2%	100% (405)
October 1	0.3%	1.1%	1.3%	10.3%	86.6%	0.5%	100% (640)
October 14	0.0%	0.5%	0.8%	6.9%	91.5%	0.3%	100% (662)

Table 47. If the movement ends up with no more concrete results, how possible do you think it would be for the following developments to occur? 'The government will take mass-scale political revenge'

Date of protest	Not possible at all	A little bit possible	Half-half	Somewhat possible	Very possible	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
September 8	0.3%	0.9%	5.0%	20.8%	72.4%	0.6%	100% (337)
September 15	0.1%	0.7%	2.1%	13.9%	82.2%	1.0%	100% (911)
September 28	0.0%	0.0%	1.5%	6.9%	91.6%	0.0%	100% (405)
October 1	0.8%	0.6%	1.9%	6.4%	90.0%	0.3%	100% (640)
October 14	0.3%	0.2%	1.4%	6.5%	91.2%	0.5%	100% (662)

Table 48. If the movement ends up with no more concrete results, how possible do you think it would be for the following developments to occur? 'Significant erosion of political and civil liberties in Hong Kong'

Date of protest	Not possible at all	A little bit possible	Half-half	Somewhat possible	Very possible	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
September 8	0.3%	0.9%	5.3%	17.8%	75.4%	0.3%	100% (337)
September 15	0.4%	0.7%	2.4%	11.2%	84.7%	0.5%	100% (911)
September 28	0.5%	0.0%	2.5%	8.4%	88.1%	0.5%	100% (405)
October 1	0.3%	0.3%	1.3%	6.4%	91.6%	0.2%	100% (640)
October 14	0.0%	0.0%	1.1%	5.1%	93.7%	0.2%	100% (662)

Table 49. If the movement ends up with no more concrete results, how possible do you think it would be for the following developments to occur? 'Many Hong Kong people will become frustrated and give up the fight'

Date of protest	Not possible at all	A little bit possible	Half-half	Somewhat possible	Very possible	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
September 8	5.0%	8.9%	20.8%	23.4%	40.4%	1.5%	100% (337)
September 15	7.9%	11.6%	24.8%	19.8%	34.2%	1.6%	100% (911)
September 28	8.9%	12.6%	23.0%	23.0%	30.1%	2.5%	100% (405)
October 1	8.6%	11.7%	24.8%	20.8%	32.0%	2.0%	100% (640)
October 14	4.1%	8.8%	18.7%	22.2%	45.2%	1.1%	100% (662)

Table 50. If the movement ends up with no more concrete results, how possible do you think it would be for the following developments to occur? 'Beijing will actively interfere with Hong Kong's affairs'

Date of protest	Not possible at all	A little bit possible	Half-half	Somewhat possible	Very possible	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
September 8	0.0%	1.5%	9.5%	17.5%	70.9%	0.6%	100% (337)
September 15	0.4%	1.8%	7.7%	17.9%	71.4%	0.9%	100% (911)
September 28	0.0%	0.5%	3.0%	11.1%	84.4%	1.0%	100% (405)
October 1	0.8%	0.9%	3.8%	13.1%	80.6%	0.8%	100% (640)
October 14	0.2%	0.9%	5.0%	11.2%	82.0%	0.8%	100% (662)

Table 51. If the movement ends up with no more concrete results, how possible do you think it would be for the following developments to occur? 'Hong Kong will become an ordinary Chinese city'

Date of protest	Not possible at all	A little bit possible	Half-half	Somewhat possible	Very possible	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
September 8	2.4%	4.5%	11.3%	19.6%	60.8%	1.5%	100% (337)
September 15	1.1%	2.9%	9.4%	20.0%	65.3%	1.3%	100% (911)
September 28	1.5%	3.7%	7.2%	15.1%	71.6%	1.0%	100% (405)
October 1	2.0%	2.5%	8.0%	15.5%	71.1%	0.9%	100% (640)
October 14	1.2%	2.0%	6.6%	14.7%	74.9%	0.6%	100% (662)

Section 5.4.3 Solidarity

Table 52. In the past month or so, some protesters have adopted various radical and confrontational actions to express their demands. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 'I identify with their goals, but I disapprove of their radical tactics'

Date of protest	Strongly disagree	Disagree	So-so	Agree	Strongly agree	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
July 27	19.6%	24.3%	23.4%	18.7%	13.6%	0.4%	100% (235)
August 4 (TKO)	18.5%	18.7%	26.8%	19.2%	15.6%	1.2%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	17.6%	22.2%	25.2%	21.1%	13.0%	0.7%	100% (555)
August 10	17.6%	22.6%	29.4%	17.9%	11.8%	0.7%	100% (2,309)
August 11	17.6%	23.3%	31.2%	15.9%	11.7%	0.3%	100% (636)
August 13	15.5%	21.4%	29.1%	20.0%	12.8%	1.2%	100% (485)
August 16	27.2%	25.0%	24.7%	13.1%	8.9%	1.1%	100% (632)
August 18	15.4%	18.1%	28.3%	22.5%	14.7%	1.0%	100% (806)
August 25	17.7%	25.8%	30.1%	16.1%	9.9%	0.3%	100% (372)
August 31	21.1%	22.4%	26.0%	16.7%	13.1%	0.8%	100% (527)
October 14	18.4%	23.6%	26.1%	17.8%	13.4%	0.6%	100% (662)
October 20	17.0%	22.4%	29.2%	18.0%	12.6%	0.8%	100% (921)
December 8	46.3%	25.0%	17.5%	6.7%	4.1%	0.4%	100% (902)

Note: The question's wording in the December 8 survey is 'It is difficult for me to approve of their radical tactics.'

Table 53. In the past month or so, some protesters have adopted various radical and confrontational actions to express their demands. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 'I think they are speaking out on my behalf'

Date of protest	Strongly disagree	Disagree	So-so	Agree	Strongly agree	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
July 27	0.0%	0.0%	3.4%	17.9%	78.7%	0.0%	100% (235)
August 4 (TKO)	0.4%	0.1%	3.8%	18.0%	77.1%	0.5%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	0.0%	1.3%	2.3%	19.8%	75.9%	0.7%	100% (555)
August 10	0.2%	0.2%	2.3%	17.7%	79.3%	0.3%	100% (2,309)
August 11	0.0%	0.3%	2.3%	18.3%	78.5%	0.6%	100% (636)
August 13	0.2%	0.8%	1.4%	16.1%	81.4%	0.0%	100% (485)
August 16	0.3%	0.0%	2.1%	11.1%	86.1%	0.5%	100% (632)
August 18	0.1%	0.2%	4.4%	22.0%	73.0%	0.3%	100% (806)
August 25	0.0%	0.3%	2.4%	18.8%	78.2%	0.3%	100% (372)
August 31	0.0%	0.0%	2.8%	13.7%	83.5%	0.0%	100% (527)
October 14	0.2%	0.9%	4.5%	23.9%	70.2%	0.3%	100% (662)
October 20	0.3%	0.4%	5.1%	20.7%	73.3%	0.1%	100% (921)
December 8	0.0%	0.8%	3.1%	21.8%	74.0%	0.3%	100% (902)

Table 54. In the past month or so, some protesters have adopted various radical and confrontational actions to express their demands. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 'I think we are on the same boat'

Date of protest	Strongly disagree	Disagree	So-so	Agree	Strongly agree	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
July 27	0.0%	0.4%	2.1%	15.3%	81.7%	0.4%	100% (235)
August 4 (TKO)	0.5%	0.4%	2.0%	16.3%	80.3%	0.6%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	0.0%	0.7%	2.6%	14.6%	81.2%	0.9%	100% (555)
August 10	0.1%	0.1%	2.0%	14.7%	82.7%	0.3%	100% (2,309)
August 11	0.0%	0.2%	0.9%	16.2%	82.4%	0.2%	100% (636)
August 13	0.2%	0.0%	2.3%	15.7%	81.9%	0.0%	100% (485)
August 16	0.2%	0.2%	0.6%	7.3%	91.1%	0.6%	100% (632)
August 18	0.1%	0.4%	2.0%	18.2%	79.2%	0.1%	100% (806)
August 25	0.0%	0.3%	2.4%	14.8%	82.3%	0.3%	100% (372)
August 31	0.0%	0.0%	0.9%	10.8%	87.9%	0.4%	100% (527)
October 14	0.0%	0.3%	1.4%	18.3%	79.3%	0.8%	100% (662)
October 20	0.1%	0.2%	1.4%	14.3%	83.8%	0.1%	100% (921)
December 8	0.0%	0.2%	2.3%	17.5%	79.9%	0.1%	100% (902)

Table 55. In the past month or so, some protesters have adopted various radical and confrontational actions to express their demands. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 'I think I am part of them'

Date of protest	Strongly disagree	Disagree	So-so	Agree	Strongly agree	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
July 27	0.9%	0.0%	11.5%	27.7%	59.1%	0.9%	100% (235)
August 4 (TKO)	0.3%	0.7%	9.7%	30.1%	58.4%	0.7%	100% (717)
August 4 (SW)	0.3%	1.7%	9.8%	30.4%	56.6%	1.2%	100% (555)
August 10	0.4%	0.8%	8.3%	28.1%	61.9%	0.5%	100% (2,309)
August 11	0.2%	0.9%	7.5%	27.9%	63.2%	0.3%	100% (636)
August 13	0.4%	1.0%	7.0%	26.0%	65.6%	0.0%	100% (485)
August 16	0.3%	0.3%	5.1%	21.0%	72.5%	0.8%	100% (632)
August 18	0.3%	1.6%	12.6%	28.1%	56.3%	1.0%	100% (806)
August 25	0.0%	1.1%	11.6%	27.7%	59.7%	0.0%	100% (372)
August 31	0.2%	0.6%	8.0%	27.5%	63.4%	0.4%	100% (527)
October 14	0.3%	1.8%	10.4%	30.5%	56.2%	0.8%	100% (662)
October 20	0.2%	1.3%	9.8%	28.4%	59.9%	0.3%	100% (921)
December 8	0.2%	1.6%	13.0%	27.2%	57.2%	0.8%	100% ((902)

8.2 Telephone Surveys (6th Wave)

8.2.1 Response Rate

Total Number of Phone Calls Attempted			*58,263*
A. Total Number of Confirmed Ineligible Phone Numbers for Interview (Ineligibles)		*33,650*	
A1. Non-working number	29,878		
A2. Non-residence	1,213		
A3. Fax/ Modem/ Pager	2,028		
A4. No eligible living in	531		
B. Total Number of Phone Numbers with Unconfirmed Eligible Interviewee (Unknown)		*21,691*	
B1. No answer	12,431		
B2. Busy	1,617		
B3. Need password	25		
B4. Language problem	44		
B5. Without confirming as a household before hanging up	7,459		
B6. Long distance	115		
C. Total Number of Phone Numbers with Confirmed Eligible Interviewees (Eligibles)		*2,922*	
C1. Refusal (including refusal in the middle of interview)	751		
C2. Eligible interviewee unavailable in survey period	163		
C3. Completed	2,008		

Response rate is computed in the following way:

Completed / [Eligibles + Unknown x Eligibles / (Eligibles + Ineligibles)]

= 2,008 / [2,922 + 21,691 x 2,922 / (2,922 + 33,650)]

= 0.4314 (i.e. **43%**)

8.2.2 Questionnaire

Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey
School of Journalism and Communication
The Chinese University of Hong Kong

Opinion Survey on "Police's Handling of Public Events"

November 2019 (6th Wave)

Part 1 Sampling & Confirmation

Introduction
Good evening. This is calling from the Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. We are conducting an opinion survey on "Hong Kong's social and political situations". May I take a moment to ask you a few simple questions? We would highly appreciate your assistance.

Sampling
First, we have to randomly select a member in your family for this interview.
Could you please tell us how many family members are aged 15 or above in your household?

【If there is only one eligible respondent, interview him/her.】
【If there are more than one eligible respondent：
"**In order to randomly select a respondent, we would like to interview the family member whose birthday will come the soonest.**"】

Confirmation
Just as a confirmation, are you currently a Hong Kong resident aged between 15 or above, Sir/Madam?
Yes
No【"**Sorry, but we only interview Hong Kong residents aged 15 or above." -** Back to 'Sampling'】

Gender:【No need to ask】
1. Male
2. Female

Part 2 Main Questions

First of all, we would like to understand your views on Hong Kong's current situation.

A1. How high is your trust in the Hong Kong police? What score do you give them on a scale from 0 to 10, with '0' being 'no trust at all', '10' being 'total trust' and '5' being 'so-so'?
0-10 score 11. Don't know/ Refuse to answer

A2. Generally speaking, are you satisfied with police performance in conducting daily functions unrelated to public events? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, so-so, somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?
1. Very satisfied 2. Somewhat satisfied 3. So-so
4. Somewhat dissatisfied 5. Very dissatisfied
6. No opinion/ refuse to answer

The following are some opinion statements about the Fugitive Offenders Bill controversy.

The Fugitive Offenders Bill has triggered a series of large-scale public events, which sometimes involved conflicts between the protesters and the police. We would like to know whether you agree with the following opinions about the protesters or the police.
【The order of A3 and A4 is randomly arranged by computer】

A3. Do you agree with the statement that 'the protesters have used excessive force'? Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, so-so, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree?

A4. Do you agree with the statement, 'The police have used excessive force'? Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, so-so, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree?

1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. So-so
4. Somewhat disagree 5. Strongly disagree
6. No opinion/ refuse to answer

A5.【Only ask the respondents who answered "somewhat agree" or "strongly agree" in A4】**Have you personally experienced or witnessed any event involving the use of excessive police force?**
1. No 2. Yes 3. Refuse to answer

【The order of Part B and Part C is randomly arranged by computer】

【Part B】Then, we would like to understand your views on the police's handling of the anti-extradition bill protests.

B1. Are you satisfied with the police's overall performance during the anti-extradition bill movement? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, so-so, somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?

1. Very satisfied 2. Somewhat satisfied 3. So-s
4. Somewhat dissatisfied 5. Very dissatisfied
6. No opinion/ refuse to answer

B2a. 【Only ask the respondents who expressed satisfaction】 **Please briefly explain why you are satisfied with the police.**

B2b. 【Only ask the respondents who expressed dissatisfaction】 **Please briefly explain why you are dissatisfied with the police.**

1. Write down the answers 2. Don't know/ refuse to answer

B3. Are you satisfied with police performance in handling fierce conflicts during the anti-extradition bill movement? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, so-so, somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?

1. Very satisfied 2. Somewhat satisfied 3. So-so
4. Somewhat dissatisfied 5. Very dissatisfied
6. No opinion/ refuse to answer

Next, we would like to know to what extent you accept police performance in various aspects of handling the protests, on a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 being 'very unacceptable', 10 being 'very acceptance' and 5 being 'so-so'.

B4. 'Performing searches and arrests on public transport', how acceptable is it? On a scale of 0 to 10, what is your score?

B5. 'Non-disclosure of police identification numbers on uniforms', how acceptable is it? On a scale of 0 to 10, what is your score?

B6. 'Handling conflicts between people with different political views', how acceptable is it? On a scale of 0 to 10, what is your score?

B7. 'Disguising as different identities at protest scenes', how acceptable is it? On a scale of 0 to 10, what is your score?

B8. 'Dispersing protesters with tear gas, rubber bullets, and pepper spray, etc.', how acceptable is it? On a scale of 0 to 10, what is your score?

B9. 'Firing live rounds during confrontations', how acceptable is it? On a scale of 0 to 10, what is your score?

B10. 'Arrest actions at protest scenes', how acceptable is it? On a scale of 0 to 10, what is your score?

B11. 'Dealing with journalists in conflict situations', how acceptable is it? On a scale of 0 to 10, what is your score?

B12. Has your image of the police changed because of their performance in handling the anti-extradition bill movement since June? Is it much better, a little bit better, a little bit worse, much worse or no change?

1. Much better 2. A little bit better 3. A little bit worse
4. Much worse 5. No change
6. Don't know/ refuse to answer

B13a. 【Only ask the respondents who answered "a little bit worse" or "much worse" in B12】**Have any of the following events caused significant deterioration in your image of the police? 1. Dispersion of protesters surrounding the Legislative Council on June 12; Dispersion of protesters occupying the Legislative Council on July 1-2; 3. White-shirted people attacking citizens in Yuen Long on July 21; 4. Firing of tear gas at Kwai Fong MTR station on August 11; 5. A female protester suffering a severe eye injury on August 11; 6. Arrest operations at Prince Edward MTR station on August 31; 7. Firing of a live round at a protestor on October 1; 8. The handling of detained people at the San Uk Ling Holding Centre; 9. Other events?**

【Can choose multiple answers】

1. Dispersion of the protesters surrounding the Legislative Council on June 12
2. Dispersion of the protesters occupying the Legislative Council on July 1 and the next day;
3. White-shirted people attacking citizens in Yuen Long on July 21;
4. Firing of tear gas at Kwai Fong MTR station on August 11;
5. A female protester suffered severe eye injury on August 11;
6. Arrest operation at Prince Edward MTR station on August 31;
7. Firing of live round at a protestor's body on October 1;
8. The handling of detained persons at the San Uk Ling Holding Centre;
9. Other events (Please specify)
10. No answer/ Refuse to answer

B13b. 【Only ask the respondents who answered "a little bit better" or "much better" in B12】 **Have any of the following police performances led to improvement in your image of them? 1. Have performed the job conscientiously and dutifully despite difficulties; 2. Have suffered injuries while on duty; 3. Had to endure insults made by the protesters; 4. Had to endure harassment and doxing of themselves and their families; 5. Others?**

【Can choose multiple answers】
1. Have performed the job conscientiously and dutifully despite difficulties
2. Have suffered injuries when on duty;
3. Had to endure insults made by the protesters;
4. Had to endure harassment and the doxing of themselves and their families;
5. Others (Please specify)
6. No answer/ Refuse to answer

【Part C】 The following questions aim to understand your views on the protesters.

C1. Do you support the anti-extradition bill movement? Are you very supportive, somewhat supportive, half-half, somewhat against or very against?
1. Very support 2. Somewhat support 3. So-so
4. Somewhat against 5. Very against
6. No opinion/ refuse to answer

C2a. 【Only ask the respondents who expressed support to the movement】 **Please briefly explain why you support the anti-extradition law movement.**
C2b. 【Only ask the respondents who expressed opposition to the movement】 **Please briefly explain why you are against the anti-extradition law movement.**

1. Write down the answer 2. Don't know/ Refuse to answer

C3. The SAR government announced the withdrawal of the Fugitive Offenders Bill earlier. Do you think whether the protesters should continue to protest so as to get the government to fulfill other demands?
1. Should 2. Should not 3. No answer/ Refuse to answer

In the anti-extradition bill movement, the protesters have carried out different actions to fight for their demands. We would like to know to what extent you accept the different actions. You can provide a score on a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 meaning 'very unacceptable', 10 meaning 'very acceptable' and 5 meaning 'so-so'.

C4. 'Non-cooperation movement, such as obstructing the operation of MTR and government departments', how acceptable is it? On a scale of 0 to 10, what is your score?

C5. 'Occupying the airport', how acceptable is it? On a scale of 0 to 10, what is your score?

C6. 'Damaging MTR facilities and traffic lights, etc.', how acceptable is it? On a scale of 0 to 10, what is your score?

C7. 'Vandalising specific stores', how acceptable is it? On a scale of 0 to 10, what is your score?

C8. 'Use of force during conflicts against people with different views', how acceptable is it? On a scale of 0 to 10, what is your score?

C9. 'Besieging and attacking government buildings, such as police stations and central government offices, etc.', how acceptable is it? On a scale of 0 to 10, what is your score?

C10. 'Hurling petrol bombs at police officers or police stations', how acceptable is it? On a scale of 0 to 10, what is your score?

C11. 'Use of weapons to attack police officers, such as steel pipes, slingshots, throwing bricks, etc.', how acceptable is it? On a scale of 0 to 10, what is your score?

C12. Has your image of the movement changed because of protesters' use of force during the anti-extradition bill movement? Is it much better, a little bit better, a little bit worse, much worse or no change?

1. Much better 2. A little bit better 3. A little bit worse
4. Much worse 5. No change
6. Don't know/ refuse to answer

C13. 【Only ask the respondents who answered “a little bit worse” or “much worse” in C12】**Are there any protesters’ actions that have caused significant deterioration in your image of the anti-extradition bill movement?1. Non-cooperation movement; 2. Occupying the airport; 3. Damaging MTR facilities and traffic lights, etc.; 4. Vandalising specific stores; 5. Arson; 6. Hurling petrol bombs; 7. Use of force against people with different views during conflicts; 8. Violent attacks on police officers; Others?**

【Can choose multiple answers】
1. Non-cooperation movement
2. Occupying the airport
3. Damaging MTR facilities and traffic lights, etc.
4. Vandalising specific stores
5. Arson
6. Hurling petrol bombs
7. Use of force against people with different views during conflicts
8. Violent attacks on police officers
9. Others (Please specify)
10. No answer/ Refuse to answer

【Part D】We are going to read out some statements, and would like to know whether you agree with them.

D1. Do you agree that ‘when participating in protests in Hong Kong, it is a must to uphold the peaceful and non-violent principle’? Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, so-so, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree?

D2. Do you agree that ‘when large-scale peaceful protests fail to make the government respond to demands, it is understandable for the protesters to carry out radical actions’? Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, so-so, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree?

D3. Do you agree that ‘radical protests are more effective than peaceful, rational and non-violent protests’? Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, so-so, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree?

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. So-so
4. Somewhat disagree
5. Strongly disagree
6. No opinion/ refuse to answer

D4. When journalists are covering news in conflict situations during protests, which of the following things do you think is more important: recording on-site situations or refraining from obstructing police work?

1. Recording on-site situations
2. Refraining from obstructing the police work
3. No opinion/ Refuse to answer

D5. There has been an escalation of violence by both the police and protesters. Who do you think should bear the most responsibility for the violent conflicts? Is it the central government, SAR government, Hong Kong police, pro-establishment legislators, pan-democratic legislators, protesters, or foreign forces?

【Can choose multiple answers】

1. Central government 2. SAR government
3. Hong Kong police
4. Pro-establishment legislators 5. Pan-democratic legislators
6. Protesters 7. Foreign forces
8. Others (Please specify) 9. Don't know/ refuse to answer

D6. Which of the following channels are important for you to receive information about the anti-extradition bill movement? 1. News coverage by traditional media; 2. Text reporting by online media; 3. Live media broadcasts; 4. Social media; 5. LIHKG; 6. Telegram; 7. Information forwarded by family members or peers; 8. Others? You can choose up to three answers.

【Can choose up to three answers】

1. News coverage by traditional media
2. Text reporting by online media
3. Live media broadcasts 4. Social media
5. LIHKG 6. Telegram
7. Information forwarded by family members or peers
8. Others (Please specify) 9. No opinion/ refuse to answer

Have you done any of the following things during the anti-extradition bill movement?
D7. Participated in anti-extradition bill protests or rallies
D8. Participated in besieging or occupying actions, or provided on-site support
D9. Participated in verbal or physical conflicts with police
D10. Expressed feelings on Lennon Walls
D11. Provided assistance to protesters, such as donating money or resources, or offering free rides, etc.

1. Yes 2. No 3. No answer/ Refuse to answer

D12. 【Only ask the respondents who answered "yes" in at least one question from D7 to D11】 **What are the main reasons for your participation in these activities? 1. Strive to get the government to meet the demands; 2. Express dissatisfaction with the government's handling of the Fugitive Offenders Bill controversies; 3. Express dissatisfaction with overall governance; 4. Express dissatisfaction with the police's handling of the protests; 5. Raise international attention; 6. Support young protesters; 7. Others?**

【Can choose multiple answers】
1. Strive to get the government to meet the demands
2. Express dissatisfaction with the government's handling of the Fugitive Offenders Bill controversies
3. Express dissatisfaction with the overall governance
4. Express dissatisfaction with the police's handling of the protests
5. Raise international attention
6. Support young protesters
7. Others
8. No answer/ Refuse to answer

On the other hand, have you done the following things?
D13. Participated in pro-Fugitive Offenders Bill/ pro-police protests or rallies
D14. Expressed appreciation to police officers for their service, e.g., donating money or sending them fruit baskets or other gifts, etc.
D15. Participated in verbal or physical conflicts with protesters

1. Yes 2. No 3. No answer/ Refuse to answer

Part 3 Demographics

Finally, we would like to ask you some basic information for statistical analysis.

DM2. What is your age?
1. 15 – 17 2. 18 – 19 3. 20 – 24 4. 25 – 29 5. 30 – 34 6. 35 – 39
7. 40 – 44 8. 45 – 49 9. 50 – 54 10. 55 – 59 11. 60 – 64
12. 65 – 69 13. 70 or above 14. Refuse to answer

DM3. What is your education level? (before graduation is also counted)
1. No formal education/ kindergarten 2. Primary 3. Secondary (F.1 – F.3)
4. Secondary (F.4 – F.5) 5. Secondary (F.6 – F.7) 6. Tertiary (non-degree)
7. Tertiary (bachelor's degree) 8. Postgraduate (master degree or above) 9. Refuse to answer

DM4a. Are you a working person, a student, a homemaker, a retiree, or an unemployed person?
1. Working person 2. Student 3. Homemaker
4. Retiree 5. Unemployed person
6. Others (no occupation) 【Please specify】 7. Refuse to answer

DM4b. 【Only ask the respondents who answered "working person" in DM4a】 **What is your occupation?**
1. Managers and administrators 2. Professionals
3. Associate professionals 4. Clerks
5. Service workers and sales workers 6. Blue-collar workers
7. Others 【Please specify】 8. Refuse to answer

DM5. What is your political affiliation? Is it localists, radical democrats, moderate democrats, centrist, pro-establishment, pro-business, or pro-China?
1. Localists 2. Radical democrats 3. Moderate democrats
4. Centrists 5. Pro-establishment 6. Pro-business
7. Pro-China 8. Others (Please specify)
9. No political orientation/ Not belong to any faction
10. Don't know/ Difficult to answer 11. Refuse to answer

DM6. What is your monthly family income?
【Including all cash income and social welfare benefits. If the income is unstable, please tell me an average amount of the past three months】
1. 9,999 or below 2. 10,000 - 14,999 3. 15,000 - 19,999
4. 20,000 - 24,999 5. 25,000 - 29,999 6. 30,000 - 39,999
7. 40,000 - 49,999 8. 50,000 - 59,999 9. 60,000- 99,999
10. 100,000 or above 11. Don't know/ Refuse to answer

This is the end of the interview. Thanks a lot, goodbye!

8.2.3 Respondents' Demographic Profile

Gender

	Unweighted		Weighted	
	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
Male	979	48.8%	950	47.3%
Female	1,029	51.2%	1,058	52.7%
Total	2,008	100%	2,008	100%

Age

	Unweighted		Weighted	
	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
15 - 17	63	3.1%	67	3.3%
18 - 19	43	2.1%	29	1.5%
20 - 24	161	8.0%	134	6.7%
25 - 29	166	8.3%	146	7.3%
30 - 34	166	8.3%	148	7.4%
35 - 39	187	9.3%	171	8.5%
40 - 44	187	9.3%	161	8.0%
45 - 49	197	9.8%	176	8.7%
50 - 54	205	10.2%	194	9.7%
55 - 59	182	9.1%	194	9.6%
60 - 64	172	8.6%	171	8.5%
65 - 69	123	6.1%	140	7.0%
70 or above	145	7.2%	268	13.3%
Refuse to answer	11	0.5%	10	0.5%
Total	2,008	100%	2,008	100%

Educational level

	Unweighted		Weighted	
	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
No formal education/ kindergarten	11	0.5%	26	1.3%
Primary	117	5.8%	248	12.4%
Secondary (F.1-F.3)	195	9.7%	396	19.7%
Secondary (F.4-F.5)	444	22.1%	438	21.8%
Secondary (F.6-F.7)	199	9.9%	202	10.1%
Tertiary (non-degree)	229	11.4%	150	7.5%
Tertiary (bachelor's degree)	605	30.1%	409	20.4%
Postgraduate (master degree or above)	195	9.7%	125	6.2%
Refuse to answer	13	0.6%	13	0.7%
Total	2,008	100%	2,008	100%

Occupation status

	Frequency	Percentage
Working person	1,109	55.2%
Student	149	7.4%
Homemaker	194	9.7%
Retiree	479	23.8%
Unemployed person	69	3.4%
Others (no occupation)	0	0.0%
Refuse to answer	10	0.5%
Total	2,008	100%

Occupation type of working people

	Frequency	Percentage
Managers and administrators	271	24.4%
Professionals	100	9.0%
Associate professionals	155	14.0%
Clerks	177	15.9%
Service workers and sales workers	123	11.1%
Blue-collar workers	229	20.7%
Others	0	0.0%
Refuse to answer	54	4.9%
Total	1,109	100%

Political orientation

	Frequency	Percentage
Localists	233	11.6%
Radical democrats	116	5.8%
Moderate democrats	791	39.4%
Centrists	369	18.4%
Pro-establishment	57	2.8%
Pro-business	13	0.7%
Pro-China	38	1.9%
Others	0	0.0%
No political orientation/ not belong to any faction	332	16.5%
Don't know/ Difficult to answer	38	1.9%
Refuse to answer	21	1.1%
Total	2,008	100%

Monthly family income

	Frequency	Percentage
HK$ 9,999 or below	195	9.7%
HK$ 10,000 – 14,999	103	5.1%
HK$ 15,000 – 19,999	88	4.4%
HK$ 20,000 – 24,999	151	7.5%
HK$ 25,000 – 29,999	71	3.5%
HK$ 30,000 – 39,999	294	14.7%
HK$ 40,000 – 49,999	195	9.7%
HK$ 50,000 – 59,999	233	11.6%
HK$ 60,000 – 99,999	269	13.4%
HK$ 100,000 or above	204	10.1%
Don’t know/ refuse to answer	205	10.2%
Total	2,008	100%

8.2.4 Full Statistical Tables

Section 6.1.1 Trust in Police

Table 1. How high is your trust in the Hong Kong police? What score do you give them on a scale from 0 to 10, with '0' being 'no trust at all', '10' being 'total trust', and '5' being 'so-so'?

	Distrust (0-4)	So-so (5)	Trust (6-10)	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)	Mean (Sample size)
Overall	66.4%	12.7%	20.5%	0.4%	100%(2,008)	2.85 (2,000)
Gender*						
Male	68.7%	12.5%	18.5%	0.3%	100% (950)	2.64 (947)
Female	64.3%	12.9%	22.3%	0.5%	100% (1,058)	3.04 (1,053)
Age*						
15 – 29	87.9%	6.3%	5.8%	0.0%	100% (376)	1.30 (376)
30 – 39	75.2%	9.2%	15.4%	0.2%	100% (319)	2.16 (318)
40 – 49	58.7%	13.5%	26.2%	1.6%	100% (337)	3.37 (331)
50 – 59	63.8%	16.6%	19.6%	0.0%	100% (388)	2.96 (388)
60 or above	54.6%	15.1%	30.0%	0.3%	100% (579)	3.82 (577)
Education*						
Secondary (Form 3) or below	57.7%	19.5%	21.9%	0.9%	100% (671)	3.29 (665)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	65.3%	12.7%	21.9%	0.2%	100% (640)	2.93 (639)
Tertiary	76.1%	5.9%	17.8%	0.1%	100% (684)	2.32 (684)
Occupation*						
Managers and administrators	69.3%	6.6%	23.8%	0.3%	100% (271)	2.85 (270)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	79.9%	5.1%	15.0%	0.0%	100% (256)	1.94 (256)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	66.8%	16.0%	16.3%	0.8%	100% (529)	2.63 (524)
Students	85.0%	10.0%	5.0%	0.0%	100% (149)	1.54 (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	57.1%	15.6%	27.0%	0.4%	100% (740)	3.55 (738)
Political orientation*						
Localists	95.2%	3.8%	1.0%	0.0%	100% (233)	0.56 (233)
Pan-democrats	86.5%	8.8%	4.4%	0.2%	100% (906)	1.34 (904)
Pro-establishment	4.1%	7.8%	88.2%	0.0%	100% (108)	8.43 (108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	41.4%	21.6%	36.5%	0.5%	100% (701)	4.62 (697)
Monthly family income*						
HK$ 14,999 or below	44.6%	27.0%	27.7%	0.7%	100% (297)	4.28 (295)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	65.2%	13.4%	20.1%	1.3%	100% (239)	2.76 (236)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	67.5%	12.8%	19.7%	0.0%	100% (365)	2.88 (365)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	76.1%	7.1%	16.6%	0.2%	100% (428)	2.21 (428)
HK$ 60,000 or above	74.6%	6.7%	18.6%	0.0%	100% (473)	2.31 (473)
Stance towards the movement*						
Support	92.4%	5.8%	1.5%	0.3%	100% (1,251)	0.90 (1,248)
Half-half	44.7%	38.3%	16.5%	0.6%	100% (359)	3.77 (357)
Oppose	1.2%	10.7%	87.9%	0.2%	100% (362)	8.45 (361)

Notes
1. * T-test or ANOVA test indicate a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the mean scores of different attributes of the demographic variables.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ refuse to answer" are excluded.

Section 6.1.2 Satisfaction with Police Performance

Table 2. Generally speaking, are you satisfied with police performance in conducting daily functions unrelated to public events? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, so-so, somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?

	Satisfied	So-so	Dissatisfied	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
Overall	23.2%	28.9%	45.7%	2.2%	100% (2,008)
Gender*					
Male	20.7%	29.7%	48.0%	1.7%	100% (950)
Female	25.5%	28.1%	43.7%	2.7%	100% (1,058)
Age*					
15 – 29	9.6%	25.8%	63.7%	0.9%	100% (376)
30 – 39	20.8%	28.0%	50.5%	0.7%	100% (319)
40 – 49	30.2%	30.1%	36.6%	3.0%	100% (337)
50 – 59	22.4%	35.0%	40.6%	2.0%	100% (388)
60 or above	29.4%	26.6%	40.5%	3.4%	100% (579)
Education*					
Secondary (Form 3) or below	23.0%	31.1%	43.2%	2.7%	100% (671)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	24.3%	30.9%	42.7%	2.1%	100% (640)
Tertiary	22.4%	24.8%	51.1%	1.7%	100% (684)
Occupation*					
Managers and administrators	30.6%	27.3%	40.9%	1.2%	100% (271)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	17.8%	25.8%	54.1%	2.2%	100% (256)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	19.3%	31.2%	47.7%	1.8%	100% (529)
Students	6.8%	30.4%	62.2%	0.6%	100% (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	27.8%	28.6%	40.7%	2.9%	100% (740)
Political orientation*					
Localists	4.5%	19.2%	75.1%	1.1%	100% (233)
Pan-democrats	10.1%	30.0%	58.5%	1.4%	100% (906)
Pro-establishment	80.2%	16.3%	1.8%	1.7%	100% (108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	36.4%	33.5%	26.3%	3.8%	100% (701)
Monthly family income*					
HK$ 14,999 or below	31.3%	32.4%	33.9%	2.4%	100% (297)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	18.9%	32.5%	46.8%	1.7%	100% (239)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	20.4%	30.0%	48.4%	1.2%	100% (365)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	20.7%	27.7%	50.2%	1.4%	100% (428)
HK$ 60,000 or above	23.5%	26.1%	49.3%	1.1%	100% (473)
Stance towards the movement*					
Support	6.4%	27.2%	64.4%	2.0%	100% (1,251)
Half-half	23.0%	46.1%	28.8%	2.1%	100% (359)
Oppose	78.5%	17.7%	1.1%	2.7%	100% (362)

Notes
1. * Chi-Square test indicates a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the response to the question and the demographic attributes.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ Refuse to answer" are excluded.

Table 3. Are you satisfied with the police's overall performance during the anti-extradition bill movement? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, so-so, somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?

	Satisfied	So-so	Dissatisfied	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
Overall	13.7%	13.0%	72.6%	0.7%	100% (2,008)
Gender					
Male	12.6%	11.7%	75.2%	0.4%	100% (950)
Female	14.6%	14.1%	70.3%	1.0%	100% (1,058)
Age*					
15 – 29	2.9%	6.3%	90.8%	0.0%	100% (376)
30 – 39	8.2%	9.7%	81.6%	0.4%	100% (319)
40 – 49	17.1%	18.1%	64.3%	0.6%	100% (337)
50 – 59	10.8%	13.9%	73.7%	1.6%	100% (388)
60 or above	23.7%	14.9%	60.5%	0.9%	100% (579)
Education*					
Secondary (Form 3) or below	16.8%	15.8%	65.6%	1.9%	100% (671)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	13.3%	16.0%	70.6%	0.1%	100% (640)
Tertiary	11.0%	7.2%	81.6%	0.2%	100% (684)
Occupation*					
Managers and administrators	12.7%	10.1%	77.0%	0.3%	100% (271)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	7.8%	7.0%	84.5%	0.8%	100% (256)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	9.5%	15.8%	73.2%	1.5%	100% (529)
Students	2.3%	8.0%	89.7%	0.0%	100% (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	21.0%	15.0%	63.4%	0.6%	100% (740)
Political orientation*					
Localists	1.3%	1.1%	97.6%	0.0%	100% (233)
Pan-democrats	2.5%	4.6%	92.3%	0.5%	100% (906)
Pro-establishment	65.8%	18.3%	14.0%	1.9%	100% (108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	23.4%	26.6%	49.4%	0.7%	100% (701)
Monthly family income*					
HK$ 14,999 or below	23.6%	17.8%	55.6%	3.0%	100% (297)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	8.8%	19.5%	71.7%	0.0%	100% (239)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	14.7%	10.8%	74.0%	0.6%	100% (365)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	8.2%	11.5%	80.2%	0.0%	100% (428)
HK$ 60,000 or above	11.4%	8.5%	80.1%	0.0%	100% (473)
Stance towards the movement*					
Support	0.5%	2.5%	96.8%	0.2%	100% (1,251)
Half-half	9.6%	35.3%	53.9%	1.2%	100% (359)
Oppose	62.8%	24.5%	10.8%	1.9%	100% (362)

Notes
1. * Chi-Square test indicates a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the response to the question and the demographic attributes.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ Refuse to answer" are excluded.

Table 4. Are you satisfied with police performance in handling fierce conflicts during the anti-extradition bill movement? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, so-so, somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?

	Satisfied	So-so	Dissatisfied	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
Overall	13.6%	14.8%	70.6%	1.1%	100% (2,008)
Gender					
Male	13.1%	13.9%	72.6%	0.5%	100% (950)
Female	14.0%	15.6%	68.9%	1.6%	100% (1,058)
Age*					
15 – 29	3.5%	8.3%	88.2%	0.0%	100% (376)
30 – 39	8.6%	12.4%	78.8%	0.2%	100% (319)
40 – 49	17.8%	18.0%	63.4%	0.8%	100% (337)
50 – 59	12.2%	16.9%	70.7%	0.1%	100% (388)
60 or above	21.0%	16.3%	59.6%	3.0%	100% (579)
Education*					
Secondary (Form 3) or below	15.4%	17.4%	64.8%	2.4%	100% (671)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	14.5%	17.1%	68.1%	0.4%	100% (640)
Tertiary	10.8%	9.8%	78.9%	0.5%	100% (684)
Occupation*					
Managers and administrators	14.3%	12.2%	72.8%	0.7%	100% (271)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	8.5%	9.6%	81.8%	0.0%	100% (256)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	11.3%	16.6%	71.6%	0.5%	100% (529)
Students	3.7%	10.5%	85.8%	0.0%	100% (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	18.8%	17.0%	62.1%	2.2%	100% (740)
Political orientation*					
Localists	0.5%	3.3%	96.2%	0.0%	100% (233)
Pan-democrats	2.6%	6.2%	90.5%	0.7%	100% (906)
Pro-establishment	64.1%	21.0%	14.9%	0.0%	100% (108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	23.3%	29.1%	45.9%	1.7%	100% (701)
Monthly family income*					
HK$ 14,999 or below	18.8%	23.6%	53.4%	4.2%	100% (297)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	12.3%	19.4%	68.3%	0.0%	100% (239)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	14.4%	12.6%	72.9%	0.0%	100% (365)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	8.9%	12.6%	78.4%	0.1%	100% (428)
HK$ 60,000 or above	11.8%	10.2%	77.7%	0.2%	100% (473)
Stance towards the movement*					
Support	0.6%	4.0%	94.9%	0.4%	100% (1,251)
Half-half	10.2%	36.8%	50.2%	2.8%	100% (359)
Oppose	61.3%	27.8%	10.6%	0.3%	100% (362)

Notes
1. * Chi-Square test indicates a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the response to the question and the demographic attributes.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ Refuse to answer" are excluded.

Section 6.1.3 Acceptance of Police Actions

Table 5. 'Performing searches and arrests on public transport', how acceptable is it? On a scale of 0 to 10, what is your score?

	Unacceptable (0-4)	So-so (5)	Acceptable (6-10)	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)	Mean (Sample size)
Overall	67.7%	13.6%	18.1%	0.6%	100% (2,008)	2.68 (1,996)
Gender						
Male	69.9%	13.0%	16.6%	0.5%	100% (950)	2.53 (945)
Female	65.8%	14.2%	19.4%	0.7%	100% (1,058)	2.81 (1,051)
Age*						
15 – 29	88.7%	5.3%	6.1%	0.0%	100% (376)	1.45 (376)
30 – 39	74.0%	11.2%	14.5%	0.2%	100% (319)	2.23 (318)
40 – 49	58.9%	18.1%	22.1%	0.8%	100% (337)	3.24 (334)
50 – 59	66.6%	13.3%	19.2%	0.8%	100% (388)	2.72 (385)
60 or above	57.0%	18.0%	24.0%	0.9%	100% (579)	3.32 (573)
Education*						
Secondary (Form 3) or below	62.2%	19.6%	17.5%	0.7%	100% (671)	2.86 (666)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	66.1%	13.9%	19.3%	0.7%	100% (640)	2.74 (635)
Tertiary	74.8%	7.4%	17.5%	0.4%	100% (684)	2.43 (682)
Occupation*						
Managers and administrators	65.5%	12.1%	21.8%	0.7%	100% (271)	2.86 (269)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	80.3%	6.4%	13.3%	0.0%	100% (256)	1.95 (256)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	70.4%	13.1%	15.7%	0.8%	100% (529)	2.49 (524)
Students	88.7%	8.0%	3.3%	0.0%	100% (149)	1.52 (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	58.4%	18.4%	22.5%	0.6%	100% (740)	3.18 (736)
Political orientation*						
Localists	96.7%	2.2%	1.0%	0.0%	100% (233)	0.57 (233)
Pan-democrats	86.3%	8.7%	4.8%	0.2%	100% (906)	1.34 (905)
Pro-establishment	6.9%	11.3%	80.7%	1.1%	100% (108)	7.98 (107)
Centrist/ no political orientation	44.6%	23.8%	30.3%	1.3%	100% (701)	4.24 (692)
Monthly family income*						
HK$ 14,999 or below	50.0%	24.4%	24.3%	1.4%	100% (297)	3.77 (293)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	63.9%	18.2%	17.5%	0.4%	100% (239)	2.54 (238)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	70.2%	13.5%	16.3%	0.0%	100% (365)	2.68 (365)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	76.6%	10.2%	12.8%	0.4%	100% (428)	2.02 (427)
HK$ 60,000 or above	74.3%	6.9%	18.4%	0.4%	100% (473)	2.42 (471)
Stance towards the movement*						
Support	91.2%	7.0%	1.7%	0.0%	100% (1,251)	0.97 (1,251)
Half-half	51.3%	32.6%	15.8%	0.4%	100% (359)	3.38 (358)
Oppose	5.8%	16.6%	75.5%	2.0%	100% (362)	7.79 (355)

Notes
1. * T-test or ANOVA test indicate a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the mean scores of different attributes of the demographic variables.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ refuse to answer" are excluded.

Table 6. 'Non-disclosure of police identification numbers on uniforms', how acceptable is it? On a scale of 0 to 10, what is your score?

	Unacceptable (0-4)	So-so (5)	Acceptable (6-10)	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)	Mean (Sample size)
Overall	77.3%	7.2%	13.6%	1.9%	100% (2,008)	1.78 ((1,969)
Gender						
Male	78.4%	8.1%	12.1%	1.3%	100% (950)	1.65 (937)
Female	76.3%	6.3%	14.9%	2.5%	100% (1,058)	1.90 (1,032)
Age*						
15 – 29	93.6%	2.6%	3.6%	0.2%	100% (376)	0.70 (375)
30 – 39	85.6%	4.7%	9.7%	0.0%	100% (319)	1.38 (319)
40 – 49	73.7%	7.9%	18.2%	0.2%	100% (337)	2.18 (336)
50 – 59	75.0%	8.5%	14.8%	1.7%	100% (388)	1.87 (381)
60 or above	66.4%	10.0%	18.3%	5.3%	100% (579)	2.41 (548)
Education*						
Secondary (Form 3) or below	73.0%	9.0%	13.6%	4.4%	100% (671)	1.95 (641))
Secondary (Form 4-7)	76.0%	7.8%	15.1%	1.1%	100% (640)	1.92 (633)
Tertiary	82.8%	4.6%	12.2%	0.4%	100% (684)	1.49 (682)
Occupation*						
Managers and administrators	77.2%	5.6%	17.0%	0.2%	100% (271)	1.88 (270)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	86.8%	4.5%	8.5%	0.2%	100% (256)	1.16(255)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	80.1%	7.7%	11.3%	0.9%	100% (529)	1.58 (524)
Students	92.9%	5.0%	2.1%	0.0%	100% (149)	0.82 (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	69.1%	8.9%	17.6%	4.4%	100% (740)	2.29 (707)
Political orientation*						
Localists	98.1%	1.5%	0.3%	0.2%	100% (233)	0.17 (233)
Pan-democrats	94.5%	2.7%	2.5%	0.2%	100% (906)	0.55 (904)
Pro-establishment	10.6%	18.1%	64.7%	6.5%	100% (108)	7.10 (101)
Centrist/ no political orientation	59.4%	13.2%	24.3%	3.1%	100% (701)	3.19 (680)
Monthly family income*						
HK$ 14,999 or below	67.5%	10.0%	15.6%	6.9%	100% (297)	2.41 (277)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	75.2%	9.1%	14.4%	1.2%	100% (239)	1.95 (236)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	77.3%	8.6%	13.0%	1.1%	100% (365)	1.78 (361)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	83.8%	7.2%	9.0%	0.0%	100% (428)	1.27 (428)
HK$ 60,000 or above	82.0%	3.4%	14.2%	0.4%	100% (473)	1.58 (471)
Stance towards the movement*						
Support	98.1%	1.3%	0.5%	0.1%	100% (1,251)	0.26 (1,250)
Half-half	72.9%	14.6%	9.8%	2.7%	100% (359)	2.04 (349)
Oppose	11.7%	19.8%	61.5%	6.9%	100% (362)	7.07 (337)

Notes
1. * T-test or ANOVA test indicate a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the mean scores of different attributes of the demographic variables.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ refuse to answer" are excluded.

Table 7. 'Handling conflicts between people with different political views', how acceptable is it? On a scale of 0 to 10, what is your score?

	Unacceptable (0-4)	So-so (5)	Acceptable (6-10)	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)	Mean (Sample size)
Overall	71.2%	12.2%	13.5%	3.0%	100% (2,008)	2.19 (1,947)
Gender*						
Male	73.3%	12.3%	12.0%	2.5%	100% (950)	2.02 (926)
Female	69.4%	12.2%	14.9%	3.5%	100% (1,058)	2.34 (1,021)
Age*						
15 – 29	89.9%	5.5%	4.4%	0.2%	100% (376)	1.07 (375)
30 – 39	78.4%	9.8%	9.7%	2.0%	100% (319)	1.68 (312)
40 – 49	62.6%	16.8%	17.7%	2.9%	100% (337)	2.67 (327)
50 – 59	73.1%	9.8%	15.2%	2.0%	100% (388)	2.22 (380)
60 or above	59.5%	16.5%	17.7%	6.2%	100% (579)	2.90 (543)
Education*						
Secondary (Form 3) or below	65.5%	17.0%	12.3%	5.3%	100% (671)	2.38 (635)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	69.6%	12.7%	15.1%	2.6%	100% (640)	2.28 (623)
Tertiary	78.5%	6.9%	13.3%	1.3%	100% (684)	1.90 (676)
Occupation*						
Managers and administrators	71.6%	9.0%	18.2%	1.2%	100% (271)	2.31 (267)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	81.4%	8.5%	8.4%	1.6%	100% (256)	1.56 (251)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	73.2%	13.1%	12.1%	1.7%	100% (529)	2.03 (520)
Students	89.8%	6.9%	3.3%	0.0%	100% (149)	1.27 (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	63.0%	14.7%	16.5%	5.9%	100% (740)	2.65 (697)
Political orientation*						
Localists	95.8%	3.2%	0.7%	0.3%	100% (233)	0.42 (233)
Pan-democrats	90.7%	6.1%	2.6%	0.6%	100% (906)	0.95 (901)
Pro-establishment	6.6%	16.3%	72.7%	4.4%	100% (108)	7.57 (103)
Centrist/ no political orientation	49.0%	22.4%	22.0%	6.6%	100% (701)	3.58 (655)
Monthly family income*						
HK$ 14,999 or below	54.7%	21.7%	16.9%	6.8%	100% (297)	3.14 (277)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	71.5%	13.0%	13.4%	2.1%	100% (239)	2.11 (234)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	73.2%	12.4%	12.2%	2.1%	100% (365)	2.16 (358)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	78.9%	10.3%	9.5%	1.2%	100% (428)	1.67 (423)
HK$ 60,000 or above	77.6%	6.2%	14.9%	1.3%	100% (473)	1.92 (467)
Stance towards the movement*						
Support	94.5%	4.3%	0.8%	0.4%	100% (1,251)	0.64 (1,246)
Half-half	58.7%	28.0%	9.1%	4.2%	100% (359)	2.86 (344)
Oppose	6.1%	23.8%	61.2%	8.9%	100% (362)	7.23 (330)

Notes
1. * T-test or ANOVA test indicate a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the mean scores of different attributes of the demographic variables.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ refuse to answer" are excluded.

Table 8. 'Disguising as different identities at protest scenes', how acceptable is it? On a scale of 0 to 10, what is your score?

	Unacceptable (0-4)	So-so (5)	Acceptable (6-10)	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)	Mean (Sample size)
Overall	72.1%	8.5%	17.7%	1.7%	100% (2,008)	2.33 (1,974)
Gender						
Male	72.9%	9.4%	16.9%	0.8%	100% (950)	2.29 (942)
Female	71.4%	7.7%	18.4%	2.5%	100% (1,058)	2.37 (1,032)
Age*						
15 – 29	91.0%	3.6%	5.2%	0.2%	100% (376)	1.05 (375)
30 – 39	77.9%	8.6%	13.5%	0.0%	100% (319)	1.93 (319)
40 – 49	64.4%	11.5%	23.1%	1.0%	100% (337)	2.88 (333)
50 – 59	70.8%	10.0%	17.6%	1.6%	100% (388)	2.37 (382)
60 or above	62.6%	8.4%	25.0%	4.0%	100% (579)	3.04 (555)
Education*						
Secondary (Form 3) or below	68.3%	10.4%	18.0%	3.3%	100% (671)	2.43 (648)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	69.4%	10.5%	19.0%	1.1%	100% (640)	2.52 (633)
Tertiary	78.6%	4.6%	16.1%	0.6%	100% (684)	2.06 (680)
Occupation*						
Managers and administrators	70.7%	6.5%	22.3%	0.5%	100% (271)	2.66 (269)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	80.1%	7.7%	11.5%	0.7%	100% (256)	1.74 (254)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	73.8%	11.0%	14.2%	1.0%	100% (529)	2.14 (523)
Students	89.8%	5.5%	4.6%	0.0%	100% (149)	1.07 (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	64.9%	8.4%	23.3%	3.4%	100% (740)	2.81 (715)
Political orientation*						
Localists	97.8%	1.4%	0.8%	0.0%	100% (233)	0.33 (233)
Pan-democrats	91.0%	4.7%	3.7%	0.6%	100% (906)	0.90 (901)
Pro-establishment	10.5%	7.8%	80.0%	1.7%	100% (108)	8.02 (106)
Centrist/ no political orientation	49.4%	16.3%	30.8%	3.5%	100% (701)	3.98 (677)
Monthly family income*						
HK$ 14,999 or below	58.7%	13.3%	22.7%	5.3%	100% (297)	3.31 (282)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	70.0%	9.8%	19.1%	1.1%	100% (239)	2.28 (236)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	71.5%	10.1%	18.2%	0.2%	100% (365)	2.45 (365)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	79.6%	8.1%	12.2%	0.1%	100% (428)	1.74 (428)
HK$ 60,000 or above	76.6%	4.8%	17.9%	0.8%	100% (473)	2.12 (469)
Stance towards the movement*						
Support	95.2%	3.5%	1.0%	0.4%	100% (1,251)	0.57 (1,246)
Half-half	59.6%	23.7%	14.5%	2.2%	100% (359)	2.87 (351)
Oppose	8.6%	9.8%	76.4%	5.2%	100% (362)	7.93 (343)

Notes
1. * T-test or ANOVA test indicate a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the mean scores of different attributes of the demographic variables.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ refuse to answer" are excluded.

Table 9. 'Dispersing protesters with tear gas, rubber bullet, and pepper spray, etc.', how acceptable is it? On a scale of 0 to 10, what is your score?

	Unacceptable (0-4)	So-so (5)	Acceptable (6-10)	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)	Mean (Sample size)
Overall	72.4%	8.1%	18.6%	0.9%	100% (2,008)	2.54 (1,990)
Gender						
Male	71.8%	9.5%	17.4%	1.2%	100% (950)	2.59 (938)
Female	72.9%	6.9%	19.7%	0.6%	100% (1,058)	2.49 (1,052)
Age*						
15 – 29	89.1%	6.0%	4.3%	0.6%	100% (376)	1.23 (374)
30 – 39	81.8%	4.2%	13.8%	0.2%	100% (319)	2.07 (318)
40 – 49	67.2%	9.0%	23.4%	0.5%	100% (337)	2.98 (335)
50 – 59	69.8%	9.7%	20.0%	0.5%	100% (388)	2.64 (386)
60 or above	61.6%	10.2%	26.4%	1.7%	100% (579)	3.29 (569)
Education*						
Secondary (Form 3) or below	67.3%	11.7%	19.8%	1.1%	100% (671)	2.74 (663)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	70.8%	8.8%	19.8%	0.6%	100% (640)	2.65 (636)
Tertiary	78.7%	4.0%	16.5%	0.8%	100% (684)	2.23 (679)
Occupation*						
Managers and administrators	71.3%	5.5%	22.4%	0.7%	100% (271)	2.86 (269)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	82.9%	4.6%	12.2%	0.3%	100% (256)	1.88 (255)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	74.6%	8.8%	15.8%	0.8%	100% (529)	2.38 (525)
Students	87.9%	6.8%	4.8%	0.5%	100% (149)	1.27 (148)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	65.0%	9.9%	24.0%	1.0%	100% (740)	2.96 (733)
Political orientation*						
Localists	98.0%	0.9%	1.0%	0.0%	100% (233)	0.46 (233)
Pan-democrats	91.4%	4.7%	3.7%	0.3%	100% (906)	1.15 (904)
Pro-establishment	5.9%	3.9%	90.2%	0.0%	100% (108)	8.46 (108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	50.3%	15.6%	32.3%	1.8%	100% (701)	4.10 (689)
Monthly family income*						
HK$ 14,999 or below	59.7%	13.8%	24.8%	1.8%	100% (297)	3.33 (292)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	70.0%	9.6%	19.6%	0.7%	100% (239)	2.53 (237)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	74.1%	8.2%	17.3%	0.5%	100% (365)	2.45 (364)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	78.1%	7.6%	14.2%	0.1%	100% (428)	2.15 (428)
HK$ 60,000 or above	78.4%	3.6%	17.4%	0.6%	100% (473)	2.28 (470)
Stance towards the movement*						
Support	94.3%	4.3%	1.0%	0.4%	100% (1,251)	0.79 (1,246)
Half-half	64.1%	19.7%	15.8%	0.4%	100% (359)	2.99 (357)
Oppose	7.6%	10.0%	80.5%	1.9%	100% (362)	8.04 (355)

Notes
1. * T-test or ANOVA test indicate a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the mean scores of different attributes of the demographic variables.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ refuse to answer" are excluded.

Table 10. 'Firing live rounds during confrontations', how acceptable is it? On a scale of 0 to 10, what is your score?

	Unacceptable (0-4)	So-so (5)	Acceptable (6-10)	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)	Mean (Sample size)
Overall	78.9%	4.7%	14.2%	2.2%	100% (2,008)	1.66 (1,964)
Gender						
Male	80.8%	4.1%	13.2%	1.9%	100% (950)	1.57 (932)
Female	77.2%	5.2%	15.2%	2.5%	100% (1,058)	1.73 (1,032)
Age*						
15 – 29	94.2%	2.0%	3.9%	0.0%	100% (376)	0.59 (376)
30 – 39	85.2%	3.4%	10.4%	1.0%	100% (319)	1.20 (315)
40 – 49	75.5%	3.5%	20.2%	0.8%	100% (337)	2.12 (334)
50 – 59	77.4%	4.8%	14.7%	3.0%	100% (388)	1.69 (376)
60 or above	69.2%	7.5%	19.0%	4.4%	100% (579)	2.31 (553)
Education						
Secondary (Form 3) or below	75.2%	7.2%	14.2%	3.4%	100% (671)	1.82 (648)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	78.2%	4.3%	15.5%	2.0%	100% (640)	1.73 (627)
Tertiary	83.3%	2.7%	13.1%	1.0%	100% (684)	1.45 (677)
Occupation*						
Managers and administrators	77.3%	4.8%	16.3%	1.6%	100% (271)	1.90 (266)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	86.7%	2.3%	9.9%	1.1%	100% (256)	1.11 (253)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	81.3%	3.9%	12.3%	2.5%	100% (529)	1.38 (515)
Students	96.2%	1.0%	2.8%	0.0%	100% (149)	0.56 (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	71.8%	7.0%	18.4%	2.8%	100% (740)	2.16 (720)
Political orientation*						
Localists	98.4%	0.5%	0.5%	0.5%	100% (233)	0.10 (232)
Pan-democrats	96.9%	0.4%	2.5%	0.3%	100% (906)	0.34 (903)
Pro-establishment	11.2%	15.6%	69.6%	3.6%	100% (108)	7.47 (104)
Centrist/ no political orientation	60.7%	9.9%	24.7%	4.7%	100% (701)	3.00 (668)
Monthly family income*						
HK$ 14,999 or below	68.1%	8.0%	18.5%	5.4%	100% (297)	2.41 (281)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	76.2%	7.6%	15.0%	1.1%	100% (239)	1.75 (236)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	82.0%	3.9%	11.3%	2.8%	100% (365)	1.41 (355)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	85.4%	3.5%	10.2%	0.9%	100% (428)	1.20 (425)
HK$ 60,000 or above	82.1%	3.1%	13.9%	1.0%	100% (473)	1.53 (468)
Stance towards the movement*						
Support	98.5%	0.6%	0.3%	0.5%	100% (1,251)	0.13 (1,245)
Half-half	77.3%	10.6%	9.6%	2.5%	100% (359)	1.69 (350)
Oppose	15.8%	13.0%	64.9%	6.3%	100% (362)	7.08 (339)

Notes
1. * T-test or ANOVA test indicate a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the mean scores of different attributes of the demographic variables.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ refuse to answer" are excluded.

Table 11. 'Arrest actions at protest scenes', how acceptable is it? On a scale of 0 to 10, what is your score?

	Unacceptable (0-4)	So-so (5)	Acceptable (6-10)	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)	Mean (Sample size)
Overall	68.6%	10.5%	19.3%	1.6%	100% (2,008)	2.79 (1,976)
Gender						
Male	68.7%	11.3%	18.7%	1.2%	100% (950)	2.80 (938)
Female	68.5%	9.8%	19.8%	1.9%	100% (1,058)	2.79 (1,038)
Age*						
15 – 29	89.1%	3.9%	6.5%	0.4%	100% (376)	1.31 (375)
30 – 39	77.3%	8.1%	14.6%	0.0%	100% (319)	2.36 (319)
40 – 49	61.4%	13.1%	24.3%	1.2%	100% (337)	3.27 (333)
50 – 59	70.3%	9.3%	19.3%	1.1%	100% (388)	2.73 (384)
60 or above	54.0%	15.6%	26.8%	3.5%	100% (579)	3.77 (558)
Education*						
Secondary (Form 3) or below	60.3%	17.7%	19.0%	3.0%	100% (671)	3.11 (650)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	68.7%	8.5%	22.3%	0.5%	100% (640)	2.84 (636)
Tertiary	76.7%	5.4%	16.9%	1.0%	100% (684)	2.44 (677)
Occupation*						
Managers and administrators	69.5%	6.8%	23.0%	0.7%	100% (271)	2.92 (269)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	80.8%	5.4%	13.5%	0.2%	100% (256)	2.07 (255)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	70.8%	12.6%	15.3%	1.3%	100% (529)	2.57 (522)
Students	87.5%	5.6%	6.4%	0.5%	100% (149)	1.38 (148)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	58.9%	12.9%	25.4%	2.7%	100% (740)	3.42 (720)
Political orientation*						
Localists	96.5%	2.0%	1.2%	0.3%	100% (233)	0.59 (233)
Pan-democrats	88.5%	6.2%	4.5%	0.9%	100% (906)	1.37 (898)
Pro-establishment	6.4%	9.7%	83.9%	0.0%	100% (108)	8.39 (108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	44.0%	19.4%	33.6%	3.0%	100% (701)	4.47 (680)
Monthly family income*						
HK$ 14,999 or below	50.8%	17.0%	27.0%	5.3%	100% (297)	3.87 (282)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	66.7%	13.8%	18.8%	0.7%	100% (239)	2.66 (237)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	71.0%	12.2%	16.1%	0.7%	100% (365)	2.71 (363)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	76.4%	8.7%	14.4%	0.5%	100% (428)	2.27 (426)
HK$ 60,000 or above	76.5%	4.1%	18.9%	0.5%	100% (473)	2.42 (471)
Stance towards the movement*						
Support	93.1%	4.9%	1.4%	0.6%	100% (1,251)	0.96 (1,244)
Half-half	49.9%	28.2%	19.7%	2.2%	100% (359)	3.74 (351)
Oppose	5.4%	11.7%	79.3%	3.7%	100% (362)	8.18 (349)

Notes
1. * T-test or ANOVA test indicate a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the mean scores of different attributes of the demographic variables.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ refuse to answer" are excluded.

Table 12. 'Dealing with journalists in conflict situations', how acceptable is it? On a scale of 0 to 10, what is your score?

	Unacceptable (0-4)	So-so (5)	Acceptable (6-10)	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)	Mean (Sample size)
Overall	70.8%	11.8%	15.3%	2.1%	100% (2,008)	2.32 (1,966)
Gender						
Male	72.1%	12.7%	13.9%	1.3%	100% (950)	2.25 (937)
Female	69.6%	11.0%	16.6%	2.8%	100% (1,058)	2.39 (1029)
Age*						
15 – 29	91.0%	5.8%	2.7%	0.4%	100% (376)	0.93 (375)
30 – 39	79.3%	9.1%	11.3%	0.2%	100% (319)	1.87 (318)
40 – 49	64.0%	12.9%	22.3%	0.8%	100% (337)	2.93 (334)
50 – 59	70.3%	9.5%	18.1%	2.0%	100% (388)	2.42 (380)
60 or above	57.8%	17.5%	19.9%	4.9%	100% (579)	3.07 (551)
Education*						
Secondary (Form 3) or below	63.5%	18.3%	14.1%	4.2%	100% (671)	2.60 (642)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	69.9%	10.8%	18.6%	0.7%	100% (640)	2.42 (635)
Tertiary	78.9%	6.3%	13.6%	1.2%	100% (684)	1.96 (676)
Occupation*						
Managers and administrators	71.2%	9.0%	19.2%	0.7%	100% (271)	2.52 (269)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	82.4%	6.1%	10.2%	1.2%	100% (256)	1.69 (252)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	73.7%	10.2%	14.4%	1.7%	100% (529)	2.12 (520)
Students	90.8%	7.4%	0.8%	1.0%	100% (149)	0.92 (148)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	60.8%	17.1%	18.8%	3.3%	100% (740)	2.86 (716)
Political orientation*						
Localists	96.4%	2.8%	0.5%	0.3%	100% (233)	0.48 (233)
Pan-democrats	90.7%	5.2%	3.4%	0.7%	100% (906)	0.98 (900)
Pro-establishment	5.3%	18.6%	71.7%	4.4%	100% (108)	7.74 (103)
Centrist/ no political orientation	47.7%	22.5%	26.0%	3.9%	100% (701)	3.86 (674)
Monthly family income*						
HK$ 14,999 or below	54.1%	20.3%	18.0%	7.6%	100% (297)	3.21 (275)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	66.9%	15.5%	16.8%	0.7%	100% (239)	2.38 (237)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	72.8%	12.9%	13.5%	0.8%	100% (365)	2.18 (363)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	78.9%	7.8%	12.9%	0.3%	100% (428)	1.89 (427)
HK$ 60,000 or above	77.3%	7.5%	14.7%	0.5%	100% (473)	2.05 (471)
Stance towards the movement*						
Support	94.8%	4.1%	0.9%	0.2%	100% (1,251)	0.65 (1,248)
Half-half	54.3%	29.6%	13.1%	3.0%	100% (359)	3.21 (348)
Oppose	7.3%	20.1%	66.7%	6.0%	100% (362)	7.46 (340)

Notes
1. * T-test or ANOVA test indicate a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the mean scores of different attributes of the demographic variables.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ refuse to answer" are excluded.

Section 6.1.4 Changes in Image of the Police

Table 13. Has your image of the police changed because of their performance in handling the anti-extradition bill movement since June? Is it much better, a little bit better, a little bit worse, much worse or no change?

	Better	Worse	No change	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
Overall	7.2%	68.8%	22.3%	1.7%	100% (2,008)
Gender					
Male	6.5%	69.8%	22.0%	1.6%	100% (950)
Female	7.9%	67.9%	22.5%	1.7%	100% (1,058)
Age*					
15 – 29	2.3%	87.1%	10.6%	0.0%	100% (376)
30 – 39	4.6%	80.7%	14.4%	0.2%	100% (319)
40 – 49	7.6%	64.9%	25.9%	1.5%	100% (337)
50 – 59	6.6%	69.1%	23.6%	0.7%	100% (388)
60 or above	11.9%	52.9%	30.8%	4.3%	100% (579)
Education*					
Secondary (Form 3) or below	8.2%	58.1%	29.7%	4.0%	100% (671)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	6.4%	68.4%	24.4%	0.8%	100% (640)
Tertiary	7.1%	79.9%	12.8%	0.3%	100% (684)
Occupation*					
Managers and administrators	8.2%	71.7%	19.8%	0.3%	100% (271)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	3.7%	81.3%	15.1%	0.0%	100% (256)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	6.1%	72.0%	21.0%	1.0%	100% (529)
Students	0.8%	89.3%	9.9%	0.0%	100% (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	10.1%	57.2%	29.3%	3.4%	100% (740)
Political orientation*					
Localists	1.4%	86.3%	12.3%	0.0%	100% (233)
Pan-democrats	0.5%	87.5%	11.8%	0.2%	100% (906)
Pro-establishment	37.3%	11.4%	51.3%	0.0%	100% (108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	13.2%	49.6%	33.9%	3.3%	100% (701)
Monthly family income*					
HK$ 14,999 or below	13.0%	46.6%	34.8%	5.6%	100% (297)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	8.6%	66.8%	24.0%	0.5%	100% (239)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	6.4%	69.2%	23.9%	0.4%	100% (365)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	3.2%	79.5%	17.0%	0.2%	100% (428)
HK$ 60,000 or above	8.0%	76.8%	15.1%	0.0%	100% (473)
Stance towards the movement*					
Support	0.2%	88.8%	10.7%	0.3%	100% (1,251)
Half-half	5.7%	57.2%	32.2%	4.9%	100% (359)
Oppose	33.1%	14.2%	50.1%	2.5%	100% (362)

Notes
1. * Chi-Square test indicates a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the response to the question and the demographic attributes.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ Refuse to answer" are excluded.

Table 14. Have any of the following events caused significant deterioration in your image of the police?

	Dispersion of protesters surrounding the Legislative Council on June 12	Dispersion of protesters occupying the Legislative Council on July 1-2	White-shirted people attacking citizens in Yuen Long on July 21	Firing of tear gas at Kwai Fong MTR station on August 11	A female protester suffering severe eye injury on August 11	Arrest operations at Prince Edward MTR station on August 31	Firing of a live round at a protestor on October 1	The handling of detained people at the San Uk Ling Holding Centre	Others	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	(Sample size)
Overall	13.5%	9.8%	82.2%	18.6%	22.3%	49.8%	38.3%	29.0%	3.8%	1.4%	(1382)
Gender											
Male	13.7%	10.0%	83.6%	18.7%	20.4%	49.9%	35.2%	25.1%	2.9%	1.5%	(663)
Female	13.3%	9.6%	80.9%	18.5%	24.0%	49.8%	41.1%	32.5%	4.7%	1.3%	(719)
Age											
15 – 29	13.0%	9.3%	82.8%	21.8%	27.6%	48.8%	46.0%	29.8%	4.7%	0.3%	(328)
30 – 39	13.5%	7.5%	84.1%	18.6%	26.0%	52.1%	39.7%	28.2%	2.4%	0.3%	(257)
40 – 49	14.6%	9.6%	89.0%	18.2%	21.3%	49.2%	36.7%	34.3%	4.2%	1.0%	(219)
50 – 59	13.3%	8.3%	81.1%	16.9%	19.6%	51.0%	34.2%	29.8%	4.6%	1.0%	(268)
60 or above	13.7%	13.4%	75.9%	16.7%	16.4%	48.7%	33.6%	24.2%	3.2%	4.1%	(306)
Education											
Secondary (Form 3) or below	12.6%	11.4%	79.5%	15.0%	17.1%	45.4%	33.2%	24.6%	2.3%	2.5%	(389)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	12.8%	9.3%	79.7%	18.4%	21.3%	47.8%	35.3%	27.6%	4.7%	1.3%	(437)
Tertiary	14.9%	9.0%	86.4%	21.4%	26.9%	54.5%	44.2%	33.4%	4.3%	0.7%	(546)
Occupation											
Managers and administrators	18.8%	12.5%	84.4%	21.9%	23.4%	56.1%	37.4%	33.2%	3.7%	0.6%	(194)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	14.7%	6.6%	88.2%	20.4%	27.9%	59.0%	47.0%	34.4%	4.4%	0.3%	(208)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	12.3%	8.0%	81.8%	13.9%	19.8%	46.2%	34.9%	24.8%	3.6%	0.4%	(381)
Students	12.7%	10.1%	82.7%	24.7%	30.0%	46.1%	44.6%	33.2%	4.9%	0.7%	(133)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	12.2%	11.9%	76.9%	18.1%	18.3%	46.3%	34.8%	27.6%	3.3%	3.4%	(423)

Political orientation											
Localists	13.5%	9.2%	82.7%	15.6%	21.0%	57.3%	46.8%	29.4%	3.9%	0.2%	(201)
Pan-democrats	13.5%	8.2%	83.7%	18.0%	21.7%	52.1%	36.8%	28.6%	4.6%	1.3%	(793)
Pro-establishment	0.0%	0.0%	83.2%	18.8%	9.3%	23.9%	19.7%	9.5%	8.2%	4.8%	(12)
Centrist/ no political orientation	14.2%	13.2%	78.0%	19.4%	23.6%	41.2%	35.4%	29.4%	2.2%	2.3%	(348)
Monthly family income											
HK$ 14,999 or below	11.8%	12.6%	84.8%	25.2%	21.9%	46.1%	30.4%	22.7%	4.1%	3.9%	(139)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	11.5%	9.9%	75.4%	18.2%	24.5%	50.6%	36.1%	32.3%	1.5%	1.3%	(160)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	11.1%	7.2%	82.5%	16.1%	22.0%	47.8%	35.9%	29.9%	1.9%	0.4%	(253)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	15.2%	10.8%	82.2%	16.6%	21.9%	50.1%	39.4%	29.1%	4.0%	1.0%	(341)
HK$ 60,000 or above	13.7%	8.1%	86.5%	18.7%	21.6%	54.2%	40.8%	30.1%	5.2%	1.3%	(363)
Stance towards the movement											
Support	14.2%	10.1%	83.8%	19.4%	24.0%	55.0%	40.3%	31.0%	4.2%	0.4%	(1111)
Half-half	12.4%	9.8%	78.1%	18.3%	18.3%	34.5%	35.4%	23.4%	2.1%	1.9%	(205)
Oppose	2.9%	2.8%	68.1%	5.7%	5.2%	7.5%	10.3%	7.9%	1.4%	17.2%	(51)

Notes
1. □ Chi-Square test indicates a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the response to the question and the demographic attributes.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered “Other” and “Don’t know/ refuse to answer” are excluded.

Table 15. Have any of the following police performances led to improvement in your image of them?

	Have performed the job conscientiously and dutifully despite difficulties	Have suffered injuries while on duty	Had to endure insults made by protesters	Had to endure harassment and doxing of themselves and their families	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	(Sample size)
Overall	67.6%	23.8%	40.3%	38.5%	0.5%	(146)
Gender						
Male	60.9%	19.6%	46.9%	25.4%	1.2%	(62)
Female	72.4%	26.9%	35.4%	48.1%	0.0%	(84)
Age						
15 – 29	84.8%	23.5%	41.3%	47.8%	0.0%	(9)
30 – 39	77.7%	27.5%	27.3%	51.5%	0.0%	(15)
40 – 49	65.6%	23.7%	41.7%	43.4%	0.0%	(26)
50 – 59	58.5%	20.7%	28.3%	22.3%	0.0%	(26)
60 or above	66.6%	24.8%	46.4%	39.6%	1.0%	(69)
Education						
Secondary (Form 3) or below	59.2%	23.0%	43.6%	36.7%	0.0%	(55)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	60.4%	24.4%	36.0%	37.5%	0.0%	(41)
Tertiary	82.6%	24.8%	39.0%	42.1%	1.5%	(48)
Occupation						
Managers and administrators	71.8%	26.1%	43.7%	50.9%	0.0%	(22)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	60.5%	33.4%	18.8%	49.7%	0.0%	(9)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	67.6%	15.5%	43.1%	22.1%	0.0%	(32)
Students	51.0%	0.0%	0.0%	49.0%	0.0%	(1)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	64.8%	26.3%	38.3%	37.5%	1.0%	(75)
Political orientation						
Localists	40.9%	18.4%	59.1%	18.4%	0.0%	(3)
Pan-democrats	76.2%	22.7%	0.0%	47.6%	0.0%	(4)
Pro-establishment	66.3%	20.0%	35.0%	47.2%	1.8%	(40)
Centrist/ no political orientation	66.8%	27.1%	46.0%	37.2%	0.0%	(92)
Monthly family income						
HK$ 14,999 or below	62.6%	21.0%	35.5%	35.5%	1.9%	(39)

HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	43.6%	26.5%	24.0%	39.9%	0.0%	(21)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	73.6%	15.7%	37.4%	25.6%	0.0%	(23)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	71.3%	17.9%	36.4%	22.7%	0.0%	(14)
HK$ 60,000 or above	72.6%	21.6%	48.1%	47.9%	0.0%	(38)
Stance towards the movement						
Support	51.0%	51.0%	51.0%	100.0%	0.0%	(2)
Half-half	51.6%	17.9%	44.8%	24.1%	0.0%	(20)
Oppose	69.7%	23.5%	39.3%	39.8%	0.6%	(120)

Notes
1. □ Chi-Square test indicates a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the response to the question and the demographic attributes.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered “Other” and “Don’t know/ refuse to answer” are excluded.

Section 6.2.1 Support for the Movement

Table 16. Do you support the anti-extradition bill movement? Are you very supportive, somewhat supportive, half-half, somewhat against or very against?

	Support	So-so	Oppose	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
Overall	62.3%	17.9%	18.0%	1.8%	100% (2,008)
Gender					
Male	65.0%	17.0%	16.5%	1.4%	100% (950)
Female	59.9%	18.6%	19.4%	2.1%	100% (1,058)
Age*					
15 – 29	84.9%	10.1%	4.4%	0.6%	100% (376)
30 – 39	69.3%	18.5%	11.7%	0.4%	100% (319)
40 – 49	56.0%	18.3%	23.7%	2.0%	100% (337)
50 – 59	60.8%	19.3%	19.0%	0.9%	100% (388)
60 or above	49.1%	21.1%	26.4%	3.4%	100% (579)
Education*					
Secondary (Form 3) or below	52.2%	24.5%	20.9%	2.4%	100% (671)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	62.5%	17.1%	18.4%	1.9%	100% (640)
Tertiary	72.4%	11.7%	14.8%	1.1%	100% (684)
Occupation*					
Managers and administrators	67.1%	11.3%	20.0%	1.7%	100% (271)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	76.5%	11.6%	11.1%	0.9%	100% (256)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	62.9%	19.8%	16.1%	1.1%	100% (529)
Students	83.8%	13.0%	3.2%	0.0%	100% (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	51.6%	21.6%	23.8%	3.0%	100% (740)
Political orientation*					
Localists	94.6%	4.6%	0.5%	0.3%	100% (233)
Pan-democrats	84.6%	11.6%	3.1%	0.7%	100% (906)
Pro-establishment	4.8%	8.6%	85.1%	1.5%	100% (108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	33.3%	31.3%	32.2%	3.2%	100% (701)
Monthly family income*					
HK$ 14,999 or below	43.8%	25.5%	27.2%	3.5%	100% (297)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	61.8%	20.0%	15.9%	2.3%	100% (239)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	60.6%	19.3%	18.7%	1.4%	100% (365)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	70.9%	15.0%	13.2%	0.9%	100% (428)
HK$ 60,000 or above	71.3%	12.2%	15.8%	0.7%	100% (473)
Stance towards the movement*					
Support	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100% (1,251)
Half-half	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100% (359)
Oppose	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	100% (362)

Notes
1. * Chi-Square test indicates a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the response to the question and the demographic attributes.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ Refuse to answer" are excluded.

Table 17. The SAR government announced the withdrawal of the Fugitive Offenders Bill earlier. Do you think whether the protesters should continue to protest to force the government to fulfill other demands?

	Should	Should not	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
Overall	70.0%	24.4%	5.7%	100% (2,008)
Gender				
Male	71.3%	23.7%	5.0%	100% (950)
Female	68.7%	25.0%	6.3%	100% (1,058)
Age*				
15 – 29	89.5%	8.5%	2.0%	100% (376)
30 – 39	74.9%	20.3%	4.8%	100% (319)
40 – 49	61.3%	30.9%	7.8%	100% (337)
50 – 59	71.0%	24.8%	4.2%	100% (388)
60 or above	59.0%	32.6%	8.5%	100% (579)
Education*				
Secondary (Form 3) or below	63.7%	26.4%	9.9%	100% (671)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	68.4%	27.8%	3.8%	100% (640)
Tertiary	77.7%	19.1%	3.2%	100% (684)
Occupation*				
Managers and administrators	69.7%	26.2%	4.2%	100% (271)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	82.4%	15.8%	1.8%	100% (256)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	69.2%	24.4%	6.4%	100% (529)
Students	88.3%	9.6%	2.1%	100% (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	62.8%	29.3%	7.9%	100% (740)
Political orientation*				
Localists	96.0%	2.4%	1.6%	100% (233)
Pan-democrats	90.4%	7.5%	2.1%	100% (906)
Pro-establishment	9.6%	86.7%	3.7%	100% (108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	45.0%	43.6%	11.4%	100% (701)
Monthly family income*				
HK$ 14,999 or below	55.5%	31.5%	13.0%	100% (297)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	70.3%	24.1%	5.6%	100% (239)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	70.4%	23.9%	5.7%	100% (365)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	77.5%	19.2%	3.3%	100% (428)
HK$ 60,000 or above	74.4%	22.1%	3.5%	100% (473)
Stance towards the movement*				
Support	93.8%	4.3%	1.8%	100% (1,251)
Half-half	49.2%	33.2%	17.5%	100% (359)
Oppose	9.1%	85.3%	5.6%	100% (362)

Notes
1. * Chi-Square test indicates a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the response to the question and the demographic attributes.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ Refuse to answer" are excluded.

Section 6.2.2 Acceptance of Protest Actions

Table 18. 'Non-cooperation movement, such as obstructing the operation of MTR and government departments', how acceptable is it? On a scale of 0 to 10, what is your score?

	Unacceptable (0-4)	So-so (5)	Acceptable (6-10)	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)	Mean (Sample size)
Overall	31.3%	25.7%	42.2%	0.8%	100% (2,008)	5.20 (1,993)
Gender*						
Male	29.8%	25.6%	44.0%	0.6%	100% (950)	5.39 (944)
Female	32.6%	25.9%	40.6%	0.9%	100% (1,058)	5.03 (1,049)
Age*						
15 – 29	12.4%	9.8%	77.6%	0.2%	100% (376)	7.34 (375)
30 – 39	23.9%	23.1%	53.0%	0.0%	100% (319)	5.94 (319)
40 – 49	35.2%	25.4%	38.2%	1.2%	100% (337)	4.84 (333)
50 – 59	31.6%	34.8%	32.9%	0.8%	100% (388)	4.75 (385)
60 or above	44.7%	31.6%	22.4%	1.3%	100% (579)	3.93 (571)
Education*						
Secondary (Form 3) or below	35.7%	37.5%	25.2%	1.6%	100% (671)	4.45 (660)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	32.0%	26.1%	41.3%	0.6%	100% (640)	5.10 (636)
Tertiary	26.1%	13.8%	59.9%	0.1%	100% (684)	6.04 (683)
Occupation*						
Managers and administrators	29.9%	21.3%	48.1%	0.6%	100% (271)	5.41 (269)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	22.1%	18.6%	59.3%	0.0%	100% (256)	6.30 (256)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	29.4%	28.4%	41.2%	1.1%	100% (529)	5.24 (523)
Students	12.6%	12.7%	74.7%	0.0%	100% (149)	7.17 (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	40.2%	30.4%	28.4%	1.1%	100% (740)	4.33 (732)
Political orientation*						
Localists	4.1%	18.5%	77.4%	0.0%	100% (233)	7.84 (233)
Pan-democrats	13.9%	28.4%	56.9%	0.8%	100% (906)	6.52 (899)
Pro-establishment	91.7%	5.6%	2.7%	0.0%	100% (108)	0.79 (108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	52.7%	28.3%	18.1%	0.9%	100% (701)	3.34 (695)
Monthly family income*						
HK$ 14,999 or below	43.5%	34.2%	21.2%	1.2%	100% (297)	3.89 (294)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	33.2%	27.4%	38.7%	0.7%	100% (239)	5.07 (237)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	31.1%	28.8%	39.8%	0.3%	100% (365)	5.02 (364)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	24.3%	24.5%	50.8%	0.4%	100% (428)	5.86 (427)
HK$ 60,000 or above	24.9%	20.1%	54.8%	0.2%	100% (473)	5.93 (472)
Stance towards the movement*						
Support	9.2%	26.8%	63.5%	0.5%	100% (1,251)	7.02 (1,245)
Half-half	44.2%	44.5%	10.7%	0.6%	100% (359)	3.58 (357)
Oppose	92.7%	4.1%	2.4%	0.8%	100% (362)	0.70 (359)

Notes
1. * T-test or ANOVA test indicate a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the mean scores of different attributes of the demographic variables.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ refuse to answer" are excluded.

Table 19. 'Occupying the airport', how acceptable is it? On a scale of 0 to 10, what is your score?

	Unacceptable (0-4)	So-so (5)	Acceptable (6-10)	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)	Mean (Sample size)
Overall	39.0%	21.6%	38.4%	1.0%	100% (2,008)	4.73 (1,988)
Gender*						
Male	37.7%	22.4%	39.4%	0.5%	100% (950)	4.91 (945)
Female	40.2%	20.9%	37.4%	1.4%	100% (1,058)	4.56 (1,043)
Age*						
15 – 29	15.3%	11.3%	73.4%	0.0%	100% (376)	7.11 (376)
30 – 39	32.5%	19.7%	47.9%	0.0%	100% (319)	5.37 (319)
40 – 49	45.1%	22.5%	31.4%	0.9%	100% (337)	4.26 (334)
50 – 59	45.1%	25.2%	29.7%	0.0%	100% (388)	4.13 (388)
60 or above	49.7%	26.9%	20.6%	2.9%	100% (579)	3.51 (562)
Education*						
Secondary (Form 3) or below	42.4%	29.7%	25.4%	2.5%	100% (671)	4.02 (654)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	42.1%	21.4%	36.3%	0.3%	100% (640)	4.57 (638)
Tertiary	32.5%	14.2%	53.2%	0.0%	100% (684)	5.58 (684)
Occupation*						
Managers and administrators	40.0%	21.3%	38.4%	0.3%	100% (271)	4.62 (270)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	27.9%	19.5%	52.6%	0.0%	100% (256)	5.80 (256)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	38.2%	21.8%	39.7%	0.4%	100% (529)	4.82 (527)
Students	17.8%	10.8%	71.4%	0.0%	100% (149)	6.98 (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	47.9%	24.7%	25.1%	2.3%	100% (740)	3.81 (723)
Political orientation*						
Localists	7.5%	19.5%	73.1%	0.0%	100% (233)	7.63 (233)
Pan-democrats	21.5%	26.5%	50.9%	1.1%	100% (906)	6.01 (896)
Pro-establishment	97.3%	1.4%	1.2%	0.0%	100% (108)	0.42 (108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	62.4%	19.8%	16.8%	1.0%	100% (701)	2.82 (695)
Monthly family income*						
HK$ 14,999 or below	50.0%	24.7%	22.4%	2.9%	100% (297)	3.63 (289)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	38.7%	28.3%	33.0%	0.0%	100% (239)	4.59 (239)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	38.4%	24.8%	36.4%	0.5%	100% (365)	4.56 (364)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	33.5%	20.7%	45.5%	0.3%	100% (428)	5.28 (427)
HK$ 60,000 or above	34.4%	17.8%	47.5%	0.2%	100% (473)	5.35 (472)
Stance towards the movement*						
Support	15.4%	25.5%	58.3%	0.8%	100% (1,251)	6.57 (1241)
Half-half	60.2%	28.7%	9.0%	2.1%	100% (359)	2.90 (351)
Oppose	96.7%	2.7%	0.7%	0.0%	100% (362)	0.40 (362)

Notes
1. * T-test or ANOVA test indicate a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the mean scores of different attributes of the demographic variables.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ refuse to answer" are excluded.

Table 20. 'Damaging MTR facilities and traffic lights, etc.', how acceptable is it? On a scale of 0 to 10, what is your score?

	Unacceptable (0-4)	So-so (5)	Acceptable (6-10)	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)	Mean (Sample size)
Overall	45.6%	19.0%	34.1%	1.2%	100% (2,008)	4.26 (1,983)
Gender*						
Male	44.3%	19.3%	35.6%	0.8%	100% (950)	4.43 (942)
Female	46.8%	18.7%	32.8%	1.7%	100% (1,058)	4.10 (1,041)
Age*						
15 – 29	17.1%	13.7%	68.4%	0.8%	100% (376)	6.58 (373)
30 – 39	38.8%	17.1%	43.1%	1.0%	100% (319)	4.80 (316)
40 – 49	55.4%	15.9%	27.1%	1.6%	100% (337)	3.55 (331)
50 – 59	50.5%	23.7%	25.3%	0.5%	100% (388)	3.83 (386)
60 or above	58.2%	22.5%	17.2%	2.1%	100% (579)	3.18 (567)
Education*						
Secondary (Form 3) or below	51.4%	25.5%	21.3%	1.7%	100% (671)	3.57 (659)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	44.9%	18.4%	35.5%	1.2%	100% (640)	4.30 (632)
Tertiary	40.1%	13.5%	45.5%	0.8%	100% (684)	4.91 (679)
Occupation*						
Managers and administrators	49.1%	15.5%	33.7%	1.7%	100% (271)	4.15 (266)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	34.4%	19.3%	46.0%	0.2%	100% (256)	5.22 (255)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	44.0%	18.6%	36.5%	0.9%	100% (529)	4.38 (524)
Students	17.0%	10.7%	71.9%	0.4%	100% (149)	6.67 (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	54.2%	23.1%	20.8%	1.9%	100% (740)	3.41 (726)
Political orientation*						
Localists	9.9%	24.3%	65.5%	0.3%	100% (233)	7.09 (233)
Pan-democrats	29.8%	21.0%	47.3%	1.9%	100% (906)	5.55 (889)
Pro-establishment	96.8%	2.5%	0.7%	0.0%	100% (108)	0.27 (108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	69.3%	17.6%	12.5%	0.7%	100% (701)	2.36 (697)
Monthly family income*						
HK$ 14,999 or below	56.9%	23.1%	16.7%	3.2%	100% (297)	3.09 (288)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	45.7%	21.2%	32.1%	1.0%	100% (239)	4.26 (236)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	44.4%	21.6%	33.3%	0.7%	100% (365)	4.20 (363)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	39.0%	18.6%	41.7%	0.6%	100% (428)	4.77 (426)
HK$ 60,000 or above	42.4%	14.5%	42.5%	0.5%	100% (473)	4.77 (470)
Stance towards the movement*						
Support	22.9%	23.1%	53.0%	1.0%	100% (1,251)	6.09 (1,238)
Half-half	68.0%	24.5%	5.4%	2.1%	100% (359)	2.30 (351)
Oppose	98.8%	0.3%	0.5%	0.3%	100% (362)	0.14 (361)

Notes
1. * T-test or ANOVA test indicate a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the mean scores of different attributes of the demographic variables.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ refuse to answer" are excluded.

Table 21. 'Vandalising specific stores', how acceptable is it? On a scale of 0 to 10, what is your score?

	Unacceptable (0-4)	So-so (5)	Acceptable (6-10)	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)	Mean (Sample size)
Overall	43.0%	18.5%	37.6%	1.0%	100% (2,008)	4.57 (1,988)
Gender*						
Male	41.6%	18.4%	39.5%	0.5%	100% (950)	4.81 (945)
Female	44.2%	18.5%	35.9%	1.4%	100% (1,058)	4.35 (1,043)
Age*						
15 – 29	15.5%	12.0%	72.3%	0.2%	100% (376)	7.02 (375)
30 – 39	34.5%	17.4%	47.7%	0.4%	100% (319)	5.15 (317)
40 – 49	50.4%	18.2%	30.5%	1.0%	100% (337)	4.05 (333)
50 – 59	48.0%	23.8%	26.5%	1.8%	100% (388)	4.01 (381)
60 or above	57.0%	20.1%	21.6%	1.3%	100% (579)	3.37 (571)
Education*						
Secondary (Form 3) or below	49.9%	23.3%	25.6%	1.3%	100% (671)	3.84 (662)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	42.1%	16.0%	40.4%	1.4%	100% (640)	4.70 (631)
Tertiary	36.6%	16.2%	46.9%	0.3%	100% (684)	5.18 (682)
Occupation*						
Managers and administrators	43.8%	19.2%	36.4%	0.6%	100% (271)	4.46 (269)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	32.2%	16.3%	51.3%	0.2%	100% (256)	5.59 (255)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	40.5%	20.6%	37.6%	1.2%	100% (529)	4.72 (522)
Students	14.6%	9.5%	75.9%	0.0%	100% (149)	7.04 (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	53.3%	19.5%	25.8%	1.4%	100% (740)	3.65 (730)
Political orientation*						
Localists	7.4%	21.9%	70.7%	0.0%	100% (233)	7.58 (233)
Pan-democrats	27.4%	21.0%	50.8%	0.8%	100% (906)	5.84 (899)
Pro-establishment	96.4%	1.8%	1.8%	0.0%	100% (108)	0.35 (108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	66.2%	17.4%	15.2%	1.1%	100% (701)	2.62 (694)
Monthly family income*						
HK$ 14,999 or below	56.0%	17.6%	23.7%	2.7%	100% (297)	3.43 (289)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	42.2%	25.0%	32.5%	0.3%	100% (239)	4.38 (238)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	41.6%	19.7%	37.3%	1.4%	100% (365)	4.65 (360)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	36.2%	20.5%	42.7%	0.6%	100% (428)	5.06 (426)
HK$ 60,000 or above	39.6%	15.7%	44.6%	0.1%	100% (473)	5.02 (472)
Stance towards the movement*						
Support	21.1%	21.2%	57.2%	0.5%	100% (1,251)	6.41 (1,245)
Half-half	60.8%	27.4%	10.0%	1.8%	100% (359)	2.76 (352)
Oppose	97.8%	1.1%	0.5%	0.6%	100% (362)	0.22 (360)

Notes
1. * T-test or ANOVA test indicate a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the mean scores of different attributes of the demographic variables.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ refuse to answer" are excluded.

Table 22. 'Use of force during conflicts against people with different views', how acceptable is it? On a scale of 0 to 10, what is your score?

	Unacceptable (0-4)	So-so (5)	Acceptable (6-10)	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)	Mean (Sample size)
Overall	48.4%	21.4%	28.1%	2.0%	100% (2,008)	3.92 (1,967)
Gender*						
Male	46.1%	22.1%	29.8%	2.0%	100% (950)	4.13 (931)
Female	50.5%	20.9%	26.6%	2.0%	100% (1,058)	3.73 (1,037)
Age*						
15 – 29	25.0%	15.8%	58.3%	1.0%	100% (376)	6.09 (372)
30 – 39	40.2%	22.9%	35.0%	2.0%	100% (319)	4.49 (312)
40 – 49	56.5%	21.5%	21.4%	0.7%	100% (337)	3.25 (334)
50 – 59	55.6%	22.3%	20.3%	1.8%	100% (388)	3.45 (381)
60 or above	58.1%	24.0%	14.3%	3.7%	100% (579)	2.91 (558)
Education*						
Secondary (Form 3) or below	51.3%	26.2%	18.8%	3.8%	100% (671)	3.34 (645)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	50.7%	19.4%	28.9%	1.1%	100% (640)	3.92 (633)
Tertiary	43.3%	18.8%	36.6%	1.2%	100% (684)	4.49 (676)
Occupation*						
Managers and administrators	53.4%	18.6%	25.1%	2.9%	100% (271)	3.64 (263)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	40.8%	22.3%	36.3%	0.6%	100% (256)	4.69 (254)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	45.8%	22.9%	29.3%	2.0%	100% (529)	4.06 (518)
Students	25.3%	16.9%	57.8%	0.0%	100% (149)	5.96 (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	55.8%	22.0%	19.3%	2.8%	100% (740)	3.22 (719)
Political orientation*						
Localists	18.3%	19.8%	60.9%	1.0%	100% (233)	6.61 (231)
Pan-democrats	34.3%	28.2%	35.8%	1.6%	100% (906)	4.93 (892)
Pro-establishment	96.3%	2.4%	1.4%	0.0%	100% (108)	0.43 (108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	69.1%	16.4%	11.6%	3.0%	100% (701)	2.25 (680)
Monthly family income*						
HK$ 14,999 or below	63.2%	17.7%	14.8%	4.3%	100% (297)	2.77 (285)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	47.7%	28.0%	23.1%	1.1%	100% (239)	3.78 (236)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	44.9%	22.7%	30.5%	2.0%	100% (365)	4.05 (358)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	43.1%	22.6%	32.6%	1.7%	100% (428)	4.36 (421)
HK$ 60,000 or above	45.0%	20.4%	34.0%	0.6%	100% (473)	4.37 (470)
Stance towards the movement*						
Support	27.6%	27.6%	43.2%	1.5%	100% (1,251)	5.53 (1,232)
Half-half	70.1%	20.2%	6.1%	3.6%	100% (359)	2.16 (346)
Oppose	96.1%	2.4%	0.2%	1.3%	100% (362)	0.27 (357)

Notes
1. * T-test or ANOVA test indicate a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the mean scores of different attributes of the demographic variables.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ refuse to answer" are excluded.

Table 23. 'Besieging and attacking government buildings, such as police stations and central government offices, etc.', how acceptable is it? On a scale of 0 to 10, what is your score?

	Unacceptable (0-4)	So-so (5)	Acceptable (6-10)	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)	Mean (Sample size)
Overall	36.0%	19.2%	43.9%	0.9%	100% (2,008)	5.13 (1,990)
Gender						
Male	34.4%	20.8%	44.0%	0.8%	100% (950)	5.27 (942)
Female	37.4%	17.7%	43.9%	1.0%	100% (1,058)	5.00 (1047)
Age*						
15 – 29	12.8%	11.9%	75.3%	0.0%	100% (376)	7.33 (376)
30 – 39	26.3%	17.2%	56.0%	0.6%	100% (319)	5.97 (317)
40 – 49	41.8%	21.8%	35.8%	0.6%	100% (337)	4.58 (335)
50 – 59	41.8%	19.6%	37.5%	1.2%	100% (388)	4.75 (383)
60 or above	48.5%	23.3%	26.6%	1.7%	100% (579)	3.87 (569)
Education*						
Secondary (Form 3) or below	41.9%	23.6%	32.6%	1.8%	100% (671)	4.47 (659)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	37.1%	18.4%	43.6%	0.8%	100% (640)	5.10 (635)
Tertiary	29.1%	15.3%	55.4%	0.2%	100% (684)	5.81 (683)
Occupation*						
Managers and administrators	36.9%	16.4%	45.9%	0.8%	100% (271)	5.15 (268)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	25.7%	16.0%	58.2%	0.0%	100% (256)	6.24 (256)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	31.6%	19.3%	48.2%	0.9%	100% (529)	5.43 (524)
Students	14.6%	9.4%	76.0%	0.0%	100% (149)	7.25 (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	46.4%	22.7%	29.4%	1.5%	100% (740)	4.12 (729)
Political orientation*						
Localists	8.0%	14.6%	77.0%	0.4%	100% (233)	7.92 (232)
Pan-democrats	18.2%	20.7%	60.3%	0.8%	100% (906)	6.57 (899)
Pro-establishment	95.1%	3.3%	1.6%	0.0%	100% (108)	0.56 (108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	58.6%	21.1%	19.4%	0.9%	100% (701)	3.14 (695)
Monthly family income*						
HK$ 14,999 or below	47.5%	25.4%	24.7%	2.4%	100% (297)	3.74 (290)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	41.7%	17.6%	40.3%	0.4%	100% (239)	4.83 (238)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	35.2%	19.5%	44.3%	0.9%	100% (365)	5.15 (362)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	26.1%	21.0%	52.1%	0.8%	100% (428)	5.84 (425)
HK$ 60,000 or above	30.0%	16.3%	53.7%	0.1%	100% (473)	5.85 (472)
Stance towards the movement*						
Support	14.7%	20.4%	64.5%	0.4%	100% (1,251)	6.93 (1,246)
Half-half	48.0%	32.2%	17.7%	2.0%	100% (359)	3.76 (351)
Oppose	94.6%	3.2%	1.9%	0.3%	100% (362)	0.52 (361)

Notes
1. * T-test or ANOVA test indicate a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the mean scores of different attributes of the demographic variables.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ refuse to answer" are excluded.

Table 24. 'Hurling petrol bombs at police officers or police stations', how acceptable is it? On a scale of 0 to 10, what is your score?

	Unacceptable (0-4)	So-so (5)	Acceptable (6-10)	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)	Mean (Sample size)
Overall	48.5%	17.1%	32.9%	1.5%	100% (2,008)	4.16 (1,978)
Gender						
Male	48.5%	16.5%	33.9%	1.1%	100% (950)	4.28 (939)
Female	48.6%	17.7%	31.9%	1.8%	100% (1,058)	4.04 (1,039)
Age*						
15 – 29	21.6%	12.8%	65.0%	0.6%	100% (376)	6.59 (374)
30 – 39	41.2%	17.1%	40.2%	1.6%	100% (319)	4.68 (314)
40 – 49	57.4%	16.5%	24.6%	1.6%	100% (337)	3.36 (331)
50 – 59	57.3%	16.1%	26.2%	0.4%	100% (388)	3.61 (386)
60 or above	58.4%	21.1%	17.8%	2.7%	100% (579)	3.14 (563)
Education*						
Secondary (Form 3) or below	51.9%	22.7%	22.5%	2.9%	100% (671)	3.65 (651)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	51.2%	14.4%	33.6%	0.8%	100% (640)	4.08 (635)
Tertiary	42.7%	14.2%	42.3%	0.8%	100% (684)	4.73 (679)
Occupation*						
Managers and administrators	53.5%	15.3%	30.3%	0.9%	100% (271)	3.72 (268)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	39.5%	15.3%	44.6%	0.6%	100% (256)	5.14 (254)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	49.0%	16.1%	33.0%	1.9%	100% (529)	4.13 (519)
Students	19.6%	11.1%	68.7%	0.5%	100% (149)	6.72 (148)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	54.8%	20.6%	22.7%	1.9%	100% (740)	3.48 (726)
Political orientation*						
Localists	15.3%	16.4%	67.9%	0.4%	100% (233)	7.12 (232)
Pan-democrats	33.5%	21.3%	43.7%	1.5%	100% (906)	5.35 (893)
Pro-establishment	98.0%	1.3%	0.7%	0.0%	100% (108)	0.28 (108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	70.9%	14.4%	12.9%	1.8%	100% (701)	2.26 (689)
Monthly family income*						
HK$ 14,999 or below	59.5%	20.0%	17.7%	2.9%	100% (297)	3.13 (289)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	49.9%	19.5%	28.8%	1.8%	100% (239)	4.06 (234)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	48.8%	18.8%	31.4%	1.0%	100% (365)	4.16 (362)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	43.0%	17.3%	39.0%	0.7%	100% (428)	4.61 (425)
HK$ 60,000 or above	43.5%	13.5%	42.4%	0.7%	100% (473)	4.70 (470)
Stance towards the movement*						
Support	26.9%	21.6%	50.2%	1.3%	100% (1,251)	5.90 (1,234)
Half-half	71.2%	17.8%	8.7%	2.3%	100% (359)	2.33 (351)
Oppose	98.3%	1.4%	0.0%	0.3%	100% (362)	0.20 (361)

Notes
1. * T-test or ANOVA test indicate a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the mean scores of different attributes of the demographic variables.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ refuse to answer" are excluded.

Table 25. 'Use of weapons to attack police officers, such as steel pipes, slingshots, throwing bricks, etc.', how acceptable is it? On a scale of 0 to 10, what is your score?

	Unacceptable (0-4)	So-so (5)	Acceptable (6-10)	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)	Mean (Sample size)
Overall	45.2%	18.1%	34.7%	2.0%	100% (2,008)	4.35 (1,969)
Gender						
Male	43.6%	19.7%	34.8%	1.9%	100% (950)	4.48 (931)
Female	46.7%	16.7%	34.6%	2.0%	100% (1,058)	4.24 (1,037)
Age*						
15 – 29	19.6%	11.7%	67.8%	0.8%	100% (376)	6.83 (373)
30 – 39	40.2%	15.3%	43.5%	1.1%	100% (319)	4.90 (315)
40 – 49	54.4%	17.4%	26.8%	1.4%	100% (337)	3.54 (332)
50 – 59	53.1%	19.1%	26.0%	1.7%	100% (388)	3.83 (381)
60 or above	53.5%	23.6%	19.2%	3.7%	100% (579)	3.29 (557)
Education*						
Secondary (Form 3) or below	47.2%	25.5%	24.0%	3.4%	100% (671)	3.83 (648)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	48.5%	16.2%	34.3%	1.0%	100% (640)	4.25 (633)
Tertiary	40.3%	12.7%	45.5%	1.5%	100% (684)	4.95 (674)
Occupation*						
Managers and administrators	52.0%	13.5%	33.0%	1.5%	100% (271)	3.96 (267)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	36.5%	14.4%	47.2%	1.9%	100% (256)	5.21 (251)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	47.0%	16.5%	34.7%	1.8%	100% (529)	4.34 (519)
Students	21.0%	10.2%	68.3%	0.5%	100% (149)	6.75 (148)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	49.0%	24.2%	24.1%	2.6%	100% (740)	3.73 (721)
Political orientation*						
Localists	14.7%	14.3%	70.6%	0.4%	100% (233)	7.29 (232)
Pan-democrats	30.3%	20.9%	46.7%	2.1%	100% (906)	5.58 (888)
Pro-establishment	97.5%	1.8%	0.7%	0.0%	100% (108)	0.33 (108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	66.4%	17.5%	13.6%	2.4%	100% (701)	2.47 (684)
Monthly family income*						
HK$ 14,999 or below	52.3%	24.3%	18.1%	5.3%	100% (297)	3.32 (282)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	51.7%	18.7%	29.3%	0.4%	100% (239)	4.05 (238)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	46.1%	18.4%	34.4%	1.1%	100% (365)	4.37 (361)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	38.3%	18.2%	42.8%	0.7%	100% (428)	4.94 (425)
HK$ 60,000 or above	40.9%	14.8%	43.1%	1.1%	100% (473)	4.85 (468)
Stance towards the movement*						
Support	23.3%	21.9%	53.0%	1.9%	100% (1,251)	6.16 (1,228)
Half-half	63.6%	24.1%	8.9%	3.4%	100% (359)	2.62 (347)
Oppose	99.5%	0.2%	0.0%	0.3%	100% (362)	0.17 (361)

Notes
1. * T-test or ANOVA test indicate a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the mean scores of different attributes of the demographic variables.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ refuse to answer" are excluded.

Section 6.2.3 Views on Protest Radicalisation

Table 26. Do you agree that 'when participating in protests in Hong Kong, it is a must to uphold the peaceful and non-violent principle'? Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, so-so, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree?

	Agree	So-so	Disagree	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
Overall	68.1%	18.7%	12.5%	0.8%	100% (2,008)
Gender*					
Male	65.1%	19.3%	14.5%	1.0%	100% (950)
Female	70.7%	18.1%	10.6%	0.6%	100% (1,058)
Age*					
15 – 29	38.1%	30.2%	31.3%	0.4%	100% (376)
30 – 39	58.9%	22.5%	17.7%	0.8%	100% (319)
40 – 49	75.0%	17.0%	7.7%	0.3%	100% (337)
50 – 59	78.4%	16.4%	4.9%	0.2%	100% (388)
60 or above	81.2%	11.7%	5.4%	1.7%	100% (579)
Education*					
Secondary (Form 3) or below	79.2%	13.4%	5.8%	1.6%	100% (671)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	70.4%	19.7%	9.4%	0.5%	100% (640)
Tertiary	54.9%	23.1%	21.8%	0.2%	100% (684)
Occupation*					
Managers and administrators	67.5%	19.8%	12.0%	0.6%	100% (271)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	53.6%	24.1%	22.2%	0.0%	100% (256)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	69.6%	18.7%	10.9%	0.7%	100% (529)
Students	36.2%	32.4%	31.4%	0.0%	100% (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	78.9%	13.4%	6.4%	1.4%	100% (740)
Political orientation*					
Localists	36.4%	28.5%	34.4%	0.7%	100% (233)
Pan-democrats	63.7%	22.8%	13.2%	0.4%	100% (906)
Pro-establishment	92.4%	2.8%	4.8%	0.0%	100% (108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	81.1%	12.2%	5.4%	1.3%	100% (701)
Monthly family income*					
HK$ 14,999 or below	80.1%	12.7%	5.5%	1.7%	100% (297)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	79.1%	13.1%	7.8%	0.0%	100% (239)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	67.1%	21.5%	10.7%	0.7%	100% (365)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	62.6%	21.5%	15.5%	0.4%	100% (428)
HK$ 60,000 or above	60.1%	20.7%	19.0%	0.2%	100% (473)
Stance towards the movement*					
Support	56.6%	24.7%	18.1%	0.7%	100% (1,251)
Half-half	79.8%	15.9%	4.3%	0.0%	100% (359)
Oppose	94.4%	2.0%	2.1%	1.4%	100% (362)

Notes
1. * Chi-Square test indicates a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the response to the question and the demographic attributes.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ Refuse to answer" are excluded.

Table 27. Do you agree that 'when large-scale peaceful protests fail to make the government respond to demands, it is understandable for the protesters to carry out radical actions'? Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, so-so, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree?

	Agree	So-so	Disagree	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
Overall	68.4%	12.1%	18.6%	1.0%	100% (2,008)
Gender					
Male	70.4%	11.7%	16.6%	1.3%	100% (950)
Female	66.6%	12.4%	20.3%	0.7%	100% (1,058)
Age*					
15 – 29	86.2%	6.0%	7.1%	0.7%	100% (376)
30 – 39	73.0%	11.5%	15.2%	0.4%	100% (319)
40 – 49	63.5%	13.9%	21.7%	0.9%	100% (337)
50 – 59	66.5%	14.2%	19.3%	0.0%	100% (388)
60 or above	59.1%	13.8%	24.9%	2.3%	100% (579)
Education*					
Secondary (Form 3) or below	62.7%	14.6%	20.7%	2.0%	100% (671)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	68.5%	12.5%	18.1%	0.8%	100% (640)
Tertiary	74.0%	9.0%	16.8%	0.2%	100% (684)
Occupation*					
Managers and administrators	68.4%	11.1%	20.2%	0.3%	100% (271)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	78.1%	9.3%	12.6%	0.0%	100% (256)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	69.5%	13.0%	16.1%	1.4%	100% (529)
Students	84.1%	6.5%	9.4%	0.0%	100% (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	61.1%	14.0%	23.4%	1.5%	100% (740)
Political orientation*					
Localists	92.9%	5.5%	1.6%	0.0%	100% (233)
Pan-democrats	87.9%	7.0%	4.4%	0.7%	100% (906)
Pro-establishment	12.8%	8.8%	78.4%	0.0%	100% (108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	44.3%	21.2%	32.8%	1.6%	100% (701)
Monthly family income*					
HK$ 14,999 or below	54.0%	18.1%	26.6%	1.3%	100% (297)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	67.1%	13.2%	18.4%	1.2%	100% (239)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	69.9%	11.5%	18.6%	0.0%	100% (365)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	75.7%	9.4%	14.9%	0.0%	100% (428)
HK$ 60,000 or above	72.5%	11.3%	15.2%	1.0%	100% (473)
Stance towards the movement*					
Support	91.5%	6.3%	1.9%	0.3%	100% (1,251)
Half-half	46.0%	31.2%	21.5%	1.2%	100% (359)
Oppose	13.8%	12.2%	71.4%	2.7%	100% (362)

Notes
1. * Chi-Square test indicates a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the response to the question and the demographic attributes.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ Refuse to answer" are excluded.

Table 28. Do you agree that 'radical protests are more effective than peaceful, rational and non-violent protests'? Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, so-so, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree?

	Agree	So-so	Disagree	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
Overall	37.7%	27.1%	33.5%	1.7%	100% (2,008)
Gender*					
Male	40.3%	27.0%	31.8%	1.0%	100% (950)
Female	35.3%	27.3%	35.1%	2.3%	100% (1,058)
Age*					
15 – 29	60.6%	26.0%	12.6%	0.7%	100% (376)
30 – 39	44.2%	29.1%	24.7%	1.9%	100% (319)
40 – 49	30.5%	30.2%	38.9%	0.5%	100% (337)
50 – 59	32.5%	29.7%	35.7%	2.1%	100% (388)
60 or above	27.5%	23.2%	46.9%	2.4%	100% (579)
Education*					
Secondary (Form 3) or below	29.2%	28.4%	39.4%	3.1%	100% (671)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	38.6%	27.5%	33.0%	0.9%	100% (640)
Tertiary	45.5%	25.6%	28.2%	0.7%	100% (684)
Occupation*					
Managers and administrators	40.8%	24.9%	33.6%	0.6%	100% (271)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	46.2%	28.4%	24.8%	0.6%	100% (256)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	38.2%	29.3%	31.8%	0.7%	100% (529)
Students	58.9%	27.3%	13.0%	0.9%	100% (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	29.5%	24.9%	42.6%	3.1%	100% (740)
Political orientation*					
Localists	71.4%	21.8%	6.3%	0.5%	100% (233)
Pan-democrats	48.3%	33.1%	17.4%	1.2%	100% (906)
Pro-establishment	8.1%	5.9%	85.5%	0.5%	100% (108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	18.4%	24.4%	54.7%	2.4%	100% (701)
Monthly family income*					
HK$ 14,999 or below	24.6%	28.7%	43.1%	3.6%	100% (297)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	36.8%	29.4%	32.2%	1.6%	100% (239)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	38.9%	26.3%	33.4%	1.5%	100% (365)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	43.2%	28.5%	27.6%	0.7%	100% (428)
HK$ 60,000 or above	44.8%	26.3%	28.4%	0.5%	100% (473)
Stance towards the movement*					
Support	54.8%	32.3%	11.9%	1.0%	100% (1,251)
Half-half	14.2%	32.7%	50.8%	2.3%	100% (359)
Oppose	4.7%	5.4%	88.0%	1.9%	100% (362)

Notes
1. * Chi-Square test indicates a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the response to the question and the demographic attributes.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ Refuse to answer" are excluded.

Section 6.2.4 Changes in Image of the Movement

Table 29. Has your image of the movement changed because of protesters' use of force during the anti-extradition bill movement? Is it much better, a little bit better, a little bit worse, much worse or no change?

	Better	Worse	No change	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
Overall	11.0%	33.9%	52.0%	3.1%	100% (2,008)
Gender*					
Male	12.7%	33.4%	52.0%	2.0%	100% (950)
Female	9.5%	34.4%	51.9%	4.1%	100% (1,058)
Age*					
15 – 29	18.4%	17.8%	62.9%	0.9%	100% (376)
30 – 39	9.4%	34.3%	54.9%	1.4%	100% (319)
40 – 49	8.2%	41.0%	48.3%	2.4%	100% (337)
50 – 59	8.8%	39.0%	49.2%	2.9%	100% (388)
60 or above	10.4%	35.9%	47.7%	6.0%	100% (579)
Education*					
Secondary (Form 3) or below	12.3%	33.6%	48.0%	6.1%	100% (671)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	10.5%	34.5%	52.8%	2.2%	100% (640)
Tertiary	10.4%	33.4%	55.2%	1.0%	100% (684)
Occupation*					
Managers and administrators	10.8%	39.6%	48.5%	1.1%	100% (271)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	7.0%	32.3%	60.2%	0.5%	100% (256)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	12.2%	34.5%	51.1%	2.1%	100% (529)
Students	18.5%	22.4%	58.7%	0.4%	100% (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	10.5%	34.0%	49.3%	6.2%	100% (740)
Political orientation*					
Localists	20.5%	5.9%	72.1%	1.5%	100% (233)
Pan-democrats	12.7%	23.4%	62.2%	1.8%	100% (906)
Pro-establishment	2.4%	75.7%	18.1%	3.8%	100% (108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	6.5%	50.0%	39.1%	4.3%	100% (701)
Monthly family income*					
HK$ 14,999 or below	10.8%	29.6%	51.8%	7.7%	100% (297)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	12.6%	33.6%	51.7%	2.2%	100% (239)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	12.5%	37.5%	47.8%	2.3%	100% (365)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	11.6%	31.8%	55.6%	1.0%	100% (428)
HK$ 60,000 or above	9.7%	35.1%	53.5%	1.7%	100% (473)
Stance towards the movement*					
Support	15.0%	16.0%	67.6%	1.4%	100% (1,251)
Half-half	7.8%	56.2%	29.7%	6.3%	100% (359)
Oppose	1.0%	72.6%	22.3%	4.1%	100% (362)

Notes
1. * Chi-Square test indicates a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the response to the question and the demographic attributes.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ Refuse to answer" are excluded.

Table 30. Are there any protesters' actions that have caused significant deterioration in your image of the anti-extradition bill movement?

	Non-cooperation movement	Occupying the airport	Damaging MTR facilities and traffic lights, etc.	Vandalising specific stores	Arson	Hurling petrol bombs	Use of force against people with different views during conflicts	Violent attacks on police officers	Others	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	(Sample size)
Overall	18.5%	27.5%	45.5%	30.4%	44.7%	42.5%	52.7%	24.5%	1.1%	2.2%	(681)
Gender											
Male	20.7%	28.3%	48.7%	29.3%	40.7%	40.0%	53.1%	24.7%	1.0%	2.4%	(317)
Female	16.6%	26.8%	42.7%	31.3%	48.2%	44.6%	52.4%	24.2%	1.1%	2.0%	(365)
Age											
15 – 29	9.9%	10.8%	26.8%	12.5%	40.5%	30.5%	58.7%	10.8%	4.2%	0.0%	(67)
30 – 39	10.3%	18.1%	36.3%	26.4%	43.1%	42.0%	50.4%	21.2%	2.6%	4.3%	(109)
40 – 49	22.6%	27.7%	50.4%	34.2%	49.3%	49.3%	61.0%	28.0%	0.9%	1.4%	(138)
50 – 59	14.9%	26.3%	42.6%	31.1%	45.5%	47.3%	53.7%	25.9%	0.4%	0.6%	(151)
60 or above	24.8%	38.3%	54.7%	35.2%	42.9%	38.5%	44.5%	26.7%	0.0%	3.5%	(208)
Education											
Secondary (Form 3) or below	21.3%	33.3%	44.3%	32.6%	40.9%	36.7%	46.1%	21.7%	0.9%	3.4%	(225)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	18.0%	25.7%	48.6%	25.7%	43.4%	43.7%	54.3%	26.0%	0.0%	2.7%	(220)
Tertiary	16.2%	23.4%	43.7%	32.7%	49.8%	46.8%	57.1%	25.7%	2.3%	0.5%	(229)
Occupation											
Managers and administrators	18.5%	25.1%	47.9%	36.4%	51.4%	45.0%	63.4%	29.5%	0.6%	0.0%	(107)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	12.9%	22.9%	38.7%	30.2%	44.6%	47.0%	55.9%	26.1%	3.3%	0.9%	(82)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	14.6%	19.2%	40.7%	20.0%	40.0%	37.5%	51.0%	14.5%	0.0%	2.8%	(183)
Students	10.7%	7.6%	31.3%	6.8%	28.6%	26.4%	55.8%	8.0%	6.1%	0.0%	(33)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	23.5%	38.6%	51.7%	37.2%	46.0%	43.4%	47.2%	30.1%	0.8%	3.2%	(252)
Political orientation											
Localists	7.8%	26.6%	26.8%	19.1%	56.0%	32.3%	59.8%	16.5%	0.0%	0.0%	(14)
Pan-democrats	7.0%	16.8%	31.6%	20.6%	40.9%	39.3%	48.6%	11.9%	2.2%	2.0%	(212)

Pro-establishment	36.1%	43.5%	57.3%	52.0%	57.2%	49.2%	68.8%	46.6%	0.0%	0.9%	(82)
Centrist/ no political orientation	20.8%	30.4%	51.7%	30.7%	43.5%	42.1%	51.3%	26.6%	0.6%	2.9%	(351)
Monthly family income											
HK$ 14,999 or below	24.0%	30.4%	50.9%	40.1%	36.8%	37.5%	44.4%	28.3%	0.0%	8.0%	(88)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	14.5%	21.8%	41.5%	25.1%	43.0%	36.1%	49.3%	27.0%	0.9%	1.4%	(80)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	15.5%	25.7%	38.8%	22.3%	42.3%	39.6%	48.4%	17.1%	0.4%	1.8%	(137)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	14.3%	22.3%	50.9%	27.6%	41.8%	41.4%	57.3%	23.1%	2.5%	2.1%	(136)
HK$ 60,000 or above	16.8%	28.9%	42.4%	32.2%	49.8%	45.9%	61.5%	24.1%	1.6%	0.3%	(166)
Stance towards the movement											
Support	5.6%	12.1%	28.4%	17.9%	36.9%	37.2%	49.4%	11.7%	2.7%	1.8%	(200)
Half-half	10.6%	22.7%	45.6%	22.9%	43.9%	36.3%	41.3%	16.5%	0.6%	3.5%	(202)
Oppose	33.1%	41.5%	58.1%	44.8%	49.9%	50.9%	62.7%	38.2%	0.3%	1.7%	(263)

Notes
1. □ Chi-Square test indicates a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the response to the question and the demographic attributes.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered “Other” and “Don’t know/ refuse to answer” are excluded.

Section 6.3.1 Views on Excessive Police Force

Table 31. Do you agree with the statement, 'The police have used excessive force'? Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, so-so, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree?

	Agree	So-so	Disagree	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
Overall	71.1%	10.5%	17.4%	1.0%	100% (2,008)
Gender					
Male	73.2%	9.3%	16.5%	1.0%	100% (950)
Female	69.2%	11.7%	18.2%	0.9%	100% (1,058)
Age*					
15 – 29	91.2%	4.2%	4.4%	0.2%	100% (376)
30 – 39	80.6%	9.1%	10.3%	0.0%	100% (319)
40 – 49	65.4%	14.4%	19.0%	1.3%	100% (337)
50 – 59	69.5%	10.7%	19.0%	0.8%	100% (388)
60 or above	57.9%	12.3%	27.8%	2.0%	100% (579)
Education*					
Secondary (Form 3) or below	62.7%	14.5%	20.9%	1.9%	100% (671)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	70.9%	10.4%	18.0%	0.7%	100% (640)
Tertiary	79.6%	6.7%	13.4%	0.3%	100% (684)
Occupation*					
Managers and administrators	73.6%	9.6%	16.3%	0.5%	100% (271)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	84.0%	6.5%	8.9%	0.6%	100% (256)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	72.0%	10.5%	16.2%	1.3%	100% (529)
Students	91.7%	6.4%	1.9%	0.0%	100% (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	61.2%	12.6%	24.9%	1.3%	100% (740)
Political orientation*					
Localists	95.1%	0.8%	4.1%	0.0%	100% (233)
Pan-democrats	88.9%	3.6%	6.4%	1.1%	100% (906)
Pro-establishment	8.9%	18.7%	71.8%	0.5%	100% (108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	50.3%	20.8%	27.9%	1.0%	100% (701)
Monthly family income*					
HK$ 14,999 or below	52.6%	16.3%	28.1%	3.1%	100% (297)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	66.0%	15.5%	17.8%	0.7%	100% (239)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	73.9%	8.9%	17.1%	0.0%	100% (365)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	80.4%	8.0%	11.4%	0.2%	100% (428)
HK$ 60,000 or above	78.3%	6.4%	15.0%	0.2%	100% (473)
Stance towards the movement*					
Support	93.5%	2.4%	3.8%	0.4%	100% (1,251)
Half-half	50.3%	28.7%	18.6%	2.4%	100% (359)
Oppose	17.5%	20.4%	61.4%	0.7%	100% (362)

Notes
1. * Chi-Square test indicates a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the response to the question and the demographic attributes.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ Refuse to answer" are excluded.

Table 32. Have you personally experienced or witnessed any event involving the use of excessive police force?

	No	Yes	Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
Overall	67.5%	32.3%	0.2%	100% (1,428)
Gender*				
Male	61.0%	38.6%	0.4%	100% (695)
Female	73.7%	26.3%	0.1%	100% (733)
Age*				
15 – 29	50.7%	48.6%	0.8%	100% (343)
30 – 39	62.8%	36.9%	0.3%	100% (257)
40 – 49	77.0%	23.0%	0.0%	100% (220)
50 – 59	69.5%	30.5%	0.0%	100% (269)
60 or above	80.5%	19.5%	0.0%	100% (335)
Education*				
Secondary (Form 3) or below	75.7%	24.3%	0.0%	100% (421)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	70.2%	29.5%	0.3%	100% (453)
Tertiary	59.0%	40.6%	0.4%	100% (545)
Occupation*				
Managers and administrators	62.3%	37.3%	0.4%	100% (199)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	61.3%	38.7%	0.0%	100% (215)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	65.5%	34.0%	0.5%	100% (381)
Students	50.6%	49.0%	0.4%	100% (137)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	80.0%	20.0%	0.0%	100% (453)
Political orientation*				
Localists	48.8%	51.2%	0.0%	100% (222)
Pan-democrats	67.6%	32.1%	0.3%	100% (806)
Pro-establishment	84.2%	15.8%	0.0%	100% (10)
Centrist/ no political orientation	78.6%	21.0%	0.4%	100% (353)
Monthly family income*				
HK$ 14,999 or below	84.8%	15.2%	0.0%	100% (156)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	69.4%	30.6%	0.0%	100% (157)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	69.7%	30.3%	0.0%	100% (270)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	65.0%	34.2%	0.7%	100% (344)
HK$ 60,000 or above	59.3%	40.5%	0.2%	100% (370)
Stance towards the movement*				
Support	64.2%	35.6%	0.2%	100% (1170)
Half-half	79.4%	19.9%	0.7%	100% (180)
Oppose	86.2%	13.8%	0.0%	100% (63)

Notes
1. * Chi-Square test indicates a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the response to the question and the demographic attributes.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered “Other” and “Don’t know/ Refuse to answer” are excluded.

Section 6.3.2 Views on Excessive Force by Protesters

Table 33. Do you agree with the statement that 'the protesters have used excessive force'? Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, so-so, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree?

	Agree	So-so	Disagree	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
Overall	32.8%	28.3%	37.4%	1.5%	100% (2,008)
Gender					
Male	32.7%	28.3%	37.8%	1.2%	100% (950)
Female	32.9%	28.3%	37.1%	1.7%	100% (1,058)
Age*					
15 – 29	16.5%	27.4%	55.9%	0.2%	100% (376)
30 – 39	28.0%	29.4%	42.4%	0.2%	100% (319)
40 – 49	41.3%	32.3%	25.4%	1.0%	100% (337)
50 – 59	37.0%	27.2%	34.3%	1.5%	100% (388)
60 or above	37.9%	26.6%	32.2%	3.3%	100% (579)
Education*					
Secondary (Form 3) or below	32.1%	30.5%	34.3%	3.2%	100% (671)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	37.7%	25.3%	36.5%	0.5%	100% (640)
Tertiary	28.9%	29.0%	41.4%	0.7%	100% (684)
Occupation*					
Managers and administrators	34.4%	30.7%	34.2%	0.7%	100% (271)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	27.3%	26.6%	45.3%	0.8%	100% (256)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	34.3%	27.9%	36.5%	1.3%	100% (529)
Students	17.1%	26.3%	56.6%	0.0%	100% (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	36.3%	28.0%	33.3%	2.4%	100% (740)
Political orientation*					
Localists	7.0%	26.8%	66.2%	0.0%	100% (233)
Pan-democrats	18.6%	32.9%	47.7%	0.8%	100% (906)
Pro-establishment	86.7%	5.1%	7.6%	0.5%	100% (108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	50.8%	26.9%	19.8%	2.6%	100% (701)
Monthly family income*					
HK$ 14,999 or below	35.5%	28.5%	30.8%	5.2%	100% (297)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	28.4%	29.1%	42.5%	0.0%	100% (239)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	36.0%	29.2%	34.2%	0.6%	100% (365)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	32.4%	28.7%	38.3%	0.6%	100% (428)
HK$ 60,000 or above	28.5%	28.4%	42.6%	0.5%	100% (473)
Stance towards the movement*					
Support	13.2%	33.3%	52.4%	1.2%	100% (1,251)
Half-half	46.2%	35.7%	14.7%	3.4%	100% (359)
Oppose	86.0%	4.1%	9.6%	0.3%	100% (362)

Notes
1. * Chi-Square test indicates a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the response to the question and the demographic attributes.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ Refuse to answer" are excluded.

Section 6.3.3 Attribution of Responsibility

Table 34. There has been an escalation in violence by both the police and protesters. Whom do you think should shoulder the most responsibility for the violent conflicts?

	Central government	SAR government	Hong Kong police	Pro-establishment legislators	Pan-democratic legislators	Protesters	Foreign forces	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	(Sample size)
Overall	23.8%	58.9%	22.5%	7.0%	6.8%	11.0%	9.9%	3.4%	(2,008)
Gender									
Male	25.8%	56.3%	24.4%	8.4%	6.4%	11.4%	8.7%	2.9%	(950)
Female	22.1%	61.2%	20.8%	5.6%	7.2%	10.7%	11.0%	4.0%	(1,058)
Age									
15 – 29	28.1%	71.9%	29.9%	6.7%	3.0%	4.1%	2.7%	1.9%	(376)
30 – 39	26.5%	68.3%	22.0%	7.6%	3.8%	7.0%	4.4%	2.7%	(319)
40 – 49	17.8%	58.5%	21.3%	7.1%	10.1%	14.9%	10.5%	4.4%	(337)
50 – 59	28.2%	58.9%	23.3%	8.9%	7.9%	12.1%	13.8%	1.2%	(388)
60 or above	19.7%	45.7%	18.1%	5.3%	8.4%	14.8%	14.3%	5.9%	(579)
Education									
Secondary (Form 3) or below	19.5%	49.6%	19.9%	5.6%	5.9%	12.0%	10.6%	6.9%	(671)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	23.1%	60.5%	20.6%	5.2%	7.5%	11.1%	10.9%	1.8%	(640)
Tertiary	28.8%	66.3%	26.7%	9.8%	7.0%	10.2%	8.1%	1.7%	(684)
Occupation									
Managers and administrators	25.2%	61.5%	23.0%	8.9%	9.6%	12.2%	9.2%	2.5%	(271)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	29.2%	68.2%	27.6%	9.0%	5.4%	8.8%	6.5%	0.2%	(256)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	23.3%	61.1%	20.9%	7.0%	5.8%	9.8%	8.9%	3.2%	(529)
Students	25.4%	71.2%	30.5%	5.1%	2.6%	2.5%	4.1%	1.4%	(149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	21.5%	50.6%	19.2%	5.4%	7.5%	13.9%	13.1%	5.4%	(740)
Political orientation									
Localists	38.4%	75.3%	27.5%	10.6%	1.2%	1.0%	0.3%	0.0%	(233)
Pan-democrats	31.7%	71.1%	29.8%	9.9%	1.3%	3.1%	2.0%	0.6%	(906)
Pro-establishment	1.9%	13.5%	1.8%	1.9%	36.8%	38.7%	45.4%	4.7%	(108)

Centrist/ no political orientation	13.0%	45.2%	15.0%	2.6%	11.2%	20.2%	18.0%	6.7%	(701)
Monthly family income									
HK$ 14,999 or below	18.2%	45.0%	16.9%	7.0%	8.4%	14.3%	11.1%	9.8%	(297)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	20.5%	56.9%	20.0%	3.6%	5.3%	10.7%	9.1%	4.2%	(239)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	22.7%	60.9%	19.4%	6.4%	5.9%	10.9%	11.2%	2.0%	(365)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	26.8%	64.0%	26.2%	6.6%	5.6%	8.3%	8.2%	0.9%	(428)
HK$ 60,000 or above	28.4%	63.9%	26.3%	9.4%	7.3%	11.1%	8.0%	1.1%	(473)
Stance towards the movement									
Support	34.1%	73.1%	31.2%	9.7%	0.5%	1.1%	0.7%	0.2%	(1,251)
Half-half	10.8%	57.3%	12.1%	3.2%	3.3%	12.5%	9.8%	11.6%	(359)
Oppose	1.7%	14.1%	3.2%	1.2%	31.5%	42.4%	41.1%	5.2%	(362)

Notes
1. □ Chi-Square test indicates a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the response to the question and the demographic attributes.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered “Other” and “Don’t know/ refuse to answer” are excluded.

Section 6.4.1 News Acquisition

Table 35. Which of the following channels are important for you to receive information about the anti-extradition bill movement?

	News coverage by traditional media	Text reporting by online media	Live media broadcasts	Social media	LIHKG	Telegram	Information forwarded by family members or peers	Others	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	(Sample size)
Overall	56.5%	44.8%	55.2%	29.2%	14.5%	10.2%	10.4%	1.5%	1.0%	(2008)
Gender										
Male	56.1%	44.7%	53.3%	29.4%	16.2%	11.2%	8.7%	2.4%	1.3%	(950)
Female	56.8%	44.9%	57.0%	29.1%	13.0%	9.4%	11.9%	0.7%	0.7%	(1058)
Age										
15 – 29	34.8%	48.7%	65.6%	43.4%	31.8%	31.9%	6.6%	2.2%	0.0%	(376)
30 – 39	43.2%	48.7%	66.3%	45.2%	15.9%	12.2%	13.4%	1.2%	0.8%	(319)
40 – 49	56.9%	54.4%	63.2%	33.7%	13.8%	6.4%	9.5%	1.9%	0.0%	(337)
50 – 59	59.0%	53.8%	56.1%	23.3%	9.5%	4.8%	17.2%	1.1%	0.2%	(388)
60 or above	75.7%	28.6%	36.9%	12.8%	6.6%	1.1%	7.0%	1.1%	3.0%	(579)
Education										
Secondary (Form 3) or below	67.3%	34.7%	41.3%	17.2%	9.2%	3.2%	8.0%	0.6%	2.0%	(671)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	54.6%	46.3%	59.3%	31.0%	14.8%	8.6%	10.4%	2.1%	0.8%	(640)
Tertiary	47.2%	53.5%	65.0%	39.4%	19.4%	18.7%	12.6%	1.8%	0.3%	(684)
Occupation										
Managers and administrators	48.0%	53.0%	64.3%	39.9%	16.4%	12.5%	12.0%	1.6%	0.9%	(271)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	45.9%	54.0%	64.0%	37.5%	22.2%	18.1%	14.7%	1.6%	0.0%	(256)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	53.7%	48.9%	58.9%	31.3%	13.6%	9.0%	10.1%	1.7%	0.5%	(529)
Students	37.9%	47.6%	59.5%	43.1%	31.0%	38.6%	7.7%	3.2%	0.0%	(149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	68.8%	34.3%	45.0%	17.9%	8.8%	2.2%	9.0%	0.8%	2.0%	(740)
Political orientation										
Localists	33.9%	48.5%	68.9%	41.4%	29.8%	25.6%	5.8%	2.3%	0.0%	(233)
Pan-democrats	49.3%	51.1%	61.0%	33.2%	17.8%	12.2%	11.9%	1.9%	0.1%	(906)

Pro-establishment	79.5%	41.3%	37.0%	20.3%	3.9%	2.9%	14.4%	0.0%	2.3%	(108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	69.6%	37.3%	45.7%	22.0%	7.4%	4.2%	9.7%	1.0%	1.9%	(701)
Monthly family income										
HK$ 14,999 or below	73.9%	24.5%	34.7%	16.1%	6.3%	2.2%	8.4%	0.6%	3.4%	(297)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	58.5%	47.5%	51.6%	29.0%	14.1%	11.5%	7.0%	1.9%	0.3%	(239)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	57.5%	46.4%	55.5%	25.3%	13.1%	8.2%	17.1%	1.2%	0.0%	(365)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	48.9%	52.5%	61.3%	35.2%	18.3%	13.2%	7.6%	0.7%	0.9%	(428)
HK$ 60,000 or above	48.6%	50.7%	64.8%	36.3%	17.7%	13.7%	11.4%	2.5%	0.1%	(473)
Stance towards the movement										
Support	44.3%	50.7%	64.2%	34.5%	20.5%	15.1%	9.4%	1.8%	0.3%	(1251)
Half-half	72.6%	41.8%	43.8%	21.3%	6.7%	3.5%	10.9%	1.1%	0.7%	(359)
Oppose	81.8%	29.2%	37.7%	19.2%	2.4%	1.0%	12.9%	0.8%	2.7%	(362)

Notes
1. □ Chi-Square test indicates a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the response to the question and the demographic attributes.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered “Other” and “Don’t know/ refuse to answer” are excluded.

Table 36. When journalists are covering news in conflict situations during protests, which of the following things do you think is more important: recording on-site situations or refraining from obstructing police work?

	Record on-site situations	Refrain from obstructing police work	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
Overall	71.2%	23.9%	4.9%	100% (2,008)
Gender*				
Male	73.4%	23.6%	3.0%	100% (950)
Female	69.2%	24.2%	6.6%	100% (1,058)
Age*				
15 – 29	90.5%	7.0%	2.5%	100% (376)
30 – 39	78.2%	15.9%	5.9%	100% (319)
40 – 49	67.5%	30.1%	2.5%	100% (337)
50 – 59	67.5%	27.6%	5.0%	100% (388)
60 or above	60.4%	32.6%	7.1%	100% (579)
Education*				
Secondary (Form 3) or below	66.3%	25.9%	7.9%	100% (671)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	67.0%	28.3%	4.6%	100% (640)
Tertiary	80.3%	17.8%	2.0%	100% (684)
Occupation*				
Managers and administrators	71.6%	25.1%	3.3%	100% (271)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	82.1%	16.8%	1.1%	100% (256)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	71.4%	24.8%	3.8%	100% (529)
Students	90.6%	7.7%	1.7%	100% (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	63.0%	29.2%	7.8%	100% (740)
Political orientation*				
Localists	95.8%	4.2%	0.0%	100% (233)
Pan-democrats	90.1%	7.6%	2.3%	100% (906)
Pro-establishment	7.5%	84.6%	7.9%	100% (108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	49.6%	42.3%	8.2%	100% (701)
Monthly family income*				
HK$ 14,999 or below	56.5%	33.6%	10.0%	100% (297)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	70.3%	24.7%	5.0%	100% (239)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	71.3%	24.5%	4.1%	100% (365)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	78.2%	19.7%	2.2%	100% (428)
HK$ 60,000 or above	77.0%	19.9%	3.1%	100% (473)
Stance towards the movement*				
Support	93.8%	3.9%	2.3%	100% (1,251)
Half-half	58.1%	33.3%	8.6%	100% (359)
Oppose	9.8%	81.7%	8.5%	100% (362)

Notes
1. * Chi-Square test indicates a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the response to the question and the demographic attributes.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ Refuse to answer" are excluded.

Section 6.4.2 Political Participation

Table 37. Participation in at least one of the activities in the anti-extradition bill movement

	Yes	No	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
Overall	52.6%	46.7%	0.7%	100% (2,008)
Gender*				
Male	55.8%	43.3%	0.9%	100% (950)
Female	49.7%	49.7%	0.6%	100% (1,058)
Age*				
15 – 29	79.7%	18.8%	1.5%	100% (376)
30 – 39	62.0%	37.4%	0.6%	100% (319)
40 – 49	49.5%	49.3%	1.1%	100% (337)
50 – 59	52.9%	47.0%	0.1%	100% (388)
60 or above	32.0%	67.4%	0.5%	100% (579)
Education*				
Secondary (Form 3) or below	37.0%	62.7%	0.3%	100% (671)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	54.2%	45.2%	0.6%	100% (640)
Tertiary	66.5%	32.1%	1.3%	100% (684)
Occupation*				
Managers and administrators	60.1%	38.4%	1.5%	100% (271)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	71.0%	27.4%	1.6%	100% (256)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	55.9%	44.0%	0.1%	100% (529)
Students	80.8%	17.9%	1.3%	100% (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	35.8%	63.9%	0.3%	100% (740)
Political orientation*				
Localists	81.6%	17.5%	0.8%	100% (233)
Pan-democrats	73.0%	26.3%	0.7%	100% (906)
Pro-establishment	6.3%	93.7%	0.0%	100% (108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	24.3%	74.9%	0.8%	100% (701)
Monthly family income*				
HK$ 14,999 or below	23.2%	75.8%	1.0%	100% (297)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	45.5%	54.5%	0.0%	100% (239)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	53.4%	45.9%	0.7%	100% (365)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	67.0%	32.5%	0.6%	100% (428)
HK$ 60,000 or above	65.5%	33.6%	0.9%	100% (473)
Stance towards the movement*				
Support	74.9%	24.2%	0.9%	100% (1,251)
Half-half	25.8%	74.0%	0.2%	100% (359)
Oppose	5.8%	93.9%	0.3%	100% (362)

Notes
1. * Chi-Square test indicates a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the response to the question and the demographic attributes.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ Refuse to answer" are excluded.

Table 38. Have you done any of the following things during the anti-extradition bill movement? 'Participated in anti-extradition bill protests or rallies'

	Yes	No	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
Overall	43.2%	56.2%	0.6%	100% (2,008)
Gender*				
Male	46.0%	53.0%	1.0%	100% (950)
Female	40.6%	59.0%	0.4%	100% (1,058)
Age*				
15 – 29	69.2%	29.1%	1.8%	100% (376)
30 – 39	53.7%	45.9%	0.4%	100% (319)
40 – 49	41.6%	56.9%	1.4%	100% (337)
50 – 59	42.5%	57.5%	0.0%	100% (388)
60 or above	22.4%	77.5%	0.1%	100% (579)
Education*				
Secondary (Form 3) or below	27.0%	73.0%	0.0%	100% (671)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	41.7%	57.5%	0.8%	100% (640)
Tertiary	60.8%	38.0%	1.2%	100% (684)
Occupation*				
Managers and administrators	51.3%	47.6%	1.0%	100% (271)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	63.7%	34.7%	1.6%	100% (256)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	46.7%	53.3%	0.0%	100% (529)
Students	68.0%	30.1%	1.9%	100% (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	25.8%	74.0%	0.2%	100% (740)
Political orientation*				
Localists	67.7%	31.5%	0.8%	100% (233)
Pan-democrats	61.5%	37.9%	0.6%	100% (906)
Pro-establishment	5.0%	95.0%	0.0%	100% (108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	18.3%	80.9%	0.8%	100% (701)
Monthly family income*				
HK$ 14,999 or below	12.1%	87.5%	0.4%	100% (297)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	37.7%	62.3%	0.0%	100% (239)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	43.1%	55.9%	0.9%	100% (365)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	58.3%	41.3%	0.4%	100% (428)
HK$ 60,000 or above	57.5%	41.5%	0.9%	100% (473)
Stance towards the movement*				
Support	62.6%	36.4%	0.9%	100% (1,251)
Half-half	17.2%	82.5%	0.2%	100% (359)
Oppose	5.0%	95.0%	0.0%	100% (362)

Notes
1. * Chi-Square test indicates a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the response to the question and the demographic attributes.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ Refuse to answer" are excluded.

Table 39. Have you done any of the following things during the anti-extradition bill movement?
'Participated in besieging or occupying actions, or provided on-site support'

	Yes	No	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
Overall	16.3%	82.3%	1.4%	100% (2,008)
Gender*				
Male	19.3%	78.9%	1.9%	100% (950)
Female	13.6%	85.4%	1.0%	100% (1,058)
Age*				
15 – 29	33.2%	62.3%	4.5%	100% (376)
30 – 39	21.4%	77.2%	1.4%	100% (319)
40 – 49	12.6%	86.0%	1.5%	100% (337)
50 – 59	13.3%	86.4%	0.2%	100% (388)
60 or above	6.9%	93.0%	0.1%	100% (579)
Education*				
Secondary (Form 3) or below	9.5%	90.5%	0.0%	100% (671)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	16.0%	82.6%	1.4%	100% (640)
Tertiary	23.0%	74.2%	2.8%	100% (684)
Occupation*				
Managers and administrators	16.2%	81.6%	2.1%	100% (271)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	25.8%	72.4%	1.8%	100% (256)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	18.0%	81.4%	0.6%	100% (529)
Students	35.1%	60.9%	4.0%	100% (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	7.9%	91.5%	0.6%	100% (740)
Political orientation*				
Localists	35.4%	61.5%	3.1%	100% (233)
Pan-democrats	21.3%	77.5%	1.2%	100% (906)
Pro-establishment	0.7%	98.8%	0.5%	100% (108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	6.2%	92.9%	0.9%	100% (701)
Monthly family income*				
HK$ 14,999 or below	3.2%	96.1%	0.7%	100% (297)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	15.2%	84.5%	0.3%	100% (239)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	16.3%	82.6%	1.1%	100% (365)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	21.9%	76.3%	1.7%	100% (428)
HK$ 60,000 or above	21.9%	75.7%	2.4%	100% (473)
Stance towards the movement*				
Support	25.0%	72.9%	2.1%	100% (1,251)
Half-half	3.5%	96.5%	0.0%	100% (359)
Oppose	0.2%	99.8%	0.0%	100% (362)

Notes
1. * Chi-Square test indicates a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the response to the question and the demographic attributes.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ Refuse to answer" are excluded.

Table 40. Have you done any of the following things during the anti-extradition bill movement? 'Participated in verbal or physical conflicts with police'

	Yes	No	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
Overall	4.1%	94.9%	1.0%	100% (2,008)
Gender*				
Male	6.2%	92.7%	1.1%	100% (950)
Female	2.3%	96.9%	0.8%	100% (1,058)
Age*				
15 – 29	12.3%	85.1%	2.6%	100% (376)
30 – 39	5.7%	93.0%	1.3%	100% (319)
40 – 49	1.6%	97.6%	0.8%	100% (337)
50 – 59	2.1%	97.6%	0.2%	100% (388)
60 or above	0.9%	98.8%	0.3%	100% (579)
Education*				
Secondary (Form 3) or below	1.5%	97.9%	0.6%	100% (671)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	4.5%	94.6%	0.8%	100% (640)
Tertiary	6.5%	92.1%	1.5%	100% (684)
Occupation*				
Managers and administrators	3.7%	95.2%	1.1%	100% (271)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	6.6%	92.5%	0.9%	100% (256)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	5.2%	93.8%	1.0%	100% (529)
Students	12.3%	85.2%	2.5%	100% (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	0.9%	98.6%	0.5%	100% (740)
Political orientation*				
Localists	11.0%	86.7%	2.3%	100% (233)
Pan-democrats	5.6%	93.8%	0.6%	100% (906)
Pro-establishment	0.7%	99.3%	0.0%	100% (108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	0.7%	98.5%	0.8%	100% (701)
Monthly family income*				
HK$ 14,999 or below	1.1%	98.3%	0.6%	100% (297)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	3.2%	96.8%	0.0%	100% (239)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	5.3%	94.2%	0.5%	100% (365)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	3.9%	94.6%	1.5%	100% (428)
HK$ 60,000 or above	7.1%	91.4%	1.4%	100% (473)
Stance towards the movement*				
Support	6.4%	92.0%	1.6%	100% (1,251)
Half-half	0.7%	99.3%	0.0%	100% (359)
Oppose	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	100% (362)

Notes
1. * Chi-Square test indicates a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the response to the question and the demographic attributes.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ Refuse to answer" are excluded.

Table 41. Have you done any of the following things during the anti-extradition bill movement? 'Expressed feelings on Lennon Walls'

	Yes	No	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
Overall	27.2%	71.9%	0.9%	100% (2,008)
Gender				
Male	28.5%	70.5%	1.0%	100% (950)
Female	26.1%	73.1%	0.8%	100% (1,058)
Age*				
15 – 29	54.2%	43.5%	2.4%	100% (376)
30 – 39	33.9%	64.7%	1.3%	100% (319)
40 – 49	24.1%	74.8%	1.1%	100% (337)
50 – 59	24.1%	75.9%	0.0%	100% (388)
60 or above	10.2%	89.5%	0.3%	100% (579)
Education*				
Secondary (Form 3) or below	14.8%	85.2%	0.0%	100% (671)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	30.1%	68.5%	1.5%	100% (640)
Tertiary	36.7%	62.0%	1.3%	100% (684)
Occupation*				
Managers and administrators	29.2%	68.8%	2.0%	100% (271)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	38.0%	60.6%	1.4%	100% (256)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	29.3%	70.3%	0.4%	100% (529)
Students	58.6%	38.9%	2.5%	100% (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	14.9%	84.8%	0.3%	100% (740)
Political orientation*				
Localists	52.7%	45.7%	1.6%	100% (233)
Pan-democrats	37.5%	61.9%	0.6%	100% (906)
Pro-establishment	1.2%	98.8%	0.0%	100% (108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	10.3%	88.8%	0.9%	100% (701)
Monthly family income*				
HK$ 14,999 or below	11.3%	88.0%	0.7%	100% (297)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	20.9%	78.6%	0.5%	100% (239)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	29.1%	70.4%	0.5%	100% (365)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	36.4%	62.9%	0.8%	100% (428)
HK$ 60,000 or above	33.8%	64.8%	1.4%	100% (473)
Stance towards the movement*				
Support	40.4%	58.3%	1.3%	100% (1,251)
Half-half	10.1%	89.9%	0.0%	100% (359)
Oppose	0.9%	98.9%	0.3%	100% (362)

Notes
1. * Chi-Square test indicates a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the response to the question and the demographic attributes.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ Refuse to answer" are excluded.

Table 42. Have you done any of the following things during the anti-extradition bill movement? 'Provided assistance to protesters, such as donating money or resources, or offering free rides, etc."

	Yes	No	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
Overall	32.5%	66.3%	1.3%	100% (2,008)
Gender				
Male	34.0%	64.3%	1.8%	100% (950)
Female	31.1%	68.1%	0.8%	100% (1,058)
Age*				
15 – 29	52.5%	44.8%	2.6%	100% (376)
30 – 39	41.6%	57.2%	1.2%	100% (319)
40 – 49	30.4%	68.0%	1.6%	100% (337)
50 – 59	28.6%	70.7%	0.7%	100% (388)
60 or above	18.6%	80.9%	0.5%	100% (579)
Education*				
Secondary (Form 3) or below	19.4%	79.6%	1.0%	100% (671)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	32.2%	67.2%	0.7%	100% (640)
Tertiary	45.5%	52.3%	2.1%	100% (684)
Occupation*				
Managers and administrators	41.9%	56.8%	1.3%	100% (271)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	46.8%	51.4%	1.8%	100% (256)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	32.0%	67.7%	0.3%	100% (529)
Students	48.5%	48.5%	3.0%	100% (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	21.3%	77.8%	0.9%	100% (740)
Political orientation*				
Localists	57.1%	41.3%	1.6%	100% (233)
Pan-democrats	47.4%	51.6%	1.0%	100% (906)
Pro-establishment	1.1%	98.9%	0.0%	100% (108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	10.3%	88.6%	1.1%	100% (701)
Monthly family income*				
HK$ 14,999 or below	11.9%	87.4%	0.7%	100% (297)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	25.9%	74.1%	0.0%	100% (239)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	31.4%	68.1%	0.5%	100% (365)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	40.0%	58.5%	1.5%	100% (428)
HK$ 60,000 or above	47.6%	51.1%	1.3%	100% (473)
Stance towards the movement*				
Support	49.3%	49.0%	1.7%	100% (1,251)
Half-half	8.1%	91.2%	0.8%	100% (359)
Oppose	1.0%	99.0%	0.0%	100% (362)

Notes
1. * Chi-Square test indicates a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the response to the question and the demographic attributes.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ Refuse to answer" are excluded.

Table 43. What are the main reasons for your participation in these activities?

	Strive to get the government to meet the demands	Express dissatisfaction with the government's handling of the Fugitive Offenders Bill controversies	Express dissatisfaction with overall governance	Express dissatisfaction with the police's handling of the protests	Raise international attention	Support young protesters	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	(Sample size)
Overall	39.2%	40.0%	39.4%	34.6%	14.7%	38.4%	0.2%	(1056)
Gender								
Male	34.8%	38.2%	40.8%	33.4%	13.0%	33.5%	0.2%	(530)
Female	43.8%	41.9%	38.0%	35.8%	16.4%	43.4%	0.3%	(526)
Age								
15 – 29	46.3%	40.9%	32.2%	44.3%	18.4%	34.3%	0.3%	(300)
30 – 39	42.4%	42.3%	39.0%	34.1%	17.9%	45.9%	0.0%	(198)
40 – 49	37.6%	47.7%	50.6%	33.0%	10.2%	38.9%	0.0%	(167)
50 – 59	37.4%	41.6%	39.4%	34.5%	12.6%	38.9%	0.5%	(205)
60 or above	27.6%	27.0%	41.2%	20.9%	11.4%	36.1%	0.4%	(185)
Education								
Secondary (Form 3) or below	26.1%	32.8%	38.1%	27.4%	8.6%	33.0%	0.0%	(248)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	37.2%	35.8%	39.5%	30.4%	14.9%	36.5%	0.5%	(347)
Tertiary	47.9%	47.4%	40.4%	41.6%	18.0%	42.8%	0.2%	(455)
Occupation								
Managers and administrators	40.8%	44.4%	46.0%	41.1%	15.5%	46.2%	0.5%	(163)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	45.1%	46.4%	40.0%	40.8%	15.9%	45.7%	0.0%	(181)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	32.3%	39.9%	39.2%	30.3%	12.8%	33.5%	0.3%	(295)
Students	55.2%	43.2%	33.3%	49.2%	23.6%	27.9%	0.7%	(121)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	33.9%	31.1%	37.2%	23.9%	11.8%	39.4%	0.0%	(265)
Political orientation								
Localists	44.6%	35.5%	33.7%	39.7%	17.8%	41.8%	0.0%	(190)
Pan-democrats	39.6%	42.4%	39.4%	35.2%	15.5%	40.8%	0.1%	(661)
Pro-establishment	56.0%	18.8%	42.5%	8.6%	8.6%	8.6%	0.0%	(7)

Centrist/ no political orientation	32.5%	37.4%	44.3%	26.1%	8.4%	27.8%	1.0%	(170)
Monthly family income								
HK$ 14,999 or below	34.9%	37.3%	21.5%	21.9%	14.4%	26.5%	0.0%	(69)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	33.6%	41.2%	38.4%	32.2%	13.5%	34.5%	0.0%	(109)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	41.8%	35.1%	39.8%	31.1%	18.1%	38.3%	0.4%	(195)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	37.1%	44.3%	42.2%	33.7%	12.5%	34.0%	0.3%	(287)
HK$ 60,000 or above	42.1%	39.1%	40.8%	40.7%	14.2%	45.2%	0.0%	(310)
Stance towards the movement								
Support	41.3%	39.8%	39.1%	37.3%	15.7%	41.6%	0.0%	(937)
Half-half	20.8%	44.3%	40.4%	14.8%	7.1%	13.6%	0.8%	(93)
Oppose	29.8%	27.3%	51.6%	5.7%	5.7%	5.7%	8.2%	(21)

Notes
1. □ Chi-Square test indicates a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the response to the question and the demographic attributes.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered “Other” and “Don’t know/ refuse to answer” are excluded.

Table 44. Participation in at least one of the pro-government/ pro-police activities

	Yes	No	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
Overall	3.3%	96.3%	0.4%	100% (2,008)
Gender				
Male	4.0%	95.4%	0.7%	100% (950)
Female	2.7%	97.1%	0.1%	100% (1,058)
Age*				
15 – 29	1.8%	97.0%	1.2%	100% (376)
30 – 39	1.8%	97.8%	0.4%	100% (319)
40 – 49	4.7%	94.7%	0.6%	100% (337)
50 – 59	3.8%	96.2%	0.0%	100% (388)
60 or above	4.0%	96.0%	0.0%	100% (579)
Education				
Secondary (Form 3) or below	2.7%	97.3%	0.0%	100% (671)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	3.3%	96.3%	0.5%	100% (640)
Tertiary	4.0%	95.3%	0.7%	100% (684)
Occupation*				
Managers and administrators	6.7%	92.4%	0.9%	100% (271)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	2.0%	97.4%	0.6%	100% (256)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	3.0%	97.0%	0.0%	100% (529)
Students	0.9%	97.6%	1.5%	100% (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	3.1%	96.8%	0.1%	100% (740)
Political orientation*				
Localists	1.7%	97.2%	1.1%	100% (233)
Pan-democrats	1.0%	99.0%	0.1%	100% (906)
Pro-establishment	23.4%	76.6%	0.0%	100% (108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	4.0%	95.7%	0.2%	100% (701)
Monthly family income				
HK$ 14,999 or below	3.7%	96.1%	0.3%	100% (297)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	3.6%	96.4%	0.0%	100% (239)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	3.2%	96.3%	0.5%	100% (365)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	2.7%	96.9%	0.4%	100% (428)
HK$ 60,000 or above	4.1%	95.5%	0.4%	100% (473)
Stance towards the movement*				
Support	0.8%	98.6%	0.6%	100% (1,251)
Half-half	1.0%	99.0%	0.0%	100% (359)
Oppose	14.4%	85.6%	0.0%	100% (362)

Notes
1. * Chi-Square test indicates a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the response to the question and the demographic attributes.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ Refuse to answer" are excluded.

Table 45. On the other hand, have you done the following things? 'Participated in pro-Fugitive Offenders Bill/ pro-police protests or rallies'

	Yes	No	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
Overall	2.3%	97.4%	0.3%	100% (2,008)
Gender				
Male	2.6%	96.8%	0.6%	100% (950)
Female	2.0%	97.9%	0.1%	100% (1,058)
Age*				
15 – 29	0.6%	98.5%	1.0%	100% (376)
30 – 39	0.9%	98.7%	0.4%	100% (319)
40 – 49	3.6%	95.7%	0.6%	100% (337)
50 – 59	2.8%	97.2%	0.0%	100% (388)
60 or above	3.1%	96.9%	0.0%	100% (579)
Education				
Secondary (Form 3) or below	2.0%	98.0%	0.0%	100% (671)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	2.5%	97.2%	0.3%	100% (640)
Tertiary	2.4%	96.9%	0.7%	100% (684)
Occupation*				
Managers and administrators	4.4%	94.7%	0.9%	100% (271)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	1.0%	98.4%	0.6%	100% (256)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	2.4%	97.6%	0.0%	100% (529)
Students	0.4%	98.7%	0.9%	100% (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	2.2%	97.7%	0.1%	100% (740)
Political orientation*				
Localists	0.3%	99.1%	0.7%	100% (233)
Pan-democrats	0.4%	99.5%	0.1%	100% (906)
Pro-establishment	20.1%	79.9%	0.0%	100% (108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	2.8%	97.0%	0.2%	100% (701)
Monthly family income				
HK$ 14,999 or below	2.4%	97.3%	0.3%	100% (297)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	3.6%	96.4%	0.0%	100% (239)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	2.2%	97.3%	0.5%	100% (365)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	1.9%	97.7%	0.4%	100% (428)
HK$ 60,000 or above	2.5%	97.1%	0.4%	100% (473)
Stance towards the movement*				
Support	0.0%	99.5%	0.5%	100% (1,251)
Half-half	0.5%	99.5%	0.0%	100% (359)
Oppose	11.9%	88.1%	0.0%	100% (362)

Notes
1. * Chi-Square test indicates a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the response to the question and the demographic attributes.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ Refuse to answer" are excluded.

Table 46. On the other hand, have you done the following things? 'Expressed appreciation to police officers for their service, such as donating money or sending them fruit baskets and other gifts, etc.'

	Yes	No	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
Overall	0.6%	99.2%	0.2%	100% (2,008)
Gender				
Male	0.7%	99.1%	0.2%	100% (950)
Female	0.6%	99.3%	0.1%	100% (1,058)
Age*				
15 – 29	0.4%	98.6%	1.0%	100% (376)
30 – 39	0.5%	99.5%	0.0%	100% (319)
40 – 49	0.7%	99.3%	0.0%	100% (337)
50 – 59	0.7%	99.3%	0.0%	100% (388)
60 or above	0.8%	99.2%	0.0%	100% (579)
Education				
Secondary (Form 3) or below	0.3%	99.7%	0.0%	100% (671)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	0.5%	99.4%	0.1%	100% (640)
Tertiary	1.1%	98.5%	0.4%	100% (684)
Occupation*				
Managers and administrators	1.5%	98.5%	0.0%	100% (271)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	0.2%	99.5%	0.3%	100% (256)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	0.4%	99.6%	0.0%	100% (529)
Students	0.4%	98.1%	1.5%	100% (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	0.6%	99.3%	0.1%	100% (740)
Political orientation*				
Localists	0.0%	99.3%	0.7%	100% (233)
Pan-democrats	0.2%	99.8%	0.1%	100% (906)
Pro-establishment	4.5%	95.5%	0.0%	100% (108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	0.9%	99.1%	0.0%	100% (701)
Monthly family income				
HK$ 14,999 or below	0.6%	99.2%	0.3%	100% (297)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	0.6%	99.4%	0.0%	100% (239)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	0.5%	99.3%	0.2%	100% (365)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	0.3%	99.5%	0.2%	100% (428)
HK$ 60,000 or above	0.9%	99.0%	0.2%	100% (473)
Stance towards the movement*				
Support	0.0%	99.8%	0.2%	100% (1,251)
Half-half	0.6%	99.4%	0.0%	100% (359)
Oppose	2.7%	97.3%	0.0%	100% (362)

Notes
1. * Chi-Square test indicates a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the response to the question and the demographic attributes.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ Refuse to answer" are excluded.

Table 47. On the other hand, have you done the following things? 'Participated in verbal or physical conflicts with protesters'

	Yes	No	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total (Sample size)
Overall	0.8%	99.1%	0.1%	100% (2,008)
Gender				
Male	1.0%	98.9%	0.1%	100% (950)
Female	0.5%	99.3%	0.1%	100% (1,058)
Age				
15 – 29	1.2%	98.0%	0.8%	100% (376)
30 – 39	0.7%	99.3%	0.0%	100% (319)
40 – 49	0.6%	99.4%	0.0%	100% (337)
50 – 59	0.5%	99.5%	0.0%	100% (388)
60 or above	0.8%	99.2%	0.0%	100% (579)
Education				
Secondary (Form 3) or below	0.4%	99.6%	0.0%	100% (671)
Secondary (Form 4-7)	0.6%	99.4%	0.0%	100% (640)
Tertiary	1.3%	98.3%	0.4%	100% (684)
Occupation				
Managers and administrators	1.4%	98.6%	0.0%	100% (271)
Professionals/ Associate professionals	0.8%	98.9%	0.3%	100% (256)
Clerks/ Service workers/ blue-collar workers	0.7%	99.3%	0.0%	100% (529)
Students	0.5%	98.6%	0.9%	100% (149)
Not in workforce (i.e., unemployed, homemakers, retirees)	0.6%	99.3%	0.1%	100% (740)
Political orientation*				
Localists	1.5%	98.2%	0.3%	100% (233)
Pan-democrats	0.5%	99.5%	0.1%	100% (906)
Pro-establishment	3.2%	96.8%	0.0%	100% (108)
Centrist/ no political orientation	0.6%	99.4%	0.0%	100% (701)
Monthly family income				
HK$ 14,999 or below	1.2%	98.5%	0.3%	100% (297)
HK$ 15,000 – 24,999	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	100% (239)
HK$ 25,000 – 39,999	0.5%	99.4%	0.2%	100% (365)
HK$ 40,000 – 59,999	0.7%	99.2%	0.2%	100% (428)
HK$ 60,000 or above	1.3%	98.5%	0.2%	100% (473)
Stance towards the movement				
Support	0.7%	99.1%	0.2%	100% (1,251)
Half-half	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	100% (359)
Oppose	1.7%	98.3%	0.0%	100% (362)

Notes
1. * Chi-Square test indicates a significant relationship exists at 95% confidence level between the response to the question and the demographic attributes.
2. Figures on demographic attributes, those who answered "Other" and "Don't know/ Refuse to answer" are excluded.